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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
This dissertation is composed of three essays which examine the impact of financial integration 
and trade liberalization. Chapter I investigates the effect of financial openness on labor share of 
income by using four measures of the labor share of income: one unadjusted and three adjusted 
measures of income share which account for earnings from the self-employed workers. The author 
also uses both measures of capital account openness: de jure and de facto indicators. The empirical 
work is applied for a panel dataset of 30 countries during the period of 1970 – 2013. Despite using 
different measurement methods of the labor share of income and financial openness, the results 
from all specifications support the hypothesis that financial integration leads to a decline in the 
labor share of income for the all countries sample.  
Chapter II examines the macro-economic performance of Vietnam through the six phases of Doi 
Moi reform, and analyzes the impact of external liberalization on economic growth, aggregate 
demand, employment and income distribution. The decomposition of aggregate demand suggests 
that private investment was the most important determinant of Vietnamese economic growth 
during the period of 1994 – 2011, while government expenditure has become more significant 
since 2005, and the external sector together with government expenditure are the important driving 
factors of Vietnamese economic growth since 2012. The decomposition of overall labor 
productivity highlighted the fact that sectoral productivity growth of the service sector plays an 
important role in the improvement of overall labor productivity in Vietnam.  
Chapter III aims to investigate the impacts of external liberalization on Vietnamese economic 
growth and industrial performance at both regional and provincial levels. To this end, the author 
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reviews regional and provincial economic and industrial performance in Vietnam during the period 
of vigorous reforms of the Doi Moi and external liberalization (1995-2015). The paper employs 
the fixed effect regression to test the relation of economic growth, industrial performance and trade 
liberalization at both regional and provincial levels. The estimation results suggest that FDI has 
positive and strongly significant impact on economic growth of five economic regions: The Red 
River Delta, Northern midlands and mountain areas, North Central area and Central Coastal area, 
South East and Mekong River Delta. The study suggests that FDI inflows and trade openness play 
very important role in accelerating economic growth and industrial performance at both the 
regional and provincial levels in Vietnam. Regions and provinces with better infrastructure seem 
to get more benefit from FDI and trade openness, which suggests that provincial authorities should 
invest in building new and more modern infrastructure and also formulating rules and regulations 
governing FDI inflows. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION ON THE LABOR SHARE OF 
INCOME: AN EMPIRICAL EVIDENT FROM A PANEL DATASET 
I. Introduction 
Financial integration, the phenomenon of rising cross-border financial flows, has been accelerating 
in the past three decades (Kose et al. 2007). Historically, financial integration activities grew in 
the late nineteenth century, until the outbreak of World War I. International capital movement had 
resumed after the World War II and we have seen a huge volume of capital flows between 
industrial countries and between developed and developing countries since 1960s. The 
international capital market has been growing rapidly since 1990s and plays a very important role 
in promoting the world economy (Obstfeld, 1998). 
Financial openness has been one of the most enduring concerns of international economists since 
the studies of Mc Kinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) on financial repression. Financial openness is 
seen to increase investment and promote economic growth and thereby reduce poverty level. They 
argued that developing country’s policies of financial repression, that restricted and controlled 
their financial markets, were the main reasons of the low economic growth rates during the 1950s 
and 1960s and suggested countries would benefit from adopting more open financial markets’ 
policies. In particular, financial integration or capital account openness and trade liberalization are 
considered to improve a country’s economic situation and increase living-standards. In theory, 
financial integration improves economic growth, financial development and institutional quality, 
and also helps reduce income inequality, poverty and unemployment rate. In addition, opening up 
to international financial markets, improves market efficiency and thereby lead to a better 
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allocation of investment (Fama, 1970). Financial integration is also supposed to boost the 
productivity of capital stock by supporting borrowing for entrepreneurs, creating new investment 
opportunities and promoting growth (Orgiazzi 2007). However, in empirical studies, there has 
been a long, contentious debate among economists on the real direct and indirect benefits of 
financial integration (Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2006). Since the 1970s, international economists have 
been developing theories and studies to measure the degree of financial integration as well as to 
elaborate the gains and costs of this phenomenon in different regions such as European countries, 
the United States, Asian countries. For example, Kose et al. (2003; 2007; 2009) provided evidence 
of a positive relation between financial capital openness and volatility. Recent studies have found 
evidence that financial liberalization has led to financial crises in emerging countries (Diwan, 
1999).  
However, we have not seen much literature on financial integration, which considers its impact on 
distribution, especially on the labor share of income. The conclusions about real impact of financial 
integration on the share of income going to workers, especially earnings of the self-employed 
workers, however, remain ambiguous1. In addition, studies on the labor share of income mostly 
focus on the income share of paid employees while ignoring the earnings of the self-employed. 
Therefore, the linkage of capital account openness and the labor share of income, which does 
account for the earnings of self-employment is still an open question. 
In this essay, I will review the literature on the impact of financial integration, while investigating 
its effects on labor share of income. The purpose of this essay is, first to survey studies on the 
impact of financial liberalization and compare the results in terms of variables, methodologies, 
                                                          
1
 The OECD classifies the employment into three categories: paid employment, unpaid employment and self-
employment. 
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data and samples while focusing on the labor share of income. Second, I construct an adjusted 
labor share of income for earnings from self-employed workers, and elaborate the relationship 
between the labor share of income and capital account openness by using all four measurements: 
the unadjusted and three adjusted measures of labor share of income. Different measures yield 
different trends and results. For completeness, I will also use both measurements of capital account 
openness: de jure and de facto measures. For de jure method, I employ Kaopen index which was 
constructed by Chinn and Ito (2007). For outcome-based method, I compute two indices which 
were constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The empirical work is applied for a panel 
dataset of 30 countries during 1970 – 20132, for which data is available.  
The theoretical and empirical framework draws on the study of Jayadev (2007) which supports the 
hypothesis that financial liberalization reduces the labor share of income through the labor 
bargaining power. However, income from self-employment accounts for a significant share of the 
income of the working population, in particular for developing countries. To get a better sense of 
the impact of financial liberalization on the share of income of labor (more broadly defined) would 
need to include the share of self-employed labor. In this essay, the author computes an adjusted 
index of the labor share of income (laborshare2), which accounts for the income going to the self-
employed workers. To test the hypothesis, that financial liberalization has a negative impact on 
this adjusted labor share, I employ a fixed effect model for all four indices of the labor share of 
income and both de jure and de facto indicators of capital account openness. The baseline model 
also controls for other important determinants of labor share of income such as trade openness, 
technological progress, unemployment rate. Despite using different measurement methods of the 
labor share of income and financial openness, the results from all specifications support the 
                                                          
2
 There are 15 developing and 15 developed countries in the sample 
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hypothesis that financial integration leads to a decline in the adjusted labor share of income for the 
all countries sample. There are also robust, negative and significant correlations between the labor 
share of income and capital account mobility for OLS estimations models. The positive and 
strongly significant effect of opening up financial markets on income share of self-employment 
and its negative effect on unemployment rate are robust to alternative specifications. Financial 
liberalization has positive impact on the labor share of income going to the self-employed. Despite 
this, the impact on the adjusted share of labor remains negative. Interestingly, the results still hold 
in both fixed effect and OLS regressions for developed countries but do not hold for developing 
countries when employing de facto measure of financial integration. The negative relation between 
financial openness and labor share of income is not evident when we focus solely on developing 
countries.   
The rest of my essay is organized as follows. Section II focuses on comparing and contrasting 
previous theoretical and empirical studies on the relation between financial integration and labor 
share of income. Section III presents the hypotheses and explains the data and empirical model 
while the results of the empirical framework are introduced and analyzed in section IV. Section V 
is dwells on presentation and analysis of the robustness checks and Section VI brings together 
some concluding remarks which contains the summary of theoretical framework and empirical 
results as well as some policy recommendations. 
II. Literature Review 
1. The Labor Share of Income and the Self-Employed 
Functional distribution of income as well as the labor share of income has been an enduring 
concern for the classical economists. The wage share governed by a historically and conventionally 
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determined subsistence wage in both Ricardo and Marx. Marx, in his later work, suggests that 
wage share is also driven by the relative bargaining power between capitalists and workers, that is 
itself determined by the pace of accumulation. In contrast to this approach, technology and 
preferences are the key determinants of the functional income distribution in the neoclassical 
theory, with the market determined equilibrium wage rate being set at the value of the marginal 
product of labor. Monopoly power and the pricing behavior of firms in monopolistic markets is 
the central key driving distribution between owners of capital and workers in Kaleckian theory of 
income distribution allowing from a bridge between the approach of the Classical economists and 
the Keynesian focus on effective demand3. 
The labor share of income is a measure of national income going to labor. “The labor share is the 
nominal wage bill over nominal output or nominal GDP” (Schneider, 2011). In other words, the 
labor share of income is the ratio of the total compensation paid to labor and the gross value added 
(Lee & Jayadev, 2003; Jayadev, 2007; Schneider, 2011). We term this definition as the unadjusted 
labor share index. However, this widely used definition is questioned by scholars since the 
compensation to employees is not clearly defined without including other worker’s benefits such 
as tips and commissions (Krueger, 1999). More important, the unadjusted labor share of income 
does not account for the income of the self-employed either, which is prevalent in areas such as 
agriculture, construction, restaurants, hotels, retail and certain business services (Freeman, 2011). 
These earnings of self-employed, that constitutes a significant share of general labor’s income has 
been ignored in empirical studies of the impact of liberalization on the labor share of income. 
                                                          
3
 The author synthesized from four studies of Kaldor (1955); Stockhammer (2009); Schneider (2011); Dunhaupt 
(2013). 
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The OECD classifies employment into three categories: paid employment, unpaid employment 
and self-employment. Self-employed workers are individuals who perform some work in order to 
earn family income, in cash or in kind (Le, 1999). Self-employment is defined as the employment 
of employers, workers who work for themselves, members of producers' co-operatives, and unpaid 
family workers measured as the percentage of employment4. Diez and Ozdagli (2011) measure 
self-employment as the share of employers or own account workers in the total labor workforce. 
The European System of Accounts (ESA) defines the “self-employed as persons who own sole or 
joint businesses of the unincorporated enterprises in which they work, with the exception of those 
unincorporated enterprises classified as quasi-corporations”. Similarly, Parker (2004) defines self-
employed as individuals who earn no wage or salary but generate their income by implementing 
their profession or entrepreneurship on their own account. ILO on the International Classification 
of Status in Employment ICSE-1993 classifies employment into six main types: employees; 
employers; own-account workers; members of producers’ cooperatives; contributing family 
workers and workers not classifiable by status. The four last types in the category are aggregated 
to be self-employed workers5. Studies also link to entrepreneurship and informal sector activities 
while analyzing the idea of self-emloyment. For instance, Acs et al. (2008); Glaeser & Kerr (2009); 
Goetz & Shrestha (2009), Goetz & Runpasingha (2013) and OECD6 considers self-employment 
as a proxy for the level of entrepreneurial activities or as the simplest kind of entrepreneurship 
                                                          
4
 Self-employment’s definition by OECD 
 
5
 Source: Table 2.D – ILO Yearbooks of Labor Statistics on Total Employment by Status in Employment. The paper 
employs ILO definition to construct an indicator of the labor share of income which adjusted for earnings from self-
employed. 
 
6
 The definition is available on OECD’s website. 
 7 
 
(Blanchflower, 2000). Heid (2015) defines informality as self-employed workers, or employees 
who do not sign a written labor contract.  
Self-employment can also be viewed as a way out of poverty, unemployment and disadvantageous 
situations (Moore, 1983; Popli, 2016). Social economic programs do not focus on self-
employment, which is not covered by the minimum wage regulation and the social security system 
such as family health care, work accidents and illnesses (Sammaniego, 1998). 
The self-employed account for one-third of the labor force in developing countries such as in 
Mexico (Popli, 2016), and about 10 percent in developed countries like the United Kingdom and 
the United States (Blanchflower, 2000). The share of self-employed in total employment tends to 
be between 10 and 14 percentage points of the total workforce in advanced countries and this 
percentage might be much higher in developing countries (Hurt, Li and Pugsley, 2010). Therefore, 
their earnings do really matter to the national income share of total labor force.  
Adjustments for self-employed income are important for the analysis of the national income share 
of labor. Based on sector, sex, age and education, Young (1995) imputed wages to the self-
employed in Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong and the corresponding results are 0.404, 
0.680 and 0.628 respectively. Krueger (1999) estimates the raw labor share of national income 
using Current Population Surveys (CPS) data to construct an adjusted labor share of income and 
shows that the ratio of incorporated to unincorporated self-employed workers and business owners 
increased from 28 percent in 1979 to 41 percent in 1997. After imputing the labor income of the 
self-employed in the United States, Freeman (2011) observed a 2.5 percentage point rise in labor 
share of income at the total economy level. The labor share’s adjustments of Gollin (2002) hover 
between 60 percent and 85 percent of GDP, leading him to suggest that estimates of factor share 
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that do not account for self-employed income will be seriously flawed, especially in developing 
countries.  
In view of these trends and developments of the labor share of income and the self-employed, it is 
clear that the income of self-employed plays a crucial role in the share of total national income 
going to labor. Hence it is very important for scholars to construct an index of the labor share 
which is adjusted for the income from self-employed labor, especially for the sectors with a higher 
rate of self-employment such as agriculture in developing countries. This index then becomes the 
basis of the investigation of the impact of financial integration on labor share of income.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of financial liberalization by including the 
earnings of self-employed while investigating the core determinants and mechanisms driving the 
income share going to labor during financial integration. The question of the precise impact of 
liberalization on the share of the self-employed has received less attention in the literature.  
2. The Declining Trend of Labor Share of Income 
The different approaches to the labor share of income have been reviewed in the previous section. 
There have been empirical studies of both neoclassical and heterodox economists to analyze the 
correlation between the income going to labor in the economy and other macro and micro 
economics factors such as growth or inequality (Krueger, 1999). Empirical studies show that the 
shares of labor and capital in national income vary both over time and across countries. Kaldor’s 
stylized fact about constant labor share over time seems to have less validity in the recent decades.  
There has been a declining trend of the labor share of income in the past three decades. Blanchard 
(1998), Krueger (1999), Diwan (1999), Lee &Jayadev (2004), Guscina (2006), Jaumotte & Tytell 
(2007), Jayadev (2007), Rodriguez & Jayadev (2010), Guerriero & Sen (2012), Maarek (2012), 
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Dunhaupt (2013), and ILO, IMF, OECD & WB (2015) show a reduction on the national income 
share of labor. Krueger (1999) found an increasing trend of the labor share from the end of World 
War II until the early 1970s, but after reaching a highest level in the mid-1970s, the labor share 
declined by almost 3 percent. Diwan (1999) found that the labor share of income in the research 
dropped from an average of 54.5 percent of GDP in 1975 to 49.3 percent in 1995. Using two 
different databases, the UN National Account Data and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) of industrial survey in the manufacturing sector, Rodriguez & Jayadev 
(2010) also show a decline of the national income share going to labor starting from 1980. In 
addition, Guscina (2006) examined the labor share in national income in 18 OECD countries 
during the period 1960-2000 and concluded that before mid-1980s technological progress was 
labor-augmenting, and therefore productivity growth increased labor share. However, after 1985 
productivity gains have boosted profits because technological progress is capital-augmenting. The 
declining trend of the labor share of income also happens in most advanced countries (Jaumotte & 
Tytell, 2007). Thus Hung & Hammette (2014) found a decline in the labor share of US national 
income as well. What lies behind the declining trend of the labor share of income all over the 
world? Does the rising trend of self-employment matter? Globalization which includes both trade 
liberalization, financial integration and technological progress have been ascribed important role 
in the decline. 
2.1.Trade Openness 
Heckscher-Ohlin’s general equilibrium model of trade between two countries with two factors of 
production and two goods suggests that countries should focus on area of comparative advantage. 
In particular, countries will export goods whose production is intensive in the factor they are 
abundantly endowed. The model indicates that an increase in the exports will lead to an upward 
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trend in the real returns to the factor used in the production of the exported goods and a decline in 
the returns to the other factor. Hence, factor-abundant countries would gain from international 
trade, while factor-scarce countries would lose (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). The Northern 
developed countries concentrate on capital intensive production and developing countries in the 
south focus on labor intensive production. Consequently, it is agreed that trade openness should 
benefit labor income, increasing employment and the labor share going to workers in developing 
countries, while the wage share of countries in the north decrease (Guerriero & Sen, 2012, 
Dunhaupt, 2012). Nevertheless, the Heckscher-Ohlin’ prediction only holds with assumptions 
such as full employment of resources; no barriers to trade; similar elastic demand as well as relative 
price; homogeneous trading goods and perfect substitutibility with identical technologies of 
production and constant return to scale (Bhagwati, 1994). 
Recent studies show results that diverge from the Heckscher-Ohlin model. For example, Ortega 
and Rodriguez (1999), Harrison (2002), and Guscina (2006), Reddy and Dube (2016) suggest a 
negative correlation between trade integration and the labor share of income for all countries 
sample in both developing and developed countries. Similarly, Stockhammer (2103) found that 
globalization had the same effect on the wage share in developing and developed economies. 
Ghose (2003) also shows that the growth of international trade has a small benefit for workers. 
Both IMF (2007) and the European Commission (2007) confirm the similar results but they argued 
that the impact is negative for medium skilled workers and it had no significant effect for low and 
high-skilled workers’ incomes. Rodrik (1997) and Slaughter (1999) provided an explanation for 
the decline in the labor share of income, in term of declining bargaining power since trade 
liberalization makes the demand for workers more elastic and labor becomes easier to substitute. 
Moreover, it is easier for capital to travel across economies to place with the cheapest labor. 
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Workers are forced to accept lower wages in the face of the threat of capital and their declining 
bargaining power. In particular, trade liberalization enlarges the “reserve army of unemployed” 
low paid workers in developing countries which leads to a lower bargaining power of unskilled 
labors as well. As argued by Pollin (2000), at any time, employers can threaten workers by moving 
to low-wage countries. Consequently, there will be a decline in the labor share of income.  
In contrast, Rana (2001), Guerriero & Sen (2012) and Dunhaupt (2013) support a positive 
correlation of trade liberalization and the national income share of labors. Rana (2001) claimed 
that trade liberalization has a weak impact on employment and wage in her study of 48 developing 
countries and the effect is greater in countries with relatively flexible labor markets. Dunhaupt 
(2013) explained that due to trade liberalization, price competition increase and it can have a 
negative impact on the mark-up and he predicts a positive correlation between trade openness and 
the labor share of income. He also suggests that prices of raw materials and semi-finished goods 
can affect the labor share of income. If the prices of semi-finished products are cheaper, the labor 
share of income increases. Similarly, there is a positive and significant correlation of trade 
liberalization and the labor share of income in the study of Guerriero and Sen (2012). 
Almost all studies support a positive relationship between trade openness and self-employment as 
well as their income share7. Trade liberalization generates a higher level of competition for 
domestic firms and leads to an increase in the informal sector since workers in the formal sector 
are laid off to lower the labor costs and improve efficiency. Moreover, self-employed workers do 
not benefit from trade liberalization while the formal sector’s workers may gain (Carr & Chen, 
2004). Particularly, Samaniego (1998) suggests that trade openness generated more than two thirds 
                                                          
7
 They are the studies of Samaniego, 1998; Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2003; Carr & Chen, 2004; Marjit & Maiti, 2005; 
Bosch et al., 2012; Arias et al., 2013; Popli, 2016; Liang & Goetz, 2016. 
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of the urban self-employed workers in Mexico. Bosh et al. (2010) find that one percentage point 
increase in trade liberalization results in roughly one percentage point of the increase in informality 
in Brazilian metropolitan labor markets in the period 1982-2002. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) 
find that reducing tariff leads to an increase in informal employment in the industries with the 
largest tariff cuts before the labor market reforms, yet they find no relationship between trade 
openness and informality for Brazil. Liang and Goetz (2016) study the moderating effects of 
entrepreneurship, measured using self-employment rates, on the impact of trade penetration for 
Chinese economy. Their empirical results indicate that opening up to trade internationally, leads 
to an increase in the self-employment rate and the marginal impacts of Chinese import penetration 
on unemployment are weakened in areas with higher self-employment rates. Popli (2016) show 
that trade liberalization process resulted in an increase in inequality and poverty among self-
employed workers in Mexico over the last two decades, since trade openness raised relative 
demand for and returns to skilled labor who are mostly working in the formal sector and led to an 
increased gap between the rates and the income of self-employment and formal workers. In sum, 
scholars who suggest the positive correlation between trade liberalization, and self-employment, 
document that trade openness generates a higher level of competition in domestic markets. Formal 
workers are laid off to reduce costs will choose to be self-employed workers to remain their 
household incomes. In addition, to compete with foreign producers, domestic producers will seek 
to utilize informal labor inputs, which are much cheaper. Consequently, the higher demand for 
informal inputs and the reduction of formal workers lead to an increase in self-employment and in 
the income share of the self-employed.  
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There is also evidence that trade liberalization is negatively correlated to self-employment8. Diez 
and Ozadagli (2011) employ the dataset of self-employment in the manufacturing sector and tariff 
levels for 32 countries and the European Union for 2016 and find that trade liberalization is 
associated with a decrease in self-employment rate; the more openness to international trade leads 
to the lower rates of self-employment; higher trade costs in both home and foreign countries leads 
to a decline in self-employment rate. They further suggest that the increased rate of exporting firms 
will result in a lower self-employment rate. Arguing that trade openness is associated with an 
increase in the productivity of the tradable sector, Fugazza and Fiess (2010) concluded that 
informal employment would decrease with deeper trade liberalization while informal output 
increase with trade liberalization. Interestingly, Aleman-Castilla (2006) links trade liberalization 
to lower trade costs and argues that the formal sector will gain more benefits than the informal 
sector and suggests that with trade liberalization, there is a reallocation from informal to formal 
sectors to take advantage of lower trade costs. Heid (2015)’s study of the relationship of regional 
trade agreement and informal self-employment indicates that these regional trade agreements 
result in 20.3 percentage points decrease in informal employment and decreased unemployment 
rate by 1.2 percentage points. Overall, trade liberalization seems to drive self-employment 
negatively as well. 
Hence, trade liberalization has a significant impact on the labor income share as well as on the 
self-employed and their earnings. However, the results of empirical studies indicate ambiguous 
effects. In this paper, we include trade openness as one of the control variables. The variable is 
measured normally by the ratio between the sum of import and export values and GDP. 
                                                          
8
 The negative effect of trade liberalization on self-employment can be found from studies of Aleman-Castilla, 2006; 
Fugazza & Fiess, 2011; Diez & Ozdagli, 2011; Heid, 2015. 
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2.2.Technological Progress 
Theoretically, international trade and capital flows combined with technological change generate 
more opportunities for multinational companies to invest in foreign locations with lower cost of 
production. Therefore, domestic workers are easily substituted by foreign workers with a negative 
effect on domestic labor. 
Extensive studies have been trying to investigate the roles of technological change and trade on 
the overall labor share of income. Among them, Harrigan (1998) finds that skilled-biased 
technological change plays a more important role in wage inequality than trade while the labor 
share of income has been equally driven by technological change and trade liberalization in the 
studies of Feenstra (2004, 2007) and Guscina (2006). Similar to the results of Harrigan (1998), 
Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) show that technological change in the information and communication 
sectors has had a bigger impact on the labor share in unskilled sectors compared to globalization 
because of the fact that computers and other information communication technologies are a 
substitute for unskilled labor and supplement skilled labor and therefore lead to a decrease in the 
labor share of unskilled workers. Technological progress also leads to the increasing use of 
technology favoring skilled workers. Consequently, the share of low-skilled workers decreases, 
while the share of high-skilled workers increases (Arpaia et al., 2009). Lawless and Whelan (2011) 
suggest the same correlation between technological change and the recent decline of the labor 
share of income because of the substitution between new technologies and unskilled workers. 
Changes in employment levels are necessary to adapt to the new technology. Moreover, 
technological progress leads to a displacement of workers so that capitalists are in a much stronger 
bargaining position relative to labor leading to a decline in their income share. 
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The recent capital-augmenting trend is regarded as the main reason for the decline in the labor 
share of income. Danhaupt (2013) shows that the labor share of income increased during the 1960s 
and 1970s since technological change in these times was labor-augmenting and boosted the 
effectiveness of labor inputs and the share of labor. Guerriero and Sen (2012) believe that since 
the mid-1980s, technological progress has become capital-augmenting. This type of technological 
progress lead to an increase in the stock of computing capital and leading to the decline in the labor 
share of income (Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003; Gucina, 2006; Ellis & Smith, 2007; Jayadev, 2007; 
Lawless & Whelan, 2011; Guerriero and Sen, 2012).  
In a different direction, Guerriero and Sen (2012) argued that innovation as another form of 
technological progress improves productivity and boosts competition in the product markets. Thus, 
innovation might lead to positive effects on employment and the labor market and an increase in 
the overall economy’s income and in the income share going to labor. In sum, their study suggests 
that technological innovation is a positive and significant driver of the labor share of income. 
Similarly, Stockhammer (2013) provides evidence that the effect of technological progress is 
asymmetric with positive effects on the labor share in developing countries but negative impacts 
in advanced countries.  
In the context of self-employment, technological change is formal-sector-augmenting since 
investment and skilled labor are more available in the formal sector than the informal sector. 
Technological change increases the demand for workers in the formal sector and therefore leads 
to a wider wage gap between formal and informal workers (Munro, 2011). This rising demand for 
formal sector skilled labor could result in a decline in income share and employment level in the 
informal and self-employed sectors. 
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All in all, we have seen both positive and negative effects of technological change on the labor 
share of income as well as self-employment and their earnings. 
2.3.The Impacts of Capital Account Openness on the Labor Share of Income  
Recently, the role of financial markets has been highlighted as a potential cause of rising inequality 
and declining labor share (ILO, IMF, OECD & WB, 2015). While numerous studies have analyzed 
the determinants of the share of labor in relation to the share of capitalists as well as the recent 
declining trend of the labor share of income, only few have linked it to financial liberalization 
which is arguably one of the most significant changes in the international economy over the last 
three decades (Jayadev, 2007). In addition, the analysis has mainly concentrated on personal 
income distribution and wage inequality while very limited numbers of studies have explored the 
effect of capital account openness on the labor share of income. Moreover, these studies on the 
correlation between capital account liberalization and the labor share of income, point to 
ambiguous findings with some yielding a positive impact and others a negative impact. One issue 
that needs to be clarified is what drives these different results? Do the use of different databases 
matter? To what extent, and how is the long-term decline in the labor shares of income related to 
capital account openness?  
Mezetti & Dinopolous (1991), Bughin & Vannini (1995), Crotty & Epstein (1996), Zhao (1998), 
Choi (2001), Harison (2002), Lee & Jayadev (2003), Jayadev (2007), Orgiazzi (2007), Dunhaupt 
(2013) have investigated the impacts of capital account openness on the labor share of income. 
Few studies suggest that in the period of higher capital mobility and relative immobile labor, the 
employees’ power on the bargaining game of income distribution is loosened by the development 
of capital. For example, Mezetti & Dinopoulos (1991) and Jayadev (2007) seek to explain a 
negative correlation between financial account mobility and the national income share going to 
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labor by exploring a model in which, due to capital mobility, a decrease in bargaining powers of 
labor leads to a decline in the income share going to worker. Similarly, Rodrik (1997) argued that 
globalization has had two effects on labor markets: the demand for low-skilled labor in advanced 
industrial countries declines and employers will look for cheaper labor abroad by relocating their 
production abroad. He argued that the strategic bargaining game between capital and labor 
ameliorates the fallback option of capital. Specifically, the relocation of capital production abroad 
leads to a reduction of labor bargaining power and a decline in their share of income. Harrison 
(2002) utilized a model of a bargaining game, between labor and capital over excess rents in 
production, to show that in the context of imperfect competition, the share of excess rents going 
to labor falls along with the fixed costs of reallocation abroad for firms. The change in factor shares 
are related to changes in capital/labor ratios. She further found that exchange rate crises lead to a 
decline in the wage share. Additionally, Lee & Jayadev (2003) predicted that financial 
liberalization might worsen the income distribution and the income share of workers. Examining 
an unbalanced panel dataset regression across countries, they show negative effects of financial 
liberalization on the labor share of income in both developed and developing countries, in the 
period 1973-1995. However, this effect is independent from the negative impact of financial crises. 
Developing this idea, Jayadev (2007), by using panel regression model to estimate the correlation 
of an unadjusted labor share of income and the level of financial openness, finds a robust negative 
impact for the group of developed and middle-income countries, however this negative effect does 
not hold for the poorest countries. Jayadev argues that financial openness has increased the 
bargaining power of capital, and therefore increased capital flows, and rents accruing to capital. 
Hence, financial integration may reduce the income share of labor at the firm and consequently at 
macroeconomic level. Most recently, Dunhaupt (2013) using a time series cross-section database 
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of 13 countries over the period from 1986 until 2007 estimated the correlation of the adjusted labor 
share of income and increasing dividend and interest payment of non-financial corporations, which 
suggests that the decline of the labor income share is driven by increasing dividend and interest 
payments of non-financial corporations. 
In contrast, Orgiazzi (2007) investigates cyclical instability in a small open economy and find that 
financial liberalization increases the capital stock and the labor share of income and therefore 
reduces profits. More critically, capital account mobility leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and an increase in the income share going to workers, which reduces profitability 
and triggers the financial crisis. In aftermath of the financial crisis a reduction in the labor share of 
income is seen. This argument is quite consistent with the evidence provided by Diwan (1999) 
who believed that a country’ financial structure and the openness of its trade and capital account 
are driving the declining labor share of income during the crisis. Using data for the last decade of 
the 20th century, the study found that the labor share increased before a financial crisis and declined 
sharply by an average of 6.13 percentage points during the crisis, but only recovers partially in the 
following years in most countries of the sample. Interestingly, in his study on the medium-term 
behavior of the labor share, Diwan (2000) argued that labor in poorer countries get more benefits 
with a higher degree of international trade and a more open capital account while the reverse holds 
for richer countries.  
Similar to other measurements of capital account openness, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has 
a possibly contradictory effect on the labor share of income. It has a positive impact due to spillover 
effects and a negative impact due to the weakening bargaining power of labor and depreciating 
exchange rates (Giovannoni, 2014). Since the bargaining power of workers can also be affected 
by FDI, it might influence income share going to labor. Using a Nash bargaining model of labor-
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management negotiations at the industry level, Zhao (1998) shows that FDI reduces employment 
in the organized sector and the competitive wage in the unorganised sector if there is more concern 
about employment than wages or even equal concern about both in the union. Kristal (2010) and 
Harrison (2002) showed a statistically negative correlation between FDI inflows and the labor 
share of income. Alderson and Nielsen (2002) argue that multinational companies in developed 
countries move their production to low-cost countries leading to a job reduction in those developed 
countries and an increase in capital’s bargaining power. Therefore, the compensation to workers 
declines for all country samples. Guerriero and Sen (2012) also stated that FDI inflows seem to be 
a negative driver of the labor share of output.  
In sum, the relationship between international capital flows and the national income share of labor 
has been largely inconclusive (see Table I.1). Scholars who support a positive correlation between 
capital openness and labor share of income argue that capital account liberalization leads to a rise 
in the capital-labor ratio, resulting in an increase in labor share if there is imperfect substitutability 
or complementarity between capital and labor. However, the employees’ bargaining power is 
reduced by labor substituting technology and leads to a decline in the labor share of income. There 
are also studies that find an ambiguous relation between financial openness and labor share of 
income but argue that capital account openness may lead to instability and crisis. However, the 
effect of these downturns on labor share of income depends on the bargaining power of labor in 
this period. In the context of crisis, the labor share increased before a financial crisis and decline 
sharply during the crisis, but it only recovers partially in the following period. Thus, the effects of 
capital account openness on labor share of income might be ambiguous.  
So what factors lie behind the different conclusions about the correlation between the share of 
labor income and financial openness in recent studies? The most plausible answer is the different 
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measures of capital account openness as well as the country samples and databases (Lee & 
Jayadev, 2003). In this paper, I use both de-jure and de-facto measures of KA openness to assess 
how the measure capital account openness affects the results. 
Financial openness would also tend to drive self-employment positively. Capital account openness 
leads to an inflow of foreign capital and a weakening of labor regulations to attract foreign capital. 
Migration from rural areas, and the expansion of the informal labor force further weakens the 
bargaining power of workers. The consequent rise in unemployment as formal employment 
opportunities are squeezed, results in an increase in self-employment as a survival strategy in the 
absence of employment. Thus, financial liberalization could lead to rise in self-employment. But 
this increase in self-employment is a direct response to the squeeze of formal employment 
opportunities.  
In this paper, I construct an adjusted labor share of income which accounts for the income going 
to self-employed workers. I also utilize two other adjusted indices of the labor share of income 
that were constructed in previous studies. Along with three indicators of adjusted labor share of 
income, the widely used unadjusted labor share of income is also considered to test for the linkage 
between the labor share of income and financial openness. The measurement of financial openness 
does matter for the different results in the literature. Hence, I also employ two different 
measurements of capital account openness, both de jure and de facto indicators. 
 21 
 
Table I. 1. The Correlation between Financial Openness and the Labor Share of Income: Empirical Frameworks 
 
Signs Explanations Authors Variables Data and Samples Conclusions 
Positive 
Capital account liberalization 
lead to a rise in the capital-
labor ratio then results in an 
increase in labor share if 
complemetnarity between 
capital and labor is assumed 
Orgiazzi 
(2007)  
Capital 
accumulation and 
the labor share 
A calibration model 
Financial liberalization leads to an increase in 
the capital stock and the labor share of income 
and therefore reduce profits 
Capital account mobility leads to appreciation 
of the real exchange rate and an increase in 
the income share going to workers, which 
reduces profitability and triggers the financial 
crisis 
Negative 
The labors’ power in a 
bargaining game of income 
distribution is weakened by 
the development of capital 
reducing the labor share of 
income 
Lee & 
Jayadev 
(2003) 
Compensation of 
Employees/GDP 
and Lee-Jayadev 
capital account 
openness index 
Pool OLS regression on un 
balanced panel of countries 
The measure of the labor 
share is derived from the 
United Nations’ system of 
national accounts, Table 
103  
Liberalization is associated with a decreased 
share of income going to labor, even when 
controlling for its effects on factor shares 
Jayadev 
(2007) 
 Compensation of 
Employees/GDP 
and Lee-Jayadev 
capital account 
openness index 
 A panel data from the 
United Nations National 
Accounts Statistics 
Database for 80 countries 
during 1970-2001 
A robust negative correlation between capitl 
account openness and the labor share, this 
effect is not present for low income countries 
 22 
 
Dunhaupt 
(2013) 
  Ajusted wage share 
and Net dividend 
payments, Net 
interest payments 
and Net dividend + 
Net Interest 
Payments 
A time series cross-section 
database of 13 countries 
over the period from 1986 
until 2007 
Data source: AMECO and 
OECD Main Aggregates 
and Detailed Tables. 
The decline of the labor income share is 
driven by increasing dividend and interest 
payments of non-financial corporation 
Rising import prices had a negative impact on 
labor share 
An increase in overhead obligations in the 
form of rising interest and dividend payments 
was passed on to wages, resulting in a rising 
mark-up and causing the share of labor 
income to decline 
Ambiguous 
Capital account liberalization 
may lead to instability and 
crisis. However, the 
downturns’ effects on labor 
share of income depend on 
the defensive power of labor 
in this period. For example, 
the labor share increased 
before a financial crisis and 
decline sharply during the 
crisis, but it only recovers 
partially in the following 
period. Then the effects of 
capital account openness on 
labor share of income might 
be ambiguous switching 
between positive or negative 
Diwan 
(1999)  
Compensations of 
employees/GDP and 
a dummy for the 
financial crises; a 
dummy for the 
downward sloping 
interval of the labor 
share during the 
distributional crisis; 
a dummy for the 
upward sloping 
interval of the labor 
share during the 
distributional crisis 
and the GDP per 
capita 
 
An international panel-data 
for labor share of 135 
countries between 1975 and 
1995  
The labor share increased before a financial 
crisis and decline sharply by an average of 
6.13 percent during the crisis, but it only 
recovers partially in most countries of the 
sample 
Source: Author’s compilation
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III. Hypotheses, Data and Empirical Model  
1. The Measurements of Financial Openness 
Capital account mobility or financial openness has been increasing across countries since 1970. 
The direct and indirect costs and benefits of this phenomenon have been subject to debate. The 
most important reason for these problems is the measurement method of financial account 
mobility. There are a few different measures of financial openness. They are de facto, de jure or 
hybrid methods (Quinn et al., 2011). Other scholars term them as rule based and outcome based 
methods. Most of recognized methods are based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restriction (AREAER). I synthesize some available measurements 
of financial openness that have been constructed by economists as follows: 
1.1.Rule Based Indexes 
The most popular de jure or rule based index - KAOPEN - was constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002, 
2007, 2008). They created an index to measure the extent and intensity of capital controls based 
on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulations of restrictions on cross-border financial 
transaction reported in AREAER (Chinn and Ito, 2007). The index is available for 181 countries 
over the period of 1970-2013. The advantages of KAOPEN index are that it is constructed in a 
relatively transparent way and is updated annually. It is also available for a wide range of countries, 
which is not common for other capital account openness indices. However, as being a rule-based 
index, Kaopen does not reflect the real capital account openness situation for each country as well 
as a de facto measurement. 
Alesina et al (1994), Rodrik (1998), Kelin and Olivei (1999), Edwards (2001), O’ Donnell (2001), 
Chanda (2001) also construct their financial openness indices based on a dummy variable from the 
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annual report of IMF (AREAER). However, the drawbacks of their indices are that they are too 
general and cannot capture the intensity and changes of controls well (Lee, 2004).  
Also based on the IMF’ annual report (AREARE), Quinn (1992, 1997) and Quinn and Toyoda 
(2007, 2008) created two indicators, which called “capital” (measures capital account openness) 
and “fin_current” (measures financial current account). The index is a composite measure of 
financial regulation that ranges from 0 to 14, with the number 14 representing for the least 
regulated and most open system. The data covers for 122 countries for the period of 1949 to 2007 
in 6 categories: Payment for imports, receipts from imports, payment for invisibles, receipts from 
invisibles, capital flows by residents and capital flows by nonresidents. Quinn’ index has been 
used and redeveloped by numerous scholars such as Jayadev (2007). 
Bekaert et al (2005) created a binary index for 95 countries from 1980 to 2006 based on Bekaert 
and Harvey’s paper in 2005 named “A Chronology of Important Financial Economic and Political 
Events in Emerging Markets”. They set the index a value of “1” for the year after financial 
liberalization and “0” for those before liberalization. However, as argued by Quinn et al. (2011), 
this measure cannot express fully for the level of capital account openness and it considers every 
country in the same two levels. 
1.2.Outcome Based Indexes9 
The most common quantity-based or outcome-based indices are two indicators that were 
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006, 2007). By investigating trends in net and gross 
external positions, and the composition of international portfolio, they constructed two indices 
                                                          
9
 Other de facto (or outcome based) measures: the uncovered or real interest rate parity by Cheung, et al (2003); 
international arbitrage pricing model or capital asset pricing model by De Gregorio (1998); the size of gross capital 
flows as the degree of capital account openness by IMF (2001). 
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which express the level of capital account openness. FO1 (financial openness) index is a result of 
the sum of country’s aggregate stocks of external assets and liabilities which divided by gross 
domestic product. The second index is based on equity instruments. FO2 index is a result of the 
sum of foreign portfolio equity assets, foreign portfolio equity liabilities, FDI assets and FDI 
liabilities. Their method is simply using the real flows as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for 
financial account openness.  
Total assets Total liabilities1
GDP (US$)FO
+=
 
Portfolio equity assets (stock) Portfolio equity liabilities (stock) FDI assets (stock) FDI liabilities (stock)2
GDP (US$)FO
+ + +=
 
The data for portfolio equity assets and liabilities, FDI assets and liabilities, total assets and total 
liabilities are collected from the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). The study covers data for the period 1970-2011 and for 188 countries and the 
European countries.  It also reports the split between "portfolio investment: debt securities" and 
"other investment" for both the category "external debt assets" and the category "external debt 
liabilities". The measures are based on the volumes of capital flows and regarded as a “volume-
based measure of international financial integration”. 
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Table I. 2. Summary Statistics of Capital Account Openness 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Kaopen_index 1300 .7213327 1.585167 -1.888895 2.389668 
FO1 1239 2.147645 3.675047 .0974888 33.06178 
FO2 1223 .7095132 1.461576 .0048034 15.51488 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In this paper, to test for the hypotheses that the higher level of financial openness would be 
associated with a lower labor share of income. I use both de jure and de facto measurements of 
capital account openness. For the rule based index, I compute Kaopen index which was constructed 
by Chin and Ito and updated to 2013. The data is available on their page at 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm.  For the de facto index, I employ both indicators 
(FO1 and FO2) which were constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006, 2007) updated until 
2013. FO1 and FO2 dataset is also available on their page at http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html. 
Table I.2 is the summary statistics of the three measurements of capital account openness. The 
trend of capital account openness since 1970 to 2013 is depicted in Figure I.1. It seems that capital 
account openness degrees have been increasing in the past three decades and decreasing 
temporarily after the 2008 crisis, but resuming the upward trend from 2009.  
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Figure I. 1. The Trend of Capital Account Openness over Time 
Source: Author’s calculations 
2. The Measurements of The Labor Share of Income 
Studies on the effects of financial account mobility on labor share of income suggest different 
results. The most important reasons for those mixed results are the different methods of measuring 
the labor share of income. The labor share of income is traditionally computed by dividing total 
compensation of employees by national income. Compensation of employees is also commonly 
used as a measure of labor income. One enduring concern among economists is that compensation 
of employees omits the earnings of people who are self-employed workers. Thus, a more careful 
measure of the labor share of income is a very important task. In this section, I introduce four 
measurements of labor share of income, one unadjusted and three adjusted indicators. 
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2.1.Laborhare1 
We have seen a declining trend of the labor share of income since 1970 in Figure I.2 in which the 
labor share of income is the ratio of compensation paid to employees and national gross value 
added or GDP. This method has been used by numerous economists on the studies of labor share 
of income (Jayadev, 2004, 2007). Since this measure does not account for the income of the self-
employed, scholars termed this method as “the unadjusted labor share of income”.  
_1
_ _
Compen employeesLaborshare
Gross value added
=
 
The “unadjusted index” underestimates the labor share of income, since the earning of the self-
employed workers is not included and are often treated incorrectly as capital incomes. However, 
the self-employed workers account for huge portion of the workforce in some countries, especially 
in developing countries where self-employment and the people working in family enterprises are 
predominant in rural areas. Gollin (2002) argued that agriculture is dominated by the self-
employed and small family business, thus it has very low-income share of labor10. Some of their 
incomes are reported, other private farmers’ incomes are not. In some cases, owners of private 
companies are also employees. Self-employed are not only agricultural workers and small 
entrepreneurs, but also marginal employment and disguised unemployment (Gollin, 2002 and 
Guerriero, 2012). Hence, the categorization of the income going to capital and the one really going 
to labor is a very crucial issue.  
                                                          
10
 For example, in Vietnam, labors in agriculture account for almost 44 percent of total workforces as reported by 
Vietnamese Labor Ministry Report in 2015. 
 29 
 
 
Figure I. 2. The Labor Share of Income over Time: Unadjusted Laborshare1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
2.2.Laborshare2 
In this paper, I construct an adjusted labor share of income (laborshare2. This index is based on 
the previous adjusted index which was constructed by the OECD (Freeman, 2011, page 10) as 
follows: 
_ ( _ )
_ _
Compen employees Employees Self employed
Employees
Laborshare
Gross value added
+
=
∑ ∑∑
  
The equation is mostly used for imputing the labor share of the self-employed by assuming that 
the self-employed workers earn the same average income as employees, either at the total economy 
or industry level. Hence, we can adjust for the self-employed by multiplying compensation of 
employees by the ratio of total employment to total employees. The adjustment can be applied if 
we have information of total employment as well as total self-employed. Let’s expand the above 
adjustment equation as follows: 
.
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_ * _ * _
_ _
Compen employees Employees Compen employees Self employed
Employees
Laborshare
Gross value added
+
=
∑ ∑∑
 
_ * _ * _
_ _
Compen employees Employees Compen employees Self employed
Employees Employees
Laborshare
Gross value added
+
⇒ =
∑ ∑∑ ∑
 
_ * _
_
_ _
Compen employees Self employed
Compen employees
Employees
Laborshare
Gross value added
+
⇒ =
∑∑
 
We can get the labor share of income if we have the data of compensation to employees, the 
number of the self-employed and gross value added. However, information on self-employed 
workers is not always available. Moreover, the preferred quantitative measure for total 
employment and total employees is hours worked. However, hours worked data are also not always 
available. We therefore use the headcount measure instead. 
As the classification of ILO on the International Classification of Status in Employment ICSE-
1993 (Table 2.D – ILO Yearbooks of Labor Statistics on Total Employment by Status in 
Employment), there are six main types of employment, which included employees, employers and 
four other types of self-employed which are own-account workers, members of producers’ 
cooperatives, contributing family workers and workers not classifiable by status. Hence, to get the 
information of the self-employed, I collected the data for total workforce, number of employees 
and number of employers for 30 countries of my sample from 1970-2013. The number of the self-
employed workers is obtained by subtracting the number of total workforces by the number of 
employees and employers as follows: 
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_ _Self employed Total workforces Employees Employers= − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   
Once we get the number of the self-employed, my adjusted index of labor share of income is the 
following: 
_ *( _ )
_
2
_ _
Compen employees Total workforces Employees Employers
Compen employees
Employees
Laborshare
Gross value added
− −+
=
∑ ∑ ∑∑
 
This measure considers the compensation to employees is an average income that the self-
employed workers earn. The adjustment is also convenient because it relies upon readily available 
information on the composition of the labor force from ILO website and the compensation of 
employees (Freeman, 2011). Moreover, it takes into account the composition of the workforce in 
the different countries and in the different period of time. However, the assumption that the self-
employed earn the same average compensation as employees ignores differences between the 
pattern of employment across sector especially characteristics of self-employment and employees 
(Bagnoli, 2009).  
2.3.Laborshare3 
Another method is used by Gollins (2002) and Dunhupt (2013). They measure labor share of 
income as follows: 
_
* _
3
_ _
Compen employees Total workforces
Employees
Laborshare
Gross value added
=
∑∑
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_
3
_ _
_
Compen employees
Employees
Laborshare Gross value added
Total workforces
= ∑
∑
 
The total labor income is constructed by dividing the total compensation of employees by the 
number of employees, and then scaling this up for the total workforce by multiplying compensation 
of employees by the number of people in the workforce. Therefore, all types of workers who are 
not employees are assumed to receive the same average wages as the employees themselves 
(Gollins, 2002).  
The labor share of income (laborshare3) is compensation per employee as a share of GDP at factor 
costs per person employed. This indicator includes both the incomes going to employees and 
dependents or the self-employed workers. The advantage of this method is that it takes into account 
the composition of the workforce in the different countries and in the different time- periods. 
However, the drawback of this adjustment is that it requires detailed data on labor workforce. 
Further, this adjustment will create a bias if there are systematic differences between the earnings 
of employees and self-employed workers. 
2.4.Laborshare4 
The System of National Accounts, (SNA) has conventionally been a key source of data on the self-
employed worker’ earning. In every SNA (1993, 2010), compensation of employees has two 
components: wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind and the contribution of employers to 
social security programs. Mixed income or operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprise 
(OSPUE) contains the overall earnings by self-employed workers (Freeman, 2011). Some studies 
consider the income going to the self-employed workers from mixed income or reported operating 
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surplus of UN dataset. The most popular approach, which was first applied by Johnson (1954) then 
Krueger (1999) Guscina (2006) and Guerriero (2012), has been to impute two-thirds of the mixed 
income (the income of proprietors of unincorporated household enterprises) to labor and the 
residual to capital income. 
2
_ _
34
_ _
Compen employees Mixed income
Laborshare
Gross value added
+
=  
This measure seems to be a straightforward adjustment. The measurement is quite simple and 
transparent. It also makes sense that the operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprise 
(OSPUE) or mixed incomes include some labor income (2/3) as well as some capital income (1/3). 
However, this measure might overstate labor share of income. It may not be reasonable to apply 
this measure to countries with different economic level, size and structure. 
Table I. 3. Summary Statistics of the Labor Share of Income: All Countries 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
laborshare1 1043 .4663996 .0981549 .0965667 .6676182 
laborshare2 371 .5690633 .1036594 .3635663 .8882398 
laborshare3 450 .6114677 .0977591 .3844442 .9285442 
laborshare4 483 .5616569 .0752906 .3462425 .8654006 
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Table I. 4. Summary Statistics of the Labor Share of Income: Developing Countries 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
laborshare1 399 .3871602     .1021183    .0965667    .6676182 
laborshare2 173 .594237 .134347    .3635663 .8882398 
laborshare3 187 .6316367     .1366125    .3844442 .9285442 
laborshare4 113 .4840317     .1009661    .3462425 .8654006 
 
Table I. 5. Summary Statistics of the Labor Share of Income: Developed Countries 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
laborshare1 644 .5154935     .0533653     .348155    .6511235 
laborshare2 198 .547068     .0581386    .4258327    .6840641 
laborshare3 263 .597127     .0513017    .4481097    .7077723 
laborshare4 370 .5853641     .0436077    .4783311    .7240793 
Source: Author’s calculation11 
Table I.3 is the summary statistics for the labor share of income for the whole sample while Table 
I.4 and Table I.5 are the summary statistics for the labor share of income in developing and 
developed countries respectively which show that after adjustment for earnings of the self-
employed workers, the national labor share of income in developing countries is higher which 
suggests that adjustments of the earnings of the self-employed play a very important role in these 
countries.  
To test the hypotheses that postulated in the previous section, I use all four indicators of labor 
income share which are the unadjusted labor share (laborhsare1), the index constructed by me 
                                                          
11
 The data of compensation to employees and gross value added are from The Tables of United Nations National 
Account Statistics. The data of number of total workforces, employers and employees are from ILO. 
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(laborshare2), the one constructed by Gollin (2002) (laborhsare3) and the last one is laborshare4. 
For the robustness check, I use all four indicators as well. 
3. Control variables 
Capital account openness, trade liberalization and technological progress seem to be the most 
important mechanisms driving the declining trend of labor share of income in the past three 
decades. Economic development, government share of GDP, unemployment rate, the labor market 
regulations as well as the size of labor workforce, are equally regarded as other important 
determinants through which capital account openness affects the labor share of income which does 
account for earnings of the self-employed workers. 
3.1.Development 
The share of income going to labor may be driven by economic development, proxied by the 
growth rate of GDP or per capita GDP. On one hand, the labor share of income is believed to 
increase due to economic development since the demand for labor rises with the accumulation of 
capital (Jayadev, 2004, 2007; Ortega & Rodriguez, 2006). In particular, Kuznets (1955) and Kravis 
(1959) regarded the process of development and structural change as the main driving factors of 
the income share going to labor. Hasan (2001) argued that overall economic activities are 
positively correlated with labor demand in manufacturing sectors, leading to an increase in 
employment and wages. Recently, Maarek (2012) found evidence of a substantial and larger labor 
share of income in industrialized countries than in developing countries which indicates that the 
levels of economic development do really matter to the total income share of paid-employed. In 
contrast, a higher level of income per capita is negatively correlated with the rates of self-
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employment and earnings from self-employment since the share of paid employment is relatively 
high due to increases in labor demand (Goetz and Rupashingha, 2013).  
On the other hand, Harrison (2002) asserted that a higher relative GDP per capita would decrease 
labor’s bargaining power and lead to a decline in the labor share of income. Stockhammer (2013) 
found a statistically significant negative effect of real GDP growth on the adjusted wage share of 
the total economy, measured as the sum of the private and the government wage shares. Moreover, 
GDP per capita has a negative impact on the labor share at early stages of development but has a 
positive impact at later stage. The impact becomes less negative for lower-middle income countries 
and strongly positive for the upper-middle-income countries (Maark, 2012). 
In sum, we have seen both positive and negative effects of economic development on the labor 
share of income. The most wide-used proxy of economic development is GDP per capita. 
3.2.Government Share of GDP 
Government expenditure relative to GDP or government share of GDP has been used to proxy for 
government activities and intervention. Harrison (2002) argued that government spending relative 
to GDP means a higher and better government intervention in the economy. Therefore, an increase 
in the government expenditure leads to a better economic management of the government. 
However, government expenditure in the economy is constrained by financial integration hence 
we might expect to see a positive relationship between the government share of GDP and labor 
share of income in the context of financial liberalization. Jayadev (2007) found that larger 
government intervention measured by the government share of GDP and the budget deficit leads 
to positive and significant effects on the labor share of income. However, these effects are small, 
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a one percentage point increase in the government share of GDP as well as the budget deficit, 
result in a 0.01 percentage point increase in the labor share of income. 
3.3.Unemployment Rate 
The labor share of income is determined by the bargaining power of workers while unemployment 
rate is one of the most important driving factors of labor’s bargaining power as well as their income 
share. Hence studies on labor share of income should link to unemployment. There is an argument 
that if unemployment rate is relatively high, the bargaining power of labor and their wage shares 
are reduced. Moreover, the linkage of unemployment and self-employment becomes a key 
determinant in analyzing the trend of income share going to labor. On one hand, unemployment 
rate affects the propensity to be self-employed and on the other hand, self-employment is a strategy 
to reduce unemployment and poverty.  
Self-employment is regarded as a government policy to reduce unemployment rate. For instance, 
The New Enterprise Incentive Scheme which has provided training and income support to the 
unemployed who choose to be a self-employed worker in the future was introduced in Australia. 
The unemployed, in the United Kingdom and France, receive transfer payments from their 
government if they start their small businesses (Le, 1999; Blanchflower, 2000). In the context of 
trade liberalization, one can argue that due to higher levels of competition during globalization, to 
reduce costs and improve efficiencies, domestic firms seek to narrow their employment rates, 
leading to an increase in unemployment for the whole economy. The formal workers who are laid 
off, take resort to self-employment to maintain their household income (Carrasco, 1999; Le, 1999; 
Blanchflower, 2000). Scholars have found that the recent rise in self-employment rates are driven 
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by high levels of unemployment combined with some labor market programs (Millan et al., 2010; 
Goetz & Rupasingha, 2013). 
Overall, we expect a negative correlation between the labor share of income and unemployment 
rate. This paper uses the rate of unemployment as a control variable. 
3.4.Population 
Population is the other determinant of labor income share since the growth of population, 
especially the working-age population, is related to the size of labor workforce. There are two 
alternative explanations for the relationship between population and the labor share of income. 
One expected a positive effect might argue that an increase in the number of people in a country 
leads to an increase in the total workforces and therefore a higher rate of income share. On the 
other hand, an increase in population generates a higher rate of unemployment and results in a 
decrease in the labor share of income. This paper utilizes log population as a proxy for the size of 
labor workforce. 
3.5.Labor Market Regulations 
Labor market regulations are also considered to be a key determinant of the income share going to 
labor since it affects the bargaining power of workers. Union density and the index on rigidity of 
labor market have been used as proxies for labor market regulations. For example, Jaunmotte and 
Tytell (2007) found that countries that improved their market flexibility experienced a smaller 
decline in the labor share of income. Similarly, Hornstein et al, (2007) explored a model to explain 
why in a relatively rigid labor market such as Europe the labor share had fallen more sharply than 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia with a relatively flexible labor 
market. Fichtenbaum (2009) found a positive relationship between unionization and the labor share 
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of income in his study on the US manufacturing sector during 1949-2006. Similarly, Stockhammer 
(2009) documented positive and significant effects of union density (percentage of workers who 
belong to labor unions) on the labor share of income by the research covering 15 OECD countries 
from 1982 to 2003. Nevertheless, Guscina (2006) and Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) found an 
insignificant effect of union density and the labor share of income.  
Recent empirical studies also employ employment protection as a proxy for labor market 
regulation. In particular, the analysis of Ellis and Smith (2007) show that a higher degree in 
employment protection leads to a decline in the labor share going to workers while the relationship 
was positive in the study of Guscina (2006). Jaumotte and Tytel (2007) concluded that employment 
protections have had no significant effect on the labor share of income since the 1980s. 
Various proxies have been used in empirical analysis to measure labor market regulations. This 
paper uses lamrig index constructed by Campos and Nugent (2011) as a proxy for labor market 
regulations. This index is a de jure measure of the rigidity of employment laws, which based on 
comparisons of labor regulations and laws across countries and overtime. Lamrig index ranges 
from 0 to 3.5 and its higher value obtains more rigid employment protection regulations.  
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Table I. 6. Definitions of Control Variables 
 
 
Table I.6 presents the data sources of trade openness, technological progress and the other 
explanatory variables. Log per capita GDP is a proxy for economic development from Penn World 
Table 8.1. Trade openness is measured as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports and GDP. 
The data of trade openness index, government share of GDP and unemployment rate are from 
WDI.  
Patent_A (Total patent application per year), following (Guerriero and Sen, 2012), is used as a 
proxy for the technological progress. The total patent applications per year are calculated by the 
sum of total patent applications of countries’ residents and countries’ non – residents. Log 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Development GDP per capita Penn World Table 8.1 
Trade Openness Exports+imports/GDP WDI 
Government Share of 
GDP 
The government share of expenditures, as a 
percentage of GDP 
WDI 
Unemployment Rate Unemployed persons/Labor force WDI 
Population The working-age population (defined in this study 
as ages 16-60, in thousands) 
Penn World Table 8.1 
Technological Progress  Total of patent applications  WDI 
Labor Market 
Regulations 
Lamrig: A purely de jure index on the rigidity of 
employment regulations, 
Campos and Nugent (2011) 
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population is a proxy for the size of labor workforce. The data of total patent application and 
population are collected from Penn World Table 8.1 as well. For labor market regulations, I use 
lamrig index on the rigidity of employment regulations which was constructed by Campos and 
Nugent (2011). Lamrig is only available for each five-year period. Hence, to make them fit with 
my panel dataset, linear interpolation method is used to get annual dataset for every country in the 
sample. Table I.7 is the summary statistics for those above control variables. 
Table I. 7. Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LogGDPpcpt 1320 8.785112 1.462294 4.716616 26.00782 
SqrtlogGDPpcpt 1320 79.31487 28.76194 22.24647 676.4066 
Logpop16_60 1320 3.239044 1.446383 .5990447 7.217087 
Trade_Openness 1278 73.68582 72.46885 10.33744 458.3322 
Govshare 1283 15.70083 5.335895 2.975538 28.98661 
Unemrate 902 7.240133 4.206879 .7 25 
Patent_A 1104 35330.6 84423.47 0 652777 
Linear_lamrig 1319 1.493857 .5744067 0 3.5 
Source: Author’s calculation 
4. Hypotheses 
As described in the theoretical framework section, there are three hypothesized relationships 
between capital account openness and the labor share of income in which a negative effect is the 
most accepted one. I expect to see a negative relationship between the adjusted labor share of income 
and capital account openness. This paper tests the hypothesis that the higher degree of capital 
account openness would be associated with a decrease of the labor share of income. Moreover, I also 
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expect to see negative relationships between the labor share of income and other control variables 
such as trade openness, unemployment rate, the number of patent applications as well as the size of 
total labor workforce. Positive linkages between financial integration and economic development 
proxied by GDP per capita, education levels and the labor market regulations are postulated as well. 
Table I.8 describes the hypothesized relationship between the labor share of income and capital 
account openness and other control variables.  
Table I. 8. Hypothesized Effects on the Labor Share of Income 
Variables 
Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Comments 
Capital Account 
Openness 
+/- 
It would be a positive effect in developing countries and opposite effect 
in developed countries but a negative effect for the whole countries 
sample. 
Economic 
Development 
+/- 
Labor share increases due to the accumulation of capital leading to a 
positive effect 
A higher relative GDP per capita would decrease labor’ bargaining 
power and thereby leads to a negative effect. 
Trade Openness +/- 
International trade generates more opportunities to relocate the 
production to lower cost countries. Labor is substituted and its 
bargaining power falls, so that labor share decreases. 
Government Share of 
GDP 
+ 
An increase in government spending relative to GDP means a better 
government intervention in the economy and leads to a higher level of 
labor income share. 
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Unemployment Rate - 
A higher unemployment rate leads to a weaker bargaining power of 
labor and a decline in the labor share of income. 
Technological 
Progress (Proxied by 
Patent_A) 
+/- 
Due to capital-augmenting technological change, improved monitoring 
and weaker labor’s bargaining power, the labor share of income falls.  
Population +/- 
Increased higher population leads to an increase in labor workforce and 
higher income share but it also leads to a higher rate of unemployment 
and a decline in the labor share of income. 
Labor Market 
Regulations 
+/- 
A higher value of union density leads to a stronger bargaining power of 
labor and thereby an increase in labor’s earnings. However, a higher 
degree in employment protections leads to a decline in the labor share 
going to workers. 
 
5. Econometric Model 
We run few diagnostic tests to ensure the goodness of the estimated model, the Breusch-Pagn 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) for random effects and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. 
Both the null hypotheses were not rejected, suggesting that there is no evidence of significant 
differences across countries, therefore ordinary least square (OLS) estimates might be relevant. 
The Pasaran CD test was used to test whether the residuals are correlated across countries and the 
null hypothesis that residuals are not correlated was not rejected. The Pagan-Hall test was used to 
test for the presence of significant heteroskedasticity and the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity 
were rejected, suggesting that Driscoll and Kraay standard errors might be consistent for 
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estimations12. Next the author employed Hausman test to choose between fixed and random 
effects. The null hypothesis is that the preferred model is a random effects model was also rejected. 
Therefore, the fixed effects model was found to be more reliable. 
To test for the causality between labor share of income and capital openness, we lag both 
laborshare and FO by 3 years and 5 years then run regression of laborshare and lagged FO. We 
also run reverse regression of FO and lagged laborshare. The sign is significant only in the first 
regression then we know the causality runs in that direction, but not the other way. Then we can 
conclude that the causality is one directional in my model. 
The correlation matrix for all controls and dependent variables has not shown any coefficients 
which are greater than 50%. This result suggests that the control variables are not endogenous with 
my dependent variable (the labor share of income).  
In this paper, I use the model of fixed-effects (FE) regression in order to control for both cross-
country and temporal effects. The advantage of the fixed-effects model is that it can control for all 
time-invariant different countries. Moreover, the fixed-effect can reduce omitted variable bias due 
to time invariant characteristics (Torres-Reyna, 2007). In addition, panel data are more informative 
and efficient than pure time-series or pure cross-sectional datasets, and their econometric analysis 
better captures the complexity of economic behavior (Torres-Reyna, 2007). One drawback of the 
fixed-effects model is that it can only explain variations within a country and we may lose 
information from cross-country variations (Dunhaupt, 2013). 
                                                          
12
 Daniel, H: “Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional Dependence”, page 4. 
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In order to test the hypotheses postulated before, the unadjusted labor share of income and three 
adjusted indicators are estimated in levels in the following form:  
1 2 , 2 2 2 2..... .... ...it it k k it n n n t itLaborshare FO X E E T Tβ β β γ γ δ δ ε= + + + + + + +  
Where i and t designate country and time period respectively. The dependent variable is the labor 
share of incomes. FO is financial openness measured by both de jure and de facto method and they 
are the key explanatory variables. For the rule based index, I use Kaopen index as a measurement 
of capital account openness. For outcome based index, I use both FO1 and FO2 as the indicators 
for financial openness. 
,k itX represent the set of control variables. kβ are the coefficients for these 
independent variables. itε is the error term. nE  is the entity n. nγ  is the coefficient for the binary 
country regressors, while 
nδ is the coefficient for the binary time regressors. tT  is time as binary 
variables. 
This paper employs all four dependent variables which are laborhshare1, laborshare2, and 
laborshare3 and laborshare4 respectively. The baseline specification for the sample with all 
countries as follows: 
1 2 3 4 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 2 2 2 2
1 _ log log _
_ _ log _ ... ...n n t t it
Laborshare Kaopen index GDP sqrt GDP Trade Openness Govshare
Unemrate FDI in Patent A Pop Linear lamrig E E T T
β β β β β β
β β β β β γ γ δ δ ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + +
 
Where: laborshare1 is the unadjusted labor share of income, Kaopen_index is the de jure or rule-
based index of capital account openness, log GDP is a proxy for economic development and its 
squared value which has been used to consider the possibility of decreasing return (Guerriero and 
Sen, 2012).  
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Trade_Openness reflects degrees of trade liberalization, Govshare is government expenditure 
relative to GDP and proxied for government intervention of their economies, Unemrate is 
unemployment rate, Patent_A is the total number of patent application per year by both countries’ 
residents and countries’ non-residents. Logpop is a proxy for the size of total labor workforce and 
linear_lamrig is the linear values of labor market regulations. 
IV. Results 
1. Estimation Results for De Jure Measure 
The estimation results for the de jure index of capital account openness (Kaopen_index) are 
reported in Table I.9, Table I.10, Table I.11 and Table I.12 for four measures of labor income 
share: laborshare1, laborsahre2, laborshare3 and laborshare4 respectively. Each table includes nine 
columns. Column (1) considers the linkage of the dependent variables and financial openness level. 
Column (2) evaluates the partial impact of capital account openness on the labor share of income 
controlling for log GDP per capital and adding its squared value in Column (3) in order to consider 
the possibility of decreasing returns. I introduce trade openness, government share of GDP, 
unemployment rate, and the total number of patent applications in Column (4), (5), (6) and (7) 
respectively. Logpop as a proxy for the size of total labor workforce is added in Column (8). In 
Column (9), I introduce the full specification with the index of the rigidity of employment 
regulations (Linear_lamrig). 
The results are generally consistent with the hypothesized relationships introduced in Table I.8, in 
almost all specification. As hypothesized, Kaopen_index has a negative and strongly significant 
impact on the labor share of income for both unadjusted and adjusted indicators. The results are 
consistent with the postulated hypothesis that a higher degree of financial openness leads to a 
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decrease in the national income share of labor. For instance, Table I-9 displays a negative effect 
of capital account openness measured by Kaopen_index on the unadjusted labor share of income 
in all specifications, and statistically significant negative effect in Column (1)-(6). These results 
are consistent with Jayadev (2007) utilized a different de jure measure of capital account openness 
constructed by Quinn (2007). A one percent increase in the capital account openness degree is 
associated with a decrease of one percent in the unadjusted labor share of income (Table I-9, 
Column 2-5).  
A number of consistent results can also be seen in Table I.10, Table I.11 and Table I.12. The 
coefficient on Kaopen index is negative and significant across all specification of adjusted labor 
shares. A one percent increase in the degree of capital account openness leads to a decline of 
around one or two percent in the adjusted labor share of income, depending on the specification 
(Table I.10). 
The coefficient on GDP per capita proxied for economic development seems to be positive and 
strongly significant across almost all the specifications of Table I.9. The results are also consistent 
with the postulated hypothesis and the previous studies (Jayadev, 2007, Guerriero and Sen, 2012). 
The consistent results can be explained by the similar use of the de jure financial openness and the 
unadjusted labor income share’s measures. The full specification model (Column 9) in Table I.9 
generates the highest coefficient which suggests that a one percent increase in GDP per capita 
leads to an increase of 8.85 percent in the labor share of income. Nevertheless, there is a negative 
and strongly significant correlation between GDP per capita and the all three adjusted labor share 
of income in every specification from Table I.10 to Table I.11 (except Column 2, Table I.10). 
Different measures of labor share of income results in different correlations between the income 
share going to labor and GDP per capita. 
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Table I.9, Table I.10, Table I.11 and Table I.12 display a strongly significant and negative effect 
of trade openness measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports volumes and GDP in all 
four measurements of labor share of income in all specifications, though the effect is small. In 
general, a one percent increase in trade openness results in a 0.05 percent decrease in the labor 
share of income (Table I.10 and Table I.11). The results are consistent with many previous studies 
(Harrison, 2002; Jayadev, 2007; Jaumotte & Tytell, 2007; Stockhammer, 2013), however their 
coefficients are higher13 due to the different measures of trade liberalization. The negative effect 
is opposite to the positive result of Guerriero & Sen (2012). 
As hypothesized, the government share of expenditures, as a percentage of GDP has a positive and 
highly significant effect on the unadjusted and adjusted labor share in almost all specifications. 
The results suggest that one percent increase in government activities, proxied by government 
expenditures, is associated to an expansion of around 0.05 percent in the unadjusted labor share 
(laborshare1, Column 6-9, Table I.9). Hence, whenever the government increases their expenditure 
the income share going to workers will increase. My results are consistent in both sign and 
magnitute with Jayadev (2007) and Harrison (2002).  
As expected, the unemployment rate has negative and strongly significant effects on the labor 
share of income for all specifications (Table I.9 and Table I.12) in which the unadjusted labor share 
(laborshare1) and laborshare4 are the dependent variables. However, the effect is not big in size, 
a one percent increase in unemployment rate results in a 0.03 percent decline in the labor share of 
income. The results are associated with most of previous theoretical literature and empirical studies 
which indicated that the higher unemployment rate would be accompanied by a decrease in the 
                                                          
13For example, in the study of Javadev (2007), the estimation result show that one percentage point increase in trade 
openness is associated to a decrease of 2 percentage points in the labor share of income. 
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labor share of income. One reasonable explanation for this result is that higher unemployment rate 
weakens the labor’s bargaining power relative to employers and thereby it would be more difficult 
for workers to bargain a higher wage rate while still remaining their employment status. 
The increase of the numbers of total patent applications lead to a decrease in the labor share of 
income for both unadjusted and adjusted indicators. To put it differently, technological progress 
proxied by the number of total patent applications depress the labor income share. Since 1980s, 
the capital augmenting technological progress has caused a decline in the income share going to 
workers (Guerrieor & Sen, 2012, Dunhaupt, 2013). In my model, the numbers of total patent 
application have a negative and significant coefficient on the labor share of income which is in 
line with argument of Guerriero & Sen (2012) and Dunhaupt (2013) that the higher number of 
total patent applications leads to a substitution between labor and capital especially for unskilled 
labors. Consequently, the bargaining position of labor is weakened and leads to a decline in the 
labor share of income. 
The coefficient of the size of economy proxied by log population is negative in Table I.11 and I.12 
but is only significant in Table I.12 when we use laborshare4 as a measure of labor income share. 
However, I have seen positive but not significant coefficients on population when laborshare2 is 
the dependent variable.   
Finally, as expected, the labor market regulation proxied by the lamrig index has a positive effect 
on the adjusted labor share of income: laborshare2, laborshare3 and laborshare4. However, the 
coefficient is only significant for laborshare4. The results suggest that greater regulation of labor 
market might influence the labor share of income positively, due to an increase in labor’ bargaining 
power. The results are consistent with the study of Goetz and Rupashingha (2013) who show that 
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the greater regulation of labor markets is positively correlated to the rates of self-employment that 
might result in an increase in the labor share of income which does account for the earnings of the 
self-employed. However, the result is opposite but insignificant when the unadjusted labor share 
of income, which does not account for the earnings of the self-employed is the dependent variable. 
The ambiguous result reflects the debate on the effect of labor market regulation on the labor share 
of income. 
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Table I. 9. Results of Fixed Effect Regressions: Laborshare1, Kaopen Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 
Kaopen_index -0.00847*** -0.0116*** -0.0126*** -0.0128*** -0.0131*** -0.00602*** -0.00291* -0.00288* -0.00302* 
 (0.00119) (0.00139) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00152) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00163) 
logGDPpcpt  0.00583*** 0.0160*** 0.0205*** 0.0167*** -0.0206*** 0.0879*** 0.0894*** 0.0885*** 
  (0.00141) (0.00426) (0.00472) (0.00483) (0.00629) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0205) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   -0.000417** -0.000548*** -0.000440** 0.000708*** -0.00522*** -0.00523*** -0.00519*** 
   (0.000164) (0.000175) (0.000177) (0.000207) (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00109) 
Trade_Openness    -0.000124** -0.000114* -0.000121** -0.000102* -0.0000972* -9.47e-05 
    (5.97e-05) (5.94e-05) (5.54e-05) (5.67e-05) (5.76e-05) (5.78e-05) 
Govshare     0.00236*** 0.00536*** 0.00557*** 0.00554*** 0.00555*** 
     (0.000698) (0.000807) (0.000825) (0.000827) (0.000827) 
Unemrate      -0.00259*** -0.00292*** -0.00290*** -0.00290*** 
      (0.000518) (0.000522) (0.000524) (0.000524) 
Patent_A       -0.00000006** -0.00000006** -0.00000006** 
       (2.91e-08) (2.91e-08) (2.92e-08) 
Logpop16_60        -0.00995 -0.00892 
        (0.0194) (0.0195) 
Linear_lamrig         -0.00257 
         (0.00388) 
Constant 0.475*** 0.425*** 0.368*** 0.349*** 0.334*** 0.540*** 0.0480 0.0678 0.0727 
 (0.00172) (0.0123) (0.0255) (0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0387) (0.0964) (0.104) (0.104) 
Observations 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,031 1,031 795 709 709 709 
R-squared 0.048 0.064 0.070 0.074 0.085 0.114 0.128 0.128 0.129 
Number of 
Country_name1 
30 30 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 10. Results of Fixed Effect Regressions: Laborshare2, Kaopen Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 
Kaopen_index -0.0212*** -0.0232*** -0.0156*** -0.0144*** -0.0144*** -0.0144*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.00326) (0.00344) (0.00342) (0.00337) (0.00335) (0.00339) (0.00310) (0.00311) (0.00313) 
logGDPpcpt  0.00461* -0.113*** -0.0851*** -0.0867*** -0.107*** -0.382*** -0.387*** -0.393*** 
  (0.00258) (0.0174) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0212) (0.0631) (0.0635) (0.0635) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   0.00360*** 0.00276*** 0.00280*** 0.00340*** 0.0173*** 0.0174*** 0.0178*** 
   (0.000529) (0.000563) (0.000560) (0.000639) (0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00329) 
Trade_Openness    -0.000514*** -0.000510*** -0.000483*** -0.000449*** -0.000483*** -0.000472*** 
    (0.000128) (0.000128) (0.000128) (0.000106) (0.000118) (0.000117) 
Govshare     0.00406** 0.00469** 0.000682 0.000524 0.000618 
     (0.00190) (0.00206) (0.00187) (0.00189) (0.00188) 
Unemrate      -0.00161 0.000238 0.000263 0.000250 
      (0.00110) (0.000950) (0.000952) (0.000949) 
Patent_A       -0.00000035* -0.00000035* -0.0000004** 
       (2.00e-07) (2.00e-07) (2.02e-07) 
Logpop16_60        0.0401 0.0299 
        (0.0596) (0.0598) 
Linear_lamrig         0.0123 
         (0.00772) 
Constant 0.598*** 0.557*** 1.332*** 1.192*** 1.139*** 1.274*** 2.681*** 2.603*** 2.634*** 
 (0.00509) (0.0235) (0.116) (0.120) (0.122) (0.138) (0.304) (0.325) (0.325) 
Observations 371 371 371 370 370 366 309 309 309 
R-squared 0.109 0.118 0.222 0.257 0.267 0.280 0.436 0.437 0.442 
Number of 
Country_name1 
25 25 25 25 25 25 23 23 23 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 11. Results of Fixed Effect Regressions: Laborshare3, Kaopen Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 
Kaopen_index -0.0204*** -0.0218*** -0.0145*** -0.0130*** -0.0130*** -0.0134*** -0.0114*** -0.0113*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.00311) (0.00329) (0.00321) (0.00314) (0.00313) (0.00315) (0.00294) (0.00295) (0.00297) 
logGDPpcpt  0.00336 -0.111*** -0.0834*** -0.0881*** -0.0997*** -0.270*** -0.270*** -0.272*** 
  (0.00246) (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0177) (0.0571) (0.0572) (0.0572) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   0.00355*** 0.00271*** 0.00285*** 0.00320*** 0.0117*** 0.0118*** 0.0119*** 
   (0.000451) (0.000472) (0.000474) (0.000537) (0.00298) (0.00299) (0.00299) 
Trade_Openness   
 -0.000593*** -0.000581*** -0.000564*** -0.000569*** -0.000550*** -0.000543*** 
    (0.000119) (0.000119) (0.000119) (9.99e-05) (0.000111) (0.000111) 
Govshare     0.00324** 0.00356** 0.000806 0.000772 0.000826 
     (0.00150) (0.00164) (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00144) 
Unemrate      -0.000943 0.000408 0.000408 0.000378 
      (0.00100) (0.000884) (0.000885) (0.000886) 
Patent_A       -4.10e-09 1.97e-09 -2.33e-09 
       (6.48e-08) (6.67e-08) (6.68e-08) 
Logpop16_60        -0.0212 -0.0283 
        (0.0539) (0.0544) 
Linear_lamrig         0.00717 
         (0.00707) 
Constant 0.641*** 0.611*** 1.366*** 1.228*** 1.207*** 1.288*** 2.169*** 2.223*** 2.241*** 
 (0.00501) (0.0226) (0.0981) (0.0999) (0.0999) (0.113) (0.272) (0.306) (0.307) 
Observations 450 450 450 449 449 445 388 388 388 
R-squared 0.092 0.096 0.213 0.257 0.266 0.277 0.404 0.405 0.406 
Number of 
Country_name1 
28 28 28 28 28 28 26 26 26 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 12. Results of Fixed Effect Regressions: Laborshare4, Kaopen Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 
Kaopen_index -0.0258*** -0.0181*** -0.0175*** -0.0162*** -0.0163*** -0.0133*** -0.0111*** -0.0100*** -0.00957*** 
 (0.00202) (0.00219) (0.00223) (0.00218) (0.00219) (0.00257) (0.00269) (0.00268) (0.00268) 
logGDPpcpt  -0.0238*** -0.0831* -0.178*** -0.177*** -0.395*** -0.456*** -0.439*** -0.451*** 
  (0.00328) (0.0492) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0702) (0.0696) (0.0691) (0.0691) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   0.00305 0.00847*** 0.00839*** 0.0189*** 0.0221*** 0.0216*** 0.0222*** 
   (0.00253) (0.00282) (0.00283) (0.00358) (0.00357) (0.00353) (0.00353) 
Trade_Openness    -0.00116*** -0.00116*** -0.00146*** -0.00143*** -0.00126*** -0.00130*** 
    (0.000197) (0.000198) (0.000215) (0.000205) (0.000211) (0.000211) 
Govshare     0.000578 -0.000184 -7.15e-05 -0.000426 -0.000500 
     (0.00102) (0.00131) (0.00130) (0.00129) (0.00129) 
Unemrate      -0.00278*** -0.00255*** -0.00252*** -0.00259*** 
      (0.000931) (0.000934) (0.000924) (0.000921) 
Patent_A       -1.12e-08 3.67e-08 2.32e-08 
       (4.06e-08) (4.33e-08) (4.37e-08) 
Logpop16_60        -0.123*** -0.126*** 
        (0.0419) (0.0417) 
Linear_lamrig         0.0118* 
         (0.00613) 
Constant 0.598*** 0.816*** 1.100*** 1.568*** 1.555*** 2.722*** 3.015*** 3.330*** 3.389*** 
 (0.00326) (0.0303) (0.237) (0.264) (0.265) (0.349) (0.346) (0.359) (0.359) 
Observations 482 482 482 476 476 412 369 369 369 
R-squared 0.261 0.336 0.338 0.380 0.380 0.397 0.414 0.428 0.434 
Number of 
Country_name1 
19 19 19 19 19 19 17 17 17 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2. Estimation Results for De Facto Measures 
De facto measures of capital account openness are now preferred to de jure measures because they 
reflect actual volume of capital movement (Quinn et al, 2011). In this section, I introduce the 
estimation results of de facto measures of financial openness in Table I.13 – Table I.16 for FO1 
and Table I.17 – Table I.20 for FO2. The benchmark specification for each column is chosen by 
the results of pre-testing and extensive experimentation. I report here the most consistent and 
significant results.  
Interestingly, capital account openness, measured by both the sum of country’s aggregate external 
assets and liabilities as a ratio to gross domestic product (FO1) and the percentage of the sum of 
foreign portfolio equity assets, foreign portfolio equity liabilities, FDI assets and FDI liabilities 
relative to GDP (FO2), have a negative and statistically significant but not strong economic 
influence on the labor share of income. A one percent increase in the degree of FO1 is associated 
with a decline of 0.01 percent in the unadjusted labor share of income (Column 1-9, Table I.13), 
while a one percent increase in the degree of FO2 results in a decrease of 0.04 percent in the 
unadjusted labor share of income (Column 1-4, Table I.17) 
Similarly, when using de facto measures, GDP per capita has a positive but insignificant effect on 
the unadjusted labor share of income (laborshare1) but has a negative influence on the adjusted 
labor share of income. The alternative use of laborshare2, laborshare3 and laborshare4 as the 
dependent variables generates their positive and strongly significant on economic development 
proxied by GDP per capita for both de facto measures of financial openness: FO1 and FO2. The 
full specification’ results in Table I.14, Column (6) indicates that a one percentage point increases 
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in GDP per capita is associated to a decrease of 0.444 percentage point in the adjusted labor share 
of income (laborshare2).  
The correlations of trade openness and the labor share of income are negative and strongly 
significant in almost all specifications from Table I.13 to Table I.20. While the coefficient on 
unemployment rate is negative in all specification it is only significant when laborshare1 and 
laborshare4 are used as the dependent variables. The number of total patent applications are also 
negatively correlated to the labor share of income. However, the effect of government expenditure 
relative to GDP proxy for government activities is ambiguous depending on which measure is 
used. The effect is positive and significant for laborshare1 and laborshare4 but is negative and not 
significant when the dependent variables are laborshare2 and laborshare3 respectively. The effect 
of the size of total labor workforce and the flexibility of labor market is insignificant when FO1 
and FO2 are employed as the measure of capital account openness. 
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Table I. 13. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare1, FO1 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 
FO1 -0.00180*** -0.00201*** -0.00211*** -0.00202*** -0.00191*** -0.000824 -0.00126** -0.00127** 
  (0.000489) (0.000541) (0.000562) (0.000642) (0.000643) (0.000584) (0.000612) (0.000612) 
logGDP 
 
0.00123 0.00411 0.00491 0.00187 -0.00197 -0.00883** -0.00907** 
  
 
(0.00141) (0.00445) (0.00471) (0.00489) (0.00150) (0.00393) (0.00395) 
sqrtlogGDP 
  
-0.000118 -0.000143 -5.79e-05 
  
 
  
  
(0.000173) (0.000179) (0.000183) 
  
  
Trade_Openness 
   
-2.75e-05 -2.21e-05 -0.000200*** -7.89e-05 -7.61e-05 
  
   
(7.69e-05) (7.68e-05) (6.54e-05) (6.72e-05) (6.75e-05) 
Govshare 
    
0.00167** 0.00477*** 0.00509*** 0.00509*** 
  
    
(0.000752) (0.000843) (0.000862) (0.000862) 
Unemrate 
     
-0.00253*** -0.00307*** -0.00308*** 
  
     
(0.000538) (0.000550) (0.000551) 
Patent_A 
      
-4.46e-08 -4.29e-08 
  
      
(3.03e-08) (3.04e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
      
0.00162 0.00261 
       
(0.0207) (0.0208) 
Linear_lamrig 
       
-0.00225 
        
(0.00400) 
Constant 0.471*** 0.460*** 0.444*** 0.442*** 0.434*** 0.495*** 0.492*** 0.494*** 
  (0.00169) (0.0125) (0.0267) (0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0268) (0.0519) (0.0520) 
Observations 995 995 995 991 991 686 686 686 
R-squared 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 0.103 0.103 0.103 
Number of 
Country_name1 30 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 58 
 
 
Table I. 14. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare2, FO1 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 
FO1 -0.00287*** -0.00289*** 0.000536 -0.000625 -0.000780 -0.000862 
  (0.00100) (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00114) (0.00117) (0.00116) 
logGDPpcpt 
 
0.000197 -0.146*** -0.427*** -0.435*** -0.444*** 
  
 
(0.00260) (0.0185) (0.0711) (0.0725) (0.0722) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.00451*** 0.0192*** 0.0194*** 0.0200*** 
  
  
(0.000567) (0.00378) (0.00381) (0.00380) 
Trade_Openness 
  
 -0.000453*** -0.000479*** -0.000459*** 
  
  
 (0.000122) (0.000129) (0.000128) 
Govshare 
  
 0.00116 0.00102 0.00110 
  
  
 (0.00191) (0.00192) (0.00191) 
Unemrate 
  
 -0.000214 -0.000214 -0.000209 
  
  
 (0.000977) (0.000978) (0.000972) 
Patent_A 
  
 -2.98e-07 -3.00e-07 -3.77e-07* 
  
  
 (2.04e-07) (2.05e-07) (2.07e-07) 
Logpop16_60 
  
  0.0387 0.0271 
  
  
  (0.0623) (0.0622) 
Linear_lamrig 
  
   0.0162** 
  
  
   (0.00779) 
Constant 0.578*** 0.577*** 1.542*** 2.914*** 2.859*** 2.892*** 
  (0.00409) (0.0246) (0.123) (0.335) (0.347) (0.345) 
Observations 371 371 371 309 309 309 
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.146 0.411 0.411 0.420 
Number of 
Country_name1 25 25 25 
23 23 23 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table I. 15. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare3, FO1 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 
FO1 -0.00340*** -0.00337*** -8.87e-05 0.000108 0.000199 0.000159 
  (0.000928) (0.000945) (0.000954) (0.00108) (0.00110) (0.00110) 
logGDPpcpt 
 
-0.000349 -0.133*** -0.296*** -0.292*** -0.295*** 
  
 
(0.00245) (0.0157) (0.0644) (0.0649) (0.0648) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.00412*** 0.0126*** 0.0125*** 0.0127*** 
  
  
(0.000483) (0.00343) (0.00344) (0.00344) 
Trade_Openness 
   
-0.000613*** -0.000591*** -0.000577*** 
  
   
(0.000115) (0.000122) (0.000122) 
Govshare 
   
0.00103 0.000973 0.00104 
  
   
(0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00147) 
Unemrate 
   
0.000199 0.000213 0.000175 
  
   
(0.000912) (0.000914) (0.000912) 
Patent_A 
   
2.64e-08 3.57e-08 2.72e-08 
  
   
(6.64e-08) (6.87e-08) (6.88e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
   
 -0.0297 -0.0395 
  
   
 (0.0557) (0.0560) 
Linear_lamrig 
    
 0.0105 
  
    
 (0.00715) 
Constant 0.622*** 0.625*** 1.499*** 2.314*** 2.380*** 2.401*** 
  (0.00360) (0.0233) (0.105) (0.301) (0.326) (0.325) 
Observations 450 450 450 388 388 388 
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.174 0.379 0.380 0.384 
Number of 
Country_name1 28 28 28 26 26 
26 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 16. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare4, FO1 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 
FO1 -0.00886*** -0.000910 -0.00290* 0.00311* 0.00330* 0.00348* 
  (0.00122) (0.00145) (0.00171) (0.00185) (0.00182) (0.00181) 
logGDPpcpt 
 
-0.0363*** -0.173*** -0.449*** -0.420*** -0.427*** 
  
 
(0.00418) (0.0627) (0.0785) (0.0777) (0.0775) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.00731** 0.0210*** 0.0200*** 0.0204*** 
  
  
(0.00334) (0.00411) (0.00405) (0.00404) 
Trade_Openness 
   
-0.00183*** -0.00161*** -0.00164*** 
  
   
(0.000250) (0.000254) (0.000254) 
Govshare 
   
-0.000575 -0.00119 -0.00131 
  
   
(0.00144) (0.00143) (0.00142) 
Unemrate 
   
-0.00371*** -0.00343*** -0.00343*** 
  
   
(0.000915) (0.000904) (0.000900) 
Patent_A 
   
3.02e-08 8.85e-08* 7.27e-08 
  
   
(4.40e-08) (4.66e-08) (4.71e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
   
 -0.150*** -0.154*** 
  
   
 (0.0439) (0.0438) 
Linear_lamrig 
    
 0.0126** 
  
    
 (0.00636) 
Constant 0.581*** 0.913*** 1.552*** 3.064*** 3.409*** 3.450*** 
  (0.00317) (0.0383) (0.294) (0.381) (0.389) (0.388) 
Observations 457 457 457 356 356 356 
R-squared 0.108 0.239 0.248 0.388 0.409 0.416 
Number of 
Country_name1 19 19 19 
17 17 17 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 17. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare1, FO2 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare1 
FO2 -0.00402*** -0.00434*** -0.00452*** -0.00520*** 0.00253 0.00252 
 (0.00112) (0.00122) (0.00125) (0.00175) (0.00177) (0.00177) 
logGDPpcpt  0.000948 0.00329 0.00280 0.0932*** 0.0928*** 
  (0.00139) (0.00440) (0.00464) (0.0237) (0.0238) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   -9.62e-05 -7.94e-05 -0.00528*** -0.00526*** 
   (0.000172) (0.000179) (0.00127) (0.00127) 
Trade_Openness    5.00e-05 -0.000231*** -0.000230*** 
    (9.37e-05) (8.77e-05) (8.80e-05) 
Unemrate     -0.00145*** -0.00145*** 
     (0.000489) (0.000489) 
Patent_A     -6.51e-08** -6.46e-08** 
     (3.09e-08) (3.11e-08) 
Logpop16_60     -0.0193 -0.0190 
     (0.0211) (0.0211) 
Linear_lamrig      -0.000627 
      (0.00407) 
Constant 0.470*** 0.462*** 0.448*** 0.449*** 0.155 0.157 
 (0.00151) (0.0124) (0.0264) (0.0267) (0.112) (0.112) 
Observations 995 995 995 991 686 686 
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.075 0.075 
Number of 
Country_name1 
30 30 30 30 29 29 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes              Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 62 
 
Table I. 18. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare2, FO2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare2 
FO2 -0.00780*** -0.00784*** -0.000699 0.00967*** 0.00355 0.00304 
 (0.00239) (0.00242) (0.00242) (0.00302) (0.00272) (0.00274) 
logGDPpcpt  0.000254 -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.376*** -0.389*** 
  (0.00259) (0.0182) (0.0204) (0.0689) (0.0695) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   0.00433*** 0.00432*** 0.0164*** 0.0171*** 
   (0.000557) (0.000622) (0.00363) (0.00364) 
Trade_Openness    -0.000872*** -0.000610*** -0.000596*** 
    (0.000168) (0.000144) (0.000151) 
Govshare    0.00537** 0.00122 0.00119 
    (0.00208) (0.00190) (0.00191) 
Unemrate    -0.00184* -5.77e-05 -4.21e-05 
    (0.00111) (0.000965) (0.000962) 
Patent_A     -2.78e-07 -3.50e-07* 
     (2.03e-07) (2.06e-07) 
Logpop16_60      0.0109 
      (0.0610) 
Linear_lamrig      0.0154** 
      (0.00780) 
Constant 0.578*** 0.576*** 1.502*** 1.506*** 2.696*** 2.699*** 
 (0.00375) (0.0245) (0.121) (0.134) (0.326) (0.341) 
Observations 371 371 371 366 309 309 
R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.175 0.264 0.413 0.422 
Number of 
Country_name1 
25 25 25 25 23 23 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes            Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 19. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare3, FO2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare3 
FO2 -0.00979*** -0.00976*** -0.00283 0.00832*** 0.00388 0.00376 
 (0.00224) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00286) (0.00262) (0.00264) 
logGDPpcpt  -0.000187 -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.266*** -0.267*** 
  (0.00243) (0.0154) (0.0173) (0.0618) (0.0620) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   0.00392*** 0.00387*** 0.0109*** 0.0112*** 
   (0.000475) (0.000529) (0.00327) (0.00327) 
Trade_Openness    -0.000905*** -0.000742*** -0.000696*** 
    (0.000156) (0.000136) (0.000143) 
Govshare    0.00408** 0.00113 0.00113 
    (0.00166) (0.00146) (0.00146) 
Unemrate    -0.00100 0.000275 0.000243 
    (0.00102) (0.000900) (0.000900) 
Patent_A     3.40e-08 3.61e-08 
     (6.57e-08) (6.79e-08) 
Logpop16_60      -0.0439 
      (0.0553) 
Linear_lamrig      0.00986 
      (0.00714) 
Constant 0.622*** 0.624*** 1.455*** 1.460*** 2.185*** 2.294*** 
 (0.00329) (0.0231) (0.103) (0.111) (0.290) (0.320) 
Observations 450 450 450 445 388 388 
R-squared 0.044 0.044 0.177 0.260 0.383 0.387 
Number of 
Country_name1 
28 28 28 28 26 26 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes          Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 20. Results of Fixed Effect regressions: Laborhshare4, FO2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 laborshare4 
FO2 -0.0315*** -0.0123*** -0.0200*** 0.00134 -0.00322 -0.00124 
 (0.00342) (0.00417) (0.00470) (0.00586) (0.00547) (0.00540) 
logGDPpcpt  -0.0303*** -0.233*** -0.451*** -0.502*** -0.480*** 
  (0.00414) (0.0597) (0.0757) (0.0756) (0.0749) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt   0.0108*** 0.0212*** 0.0240*** 0.0234*** 
   (0.00317) (0.00393) (0.00394) (0.00389) 
Trade_Openness    -0.00176*** -0.00155*** -0.00139*** 
    (0.000286) (0.000272) (0.000274) 
Govshare    -4.65e-05 -8.01e-05 -0.000729 
    (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00140) 
Unemrate    -0.00460*** -0.00402*** -0.00374*** 
    (0.000908) (0.000910) (0.000897) 
Patent_A     1.54e-08 5.77e-08 
     (4.38e-08) (4.70e-08) 
Logpop16_60      -0.150*** 
      (0.0441) 
Linear_lamrig      0.0119* 
      (0.00641) 
Constant 0.584*** 0.862*** 1.809*** 3.057*** 3.273*** 3.651*** 
 (0.00299) (0.0380) (0.281) (0.371) (0.371) (0.379) 
Observations 457 457 457 399 356 356 
R-squared 0.162 0.254 0.273 0.355 0.384 0.409 
Number of 
Country_name1 
19 19 19 19 17 17 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes          Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3. The Results for Developing and Developed Countries 
The results of a fixed effect model for two panels: developing and developed countries are reported 
in Table I.21, Table I.22 and Table I.23. Table I.21 displays the results for the de jure measure of 
financial openness and Table I.22, Table I.23 display the results for de facto measures. The country 
classifications are based on the World Economic Situation and Prospects 201414. 
The coefficient on Kaopen index is still negative and strongly significant in most measures of the 
adjusted labor share of income for both developing and developed countries however the effect is 
stronger in developing countries than in developed countries. GDP per capita has a positive effect 
on the unadjusted labor share while it has a negative effect on the adjusted labor share of income 
for both developing and developed countries. Trade liberalization has similar negative and 
significant effects on the national income share in both developing and developed countries. 
However, the coefficient on government spending, technological progress, population and labor 
market regulations are more ambiguous, varying between positive and negative depending on the 
measures of financial openness and the measure of the labor share of income used.  
The most important results are reported in Table I.21, Table I.22 and Table I.23. While the capital 
account openness measured by the de jure Kaopen index is negatively driving the labor share of 
income in both developing and developed countries. I see different results between two countries 
samples when financial openness is measured by de facto FO1 and FO2. It seems that the financial 
openness leads to a small increase in adjusted labor share in developing countries while the higher 
level of capital account openness is negatively correlated to the share of labor in the developed 
countries. Therefore, developing countries with an abundance of low cost of labor would gain from 
                                                          
14
 See Table A.I.1 (Appendices): There are 30 countries in the whole sample including 15 developing countries and 
15 developed countries. 
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capital inflows while the bargaining power of labor in developed countries with the threat of capital 
relocating abroad is weakened and results in a decrease in their labor income share. 
The relationship between unemployment rate and the labor share of income is also different for 
the developing and developed countries. In all three tables, unemployment rate is positively but 
not significantly related to the labor share of income in the developing countries while it is 
negatively and significantly related in developed countries. We can link these results to the story 
of self-employment in developing countries. Numerous studies show that the ratio of self-
employment is higher than the ratio of paid employees in developing countries (Le, 1999; 
Blanchflower, 2000). On the one hand, unemployment rate plays a crucial role in driving the 
propensity to be self-employed and on the other hand, self-employment is considered as a possible 
strategy to reduce unemployment and poverty. The higher of unemployment rate leads to a higher 
rate of the self-employed then results in an increase in the adjusted labor share of income in 
developing countries. 
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Table I. 21. Results of Developing and Developed Countries Panels: Laborshare1, Laborshare2, Laborshare3, Laborshare4 and 
Kaopen Index 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare4 laborshare4 
Devloping Developed Devloping Developed Devloping Developed Devloping Developed 
Kaopen_index 
  
-0.00236 0.000123 -0.00763 -0.0166*** -0.00895* -0.0157*** -0.0135** -0.00527** 
(0.00276) (0.00192) (0.00490) (0.00389) (0.00487) (0.00391) (0.00550) (0.00232) 
logGDPpcpt 
  
-0.0216 0.199*** -0.476*** -0.0603 -0.495*** 0.163 -1.096** -0.667*** 
(0.0420) (0.0592) (0.164) (0.163) (0.165) (0.167) (0.460) (0.104) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.00346 -0.0109*** 0.0227** 0.00277 0.0248** -0.00842 0.0655** 0.0315*** 
(0.00245) (0.00301) (0.00966) (0.00793) (0.00975) (0.00809) (0.0270) (0.00524) 
Trade_Openness 
  
-3.83e-05 -0.000701*** -0.000218 -0.00126*** -0.000345** -0.00141*** 0.00281** -0.00148*** 
(8.30e-05) (0.000105) (0.000168) (0.000201) (0.000169) (0.000179) (0.00115) (0.000139) 
Unemrate 
  
0.00213 0.00637*** -0.00875** 0.00533*** -0.00824** -0.000461 -0.00894*** 0.00296*** 
(0.00161) (0.000736) (0.00387) (0.00183) (0.00322) (0.00135) (0.00314) (0.000908) 
Govshare 
  
0.000453 -0.00452*** 0.00615** -0.00170** 0.00586** -0.000776 0.00286 -0.00356*** 
(0.00132) (0.000397) (0.00288) (0.000677) (0.00263) (0.000672) (0.00252) (0.000621) 
Patent_A 
  
-2.86e-07*** 2.79e-08 4.55e-07 -8.70e-07*** 4.94e-07 2.94e-08 7.84e-06*** -3.44e-08 
(7.02e-08) (2.51e-08) (5.18e-07) (1.57e-07) (3.01e-07) (4.88e-08) (2.67e-06) (2.58e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
  
-0.129*** -0.0195 -0.0158 -0.205*** -0.0220 -0.162*** -0.952*** 0.0977*** 
(0.0357) (0.0252) (0.0861) (0.0688) (0.0894) (0.0610) (0.135) (0.0340) 
Linear_lamrig 
  
-0.0132 0.00127 0.0569*** -0.00698 0.0549*** -0.0127** 0.00968 0.00735* 
(0.00851) (0.00317) (0.0163) (0.00553) (0.0160) (0.00553) (0.0247) (0.00376) 
Constant 
  
0.769*** -0.372 3.053*** 1.545* 3.130*** 0.496 8.862*** 3.799*** 
(0.208) (0.321) (0.683) (0.850) (0.690) (0.853) (2.045) (0.570) 
Observations 277 432 128 181 142 246 82 287 
R-squared 0.108 0.465 0.526 0.719 0.477 0.629 0.642 0.665 
Number of 
Country_name1 14 15 11 12 11 15 6 11 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country_code 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 22. Results of Developing and Developed Countries Panels: Laborshare1, Laborshare2, Laborshare3, Laborshare4 and 
FO1 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare4 laborshare4 
Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed 
FO1 
  
0.000575 0.00118** 0.00456* 0.00456* 0.00550** -0.000536 0.0927*** 0.00388*** 
(0.00146) (0.000594) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00247) (0.000871) (0.0250) (0.000993) 
logGDPpcpt 
  
-0.00643 0.240*** 
-0.399** -0.399** -0.388** -0.148 -1.172** -0.815*** 
(0.0497) (0.0569) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.171) (0.518) (0.0929) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.00248 -0.0131*** 0.0180* 0.0180* 0.0183* 0.00676 0.0740** 0.0386*** 
(0.00288) (0.00294) (0.00962) (0.00962) (0.00962) (0.00834) (0.0307) (0.00473) 
Trade_Openness 
  
-7.02e-05 -0.000828*** 
-0.000377* -0.000377* -0.000524*** -0.00176*** 0.00297*** -0.00204*** 
(9.93e-05) (0.000110) (0.000193) (0.000193) (0.000194) (0.000167) (0.00107) (0.000158) 
Govshare 
  
0.00207 0.00611*** 
-0.00819** -0.00819** -0.00854*** -0.00104 -0.0129*** 0.00125 
(0.00172) (0.000757) (0.00381) (0.00381) (0.00320) (0.00140) (0.00316) (0.000954) 
Unemrate 
  
0.000376 -0.00451*** 0.00536* 0.00536* 0.00545** -0.00108 0.00130 -0.00327*** 
(0.00136) (0.000417) (0.00280) (0.00280) (0.00260) (0.000720) (0.00252) (0.000588) 
Patent_A 
  
-2.93e-07*** 3.93e-08 6.29e-07 6.29e-07 6.38e-07** 2.95e-08 7.31e-06*** -1.16e-08 
(7.18e-08) (2.63e-08) (5.08e-07) (5.08e-07) (2.91e-07) (5.18e-08) (2.53e-06) (2.56e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
  
-0.126*** -0.0301 
-0.0612 -0.0612 -0.0780 -0.151** -1.457*** 0.0671** 
(0.0392) (0.0256) (0.0867) (0.0867) (0.0897) (0.0637) (0.161) (0.0318) 
Linear_lamrig 
  
-0.0127 0.00145 0.0562*** 0.0562*** 0.0541*** -0.00735 0.00356 0.00795** 
(0.00869) (0.00315) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.00555) (0.0231) (0.00363) 
Constant 
  
0.704*** -0.519* 2.885*** 2.885*** 2.881*** 2.047** 10.96*** 4.720*** 
(0.224) (0.305) (0.683) (0.683) (0.688) (0.861) (2.277) (0.495) 
Observations 268 418 128 128 142 246 80 276 
R-squared 0.103 0.491 0.532 0.532 0.484 0.603 0.692 0.699 
Number of 
Country_name1 14 15 11 12 11 15 6 11 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country_code 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I. 23. Results of Developing and Developed Countries Panels: Laborshare1, Laborshare2, Laborshare3, Laborshare4 and 
FO2 
 
  
VARIABLES 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare4 laborshare4 
Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed 
FO2 
  
0.00300 -0.00292 0.00963** -0.00650*** 0.0110** -0.00794*** 0.255*** 0.00269 
(0.00292) (0.00184) (0.00428) (0.00246) (0.00443) (0.00250) (0.0680) (0.00313) 
logGDPpcpt 
  
0.00963 0.189*** -0.380** -0.468*** -0.362** -0.254 -0.924* -0.840*** 
(0.0502) (0.0561) (0.164) (0.159) (0.165) (0.161) (0.501) (0.0967) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.00149 -0.0103*** 0.0165* 0.0229*** 0.0164* 0.0121 0.0574* 0.0401*** 
(0.00295) (0.00289) (0.00964) (0.00776) (0.00970) (0.00784) (0.0295) (0.00490) 
Trade_Openness 
  
-0.000149 -0.000643*** -0.000543** -0.00161*** -0.000696*** -0.00157*** 0.00381*** -0.00185*** 
(0.000129) (0.000116) (0.000229) (0.000179) (0.000230) (0.000170) (0.00106) (0.000182) 
Govshare 
  
0.00219 0.00611*** -0.00729* 0.00320* -0.00782** -0.00134 -0.0138*** 0.00226** 
(0.00170) (0.000760) (0.00379) (0.00187) (0.00319) (0.00136) (0.00318) (0.000942) 
Unemrate 
  
0.000172 -0.00493*** 0.00428 -0.00220*** 0.00444* -0.00141** 0.00323 -0.00373*** 
(0.00137) (0.000407) (0.00281) (0.000702) (0.00261) (0.000693) (0.00243) (0.000598) 
Patent_A 
  
-2.91e-07*** 2.83e-08 6.57e-07 -7.18e-07*** 6.75e-07** 6.33e-09 5.93e-06** -2.24e-08 
(7.10e-08) (2.64e-08) (5.05e-07) (1.58e-07) (2.91e-07) (5.03e-08) (2.59e-06) (2.62e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
  
-0.125*** -0.0331 -0.0192 -0.168** -0.0292 -0.121* -1.620*** 0.0704** 
(0.0370) (0.0256) (0.0848) (0.0736) (0.0879) (0.0628) (0.189) (0.0331) 
Linear_lamrig 
  
-0.0128 0.00154 0.0525*** -0.00236 0.0502*** -0.00709 0.0175 0.00747** 
(0.00866) (0.00316) (0.0161) (0.00560) (0.0159) (0.00544) (0.0230) (0.00375) 
Constant 
  
0.645*** -0.286 2.724*** 3.523*** 2.671*** 2.474*** 10.68*** 4.786*** 
(0.230) (0.300) (0.689) (0.813) (0.697) (0.815) (2.241) (0.520) 
Observations 268 418 128 181 142 246 80 276 
R-squared 0.106 0.489 0.538 0.700 0.488 0.620 0.693 0.682 
Number of 
Country_name1 14 15 11 12 11 15 6 11 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country_code 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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V. Robustness Checks 
1. OLS Estimations 
In order to check for the robustness of the negative effect of the opening of financial markets on 
the labor share of income, I use an alternative econometric model, which is an OLS regression 
(based on the diagnostic tests, OLS is the appropriate estimation method). The dependent variables 
are still the four indicators of the labor share of income which are laborshare1, laborshare2, 
laborshare3 and laborshare4. I also run the OLS regression for all three financial openness indices 
included Kaopen_index, FO1 and FO2 for both developed and developing countries. Since OLS 
assumes that errors are both independent and identically distributed, robust standard errors have 
been used to relax either or both of those assumption and to avoid bias of standard errors caused 
by heteroskedascity. 
The estimations of Table A.I.2, A.I.3 and A.I.4 in appendix demonstrate the results of OLS 
estimations for all four dependent variables using Kaopen index, FO1 and FO2 respectively as 
proxies for capital account openness. We have seen significant and negative correlations between 
all four dependent variables: laborshare1, laborshare2, laborshare3, laborshare4 and capital 
account mobility for all three proxies.  
The OLS estimations for the adjusted labor share of income (laborshare2) is the preferred model. 
The uses of alternative measurements of both dependent variables and the proxies of financial 
openness lead to the similar results which suggest that the hypotheses are robust.  
Table A.I.5, Table A.I.6 and Table A.I.7 in appendix display the results of conditional OLS 
regressions for both developing and developed countries. Interestingly, we see some specification 
with positive relationships between capital account openness and the labor share of income in 
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developing while the correlations are negative and significant for developed countries such as in 
column (2), (4) of Table A.I.6, and columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) in Table A.I.7 whenever I use de 
facto measures of financial openness. The results of OLS estimations are consistent with the fixed 
effect regressions. The results, once again, support the idea that the labor share in developing 
countries increases during financial liberalization. They also suggest that the actual measures used 
have a strong impact on the conclusions of empirical studies. 
2. Self-employed Income and Capital Account Openness 
One explanation of the effect of capital account openness on the labor share of income in developed 
and developing countries is the role of self-employment. To investigate the robustness of the 
negative effect of capital account openness on the labor share of income, I employ the fixed effect 
regression of Kaopen index and self-employed income for whole sample and for two panels: 
developing and developing countries as well. The measure of the income share of the self-
employed is generated based on the laborshare2’s adjustment and is as follows: 
_ * _
_ _
Compen employees Self employed
Employees
Selfincome
Gross value added
=
∑∑
 
_ *( _ )
_ _
Compen employees Total workforces Employees Employers
Employees
Selfincome
Gross value added
− −
⇒ =
∑ ∑ ∑∑
 
Table A.I.8 in the appendix displays positive and strongly significant effects of financial openness 
measured by the de facto measure (FO2) on the national income share of self-employed workers. 
The results suggest that the higher degree of capital account openness leads to an increase in the 
self-employed income share. The positive effect is consistent with the negative effect of capital 
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account openness on the national labor share of income. As documented in the previous section, 
capital account openness generates more chances to relocate the production to low cost countries 
and weakens the bargaining power of labor while increasing unemployment. Therefore, employees 
of the formal sector are laid off and self-employment increases, leading to an increase in the share 
of self-employed workers. What is noteworthy is that this increase in the share of self-employed 
workers does not reverse the impact of capital account openness on reducing the share of income 
going to labor, even when the earnings of self-employed are included. 
The impact of capital account openness on increasing the share of income going to self-employed 
workers is greater in developing countries compared to developed countries (see Table A.I.9 in 
appendix). This result is consistent with the opposite effects of the national income share going to 
labor in the previous section whenever FO1 and FO2 are used to measure for financial openness. 
3. The correlation of Capital Account Openness and Unemployment Rate 
An alternative way to check the robustness of the negative correlation of financial integration and 
the labor share of income is to investigate the influence of capital account openness on 
unemployment rate. Positive and strongly significant effects of Kaopen index on unemployment 
rate are reported in Table A.I.10. The coefficients are relatively high and significant. This indicates 
that a higher degree of capital account openness leads to an increase in unemployment rate. The 
analysis of negative effect of capital account openness on the labor share of income is supported 
by the positive correlation of financial openness and unemployment rate. As discussed in the 
previous section, capital account openness leads to the relocation of companies to foreign countries 
with lower cost of production. It might result in a lay-off of unskilled labor and reduction of their 
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bargaining power and therefore an increase in the unemployment rate and a decrease in the labor 
share of income even when it does account for the earnings of the self-employed workers. 
In conclusion, the negative effect of capital account openness on the labor share of income is robust 
across the different measures of financial openness measurements and the different adjustments of 
labor income share and also the alternative econometric models. In addition, the positive influence 
of financial openness on the income share of self-employed workers also supports the 
interpretation of the mechanisms by which financial integration impacts of the labor share. Despite 
the increase in self-employment, income share still falls. 
VI. Conclusion 
There has been a declining trend in the labor share of income all over the world since the mid-
1980s. Technological progress, international trade and capital account openness have been 
regarded as three key determinants of the declining trend in the labor share of income. However, 
the effects of capital account openness on the income share of workers are still contentious and the 
most accepted argument for these debates is that the different measures of financial openness as 
well as the different adjustments to share of labor yields different results. Adjusting for the earnings 
of self-employed in total labor share of income is important, especially for developing countries 
where the share of self-employment is relatively high.  
This paper aims to investigate the relative impact of financial openness on the labor share of 
income, adjusted for the self-employment. To the end, I employed a panel dataset of 30 countries 
including 15 developing and 15 developed countries. I utilized both de jure and de facto measures 
of capital account openness and four measures of the national labor income share.  
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The negative effect of capital account openness on the labor share of income was tested with a 
panel fixed effect model using controlling for trade openness, technological change and other 
economic variables. Two panels of developing and developed countries were also estimated. Four 
interesting stylized facts emerge from the results: 
• Capital account openness is negatively and significantly correlated to both unadjusted and 
adjusted labor share of income in almost all specification. 
• The results hold for both fixed effect and OLS regressions for developed countries but do not 
hold for developing countries when employing de facto measures of financial openness.  
• After adjustment for the income of the self-employed, the total labor share of income for the 
whole sample increase 0.1 percentage points and it is relatively higher than the unadjusted one 
in developing countries while it is lower in advanced countries, indicating the important role 
of self-employed’ earnings in total labor share of income in general and in developing 
countries, in particular.  
• The positive impact of capital account openness in the income share of the self-employed is 
not high enough to change the declining trend in the total labor share of income. After 
adjustments for self-employed income, the correlation between financial openness and the 
labor share of income is still negative.  
I also examine the influences of financial openness on the income share of self-employment itself 
and the unemployment rate. Capital account openness measured by both de jure and de facto 
indicators are positively correlated to the income share of self-employment which suggests that 
opening up the financial market results in an increase in unemployment and self-employment rates 
as workers in the formal sector are laid off to reduce the labor costs and increase efficiency. This 
leads to an increase in the earnings of the self-employed. However, this increase is not large enough 
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to increase the total income share of the labor workforce. Financial openness is also positively 
correlated with the unemployment rate, suggesting that financial openness leads to a further 
weakening of labor’s bargaining strength. These results support the analysis of the negative effects 
of capital account openness on the labor share. 
The critical question is how this negative impact on labor income share can be mitigated or 
counteracted? One way would be by bolstering worker’s bargaining power by stronger trade 
unions and labor market regulations. Self-employment has played a very important role not only 
in the income share of labor but also in solving the problem of unemployment. Governments 
should support this type of labor when they start their own entrepreneurship. For instance, the 
Australian government has provided training and loan to the unemployed who choose to be a self-
employed worker in the future through a program called the New Enterprise Incentive Scheme. In 
the United Kingdom and France, the unemployed will receive transfer payments from their 
government if they start their own small business (Le, 1999; Blanchflower, 2000). In the United 
States, the government assists the self-employed through Self Employment Assistance (SEA) 
program. Unemployed entrepreneurs will be supported with financial aid equal to their 
unemployment insurance benefits for a maximum of 26 weeks and will receive entrepreneurial 
training and other resources to launch their own business (www.sba.gov/blogs/laid-and-want-start-
business-self-employment-assistance-programs-may-help). The Self Help Groups (SHG) is one of 
the most popular projects in India, which provide training in livestock rearing, vegetable and fish 
cultivation and household business setup for rural self-employed women in India. The program 
also provide help with nationalized banks for leveraging larger credit to scale up their self-
employed enterprises. Other solutions might work well to raise the labor share of income for both 
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developed and developing countries such as minimum wage policy on both informal and formal 
sectors.  
In sum, the sober conclusion drawn from this analysis is that capital mobility and the opening of 
the capital account has a negative impact on the labor even when account is taken of the growing 
self-employed work force. 
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CHAPTER II 
ECONOMIC REFORMS, EXTERNAL LIBERALIZATION AND MACROECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM 
I. Introduction 
In the past three decades, Vietnam has experienced “one of the highest rates of economic growth 
anf poverty reduction in the world” (Vandemoortele and Bird, 2011, p 3). The successful 
implementation of its extensive economic and political reforms, called Doi Moi – “a 
comprehensive program of external and domestic reforms that placed the country on the path to a 
more market-oriented economy”- in 1986, transformed the nation from a closed and centralized 
economy to a market-oriented system (Le, 2006, p 456). Vietnam also became a full-fledged 
member of the international community. Vietnam signed several trade agreements and joined 
regional associations such as the trade agreement with the European Union (EU) in 1992; 
normalized diplomatic relations with the United States in 1995; joined the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1995; became a 
member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in 1998; signed a Bilateral 
Trading Agreement (BTA) with the United States in 2001 and became a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 after eleven years of negotiations (Nguyen et al, 2012). 
Vietnam has enjoyed an improvement in its diplomatic and political relationship with more than 
170 countries in the world.  
After 30 years of its economic reforms (Doi Moi), Vietnam has now integrated with the global 
community (Tsuboi, 2007) and become one of the fastest growing economies in the South East 
Asia (Bhatt, 2013) with a gross domestic product (GDP) of $202.62 billion and per capital GDP 
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of $2,115 in 2016 (UN dataset, 2016). High rates of economic growth and an impressive 
macroeconomic performance have also been observed in Vietnam since its economic opening in 
the 1990s. Trade openness measured by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP 
rose to 169 percent in 201415 while FDI inflows have been increasing substantially since the 
approval of the first Law on Foreign Investment in 1987. The poverty rate has been reduced from 
37.4 percent in 1998 to 14.2 percent in 2010 and 7 percent in 2015 (GSO dataset, 2015). The thirty-
year successful economic reforms have also led to a notable human capital development 
performance. The human development index (HDI) value in Vietnam had increased by about 40 
percent during the period 1990-2012 (OECD, 2014). The implementation of Doi Moi has 
transformed the nation from an agriculture-oriented economy to a modern industry-oriented 
system, bringing about a high rate of growth of gross industrial output (GIO) (Statistical Yearbook 
of Vietnam, 2014).  
In view of these developments, the questions arises - what are the main mechanisms driving the 
spectacular performance of Vietnamese economy since its reform? What lies behind the increasing 
trend in economic growth of Vietnam recently, and to what extent and how is Vietnamese 
economic growth related to its comprehensive reforms and external liberalization? This essay 
investigates the macro-economic performance of Vietnam through the six phases of Doi Moi 
reform, and analyzes the impact of external liberalization on economic growth, aggregate demand, 
employment and distribution. 
The paper is structured into six sections. An overview of the Doi Moi Policy and its major policies 
which has transformed the nation from a centralized and closed economy to an open and market-
                                                          
15
 Author’s calculation from export and import’s dataset of GSO and GDP’s dataset of United Nations. 
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oriented system is introduced in section II. Section III is an overview of the trends in external 
liberalization and macroeconomic performance in Vietnam since the reforms. The specific impact 
of effective demand and employment are discussed in section IV and section V respectively. 
Section VI is the concluding remarks and recommendations. 
II. Overview of Economic Reform in Vietnam 
1. The Introduction of Vietnamese Economic Reform 
After almost a century of conflict through the French and American wars, Vietnam faced a severe 
economic crisis, near famine, hyperinflation after unification in 1975 (Vuong, 2014). The 
American trade embargo which prevented trade with the western economies, together with the 
collapse and disintegration of the trading system of the Soviet Union Bloc in 1989 worsened the 
economic crisis. These severe economic conditions forced the Communist Party and Vietnamese 
government to embrace New Economic Policy and launch extensive reforms.  
The Vietnamese economic reforms (the Doi Moi Policy) was adopted after the 6th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986, however the Policy only got fully on track 
from late 1989. In Vietnamese, “doi moi” means “renovation”. The Doi Moi policy refers to a 
comprehensive program of external and domestic reforms that transformed the economy from 
closed and centralized to an open and market-oriented one. In other words, “Doi Moi was a policy 
that abandoned doctrinaire socialist theories, introduced a market economy and opened the country 
to the global economy” (Tsuboi, 2007, p 1). The policy was adopted and commenced subsequently 
to the reforms and openness under Chinese leadership of Deng Xiao Ping in 1978 and Perestrika 
reforms of the Soviet Union that significantly changed the fundamentals of the socialism of the 
past (Tsuboi, 2007). As a result, the closed and centrally-planned economy has been replaced by 
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a particular kind of market-oriented system, while adopting the concept of a multi-sectoral 
economy, with open-door policies towards international trade and investment, and recognized 
private sectors, while emphasizing the state sectors.  
The 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1991 deepened and strengthened 
the Doi Moi Policy in 1986. It was followed by the Amended Constitution in 1992 which enshrined 
the Doi Moi Policy in the set of “supreme laws” of the nation in statutory form. The Amended 
Constitution introduced the economic policy of a market system; recognized freedom in 
proprietary rights and private sector in the economy, approved and recognized long-term land-use 
rights and encouraged joint enterprises with foreign countries. Since the adoption of Doi Moi 
Policy in 1986, Vietnam has embraced massive economic and political reforms which are the most 
important catalyst for dramatic changes and economic growth and development in Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese government has introduced a host or other economic and political policies depending 
on real economic situations. Table II.1 introduces the milestones of the Doi Moi Policy from 1986 
to present day.  
In short, the Doi Moi Policy is a package of comprehensive economic reforms. It included reforms 
in agriculture, where the abandonment of state-led land collectivization and encouragement of 
privatization gave more rights to farmers; improvement of price-control by the gradual reduction 
of subsidies for state enterprises, encouragement of private business in all sectors and allowing 
commodity prices to be set up by the market and integration to the global trade through an export-
led strategy (Keough, 2016). 
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2. The Major Policy Phases of Doi Moi 
Table II. 1. Milestones of the Doi Moi Policy from 1986 to Present Day 
Year Significant Events 
1986 • The Sixth National Congress Meeting of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
launched the Doi Moi Policy. 
1987 • Land Law was introduced 1st time (amended in 1993, 1998, 2001, 2003 and 
2013) 
• Foreign Investment Law was introduced 1st time (amended in 1990, 1992, 
1995, 1996, 2000 2005, 2009) 
1988 • Resolution 10 in agricultural management was adopted, abandoning 
collectivization 
1990 • Corporate Law and Private Enterprise Law were launched to stimulate private 
business 
• The ideas about privatization of state-owned enterprise was introduced 
• One-tiered banking system was changed into a two-tiered one 
1991 • Soviet Union Bloc collapsed, the Communist Party of Vietnam decided to 
remain with the socialist ideology. 
1992 • The Amended Constitution was introduced, which recognized the role of 
private sector in the economy. 
• A trade agreement with the European Union (EU) was signed 
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1995 • Joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
agreements of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) 
• Normalized the diplomatic relations with the United States 
1998 • Became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC)  
2000 • The Enterprise Law was enacted  
2001 • Signed the Bilateral Trading Agreement (BTA) with the United States. 
• New Socioeconomic Development Strategy for 2001-2010 and five-year plan 
to 2005 was introduced 
• Decree 44/2001/ND-CP allows all kinds of companies to export and import all 
permissible goods was passed 
2002 • The Fifth Party Plenum gives Party members the right to own private business. 
2007 • Became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after eleven long 
years of negotiations. 
2009 • Vietnamese government released the stimulus package of US$8 billion after 
the global financial crisis in 2008 
2010 • Became a negotiating party of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement 
in November, 2010. After the US withdrew from this agreement, the future of 
this agreement is now being reconsidered. 
 83 
 
2011 • Resolution No.11/NQ-CP was approved on 02/24/2011 to control inflation and 
stabilize the macroeconomy. 
2013 • An economic stimulus package of VND30,000 billion (approximately USD1.5 
billion) was approved to revive and stimulate the real estate market. 
2016 • Approved the Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) for 2016-2020 in 
4/2016, which emphasized the importance of structural reforms, environmental 
sustainability, social equity and highlighted emerging issues of macroeconomic 
stability.  
Source: Author’s compilation  
Since the adoption of Doi Moi Policy in 1986 by the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam in 1986, Vietnam has integrated more fully with international economy and 
successfully modernized its economy which was mostly based on agriculture, and also produced 
dramatic growth and poverty reduction. The following section set out the major policies of six 
different phases of thirty years of the Doi Moi Policy (1986-2016).  
Phase I: The first adoption of comprehensive reforms (1986 – 1993) 
The first phase from 1986 to 1993 was marked by the adoption of the Doi Moi Policy during the 
6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December 1986. During this phase, 
the Communist Party of Vietnam started implementing the Doi Moi Policy which has embraced 
multi-sectoral economic mechanisms with open door policies towards trade, encouraging private 
sectors while continuing to emphasize the state sector.  
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The introduction of the Foreign Investment Law in 1987 strengthened the effort of Vietnamese 
government in opening their economy to the global community. As a result, Vietnam enjoyed 
continuous inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which has been regarded as the main 
catalyst of its economy.  
An important thrust of Doi Moi Policy is the recognition of the private sector and the 
“decooperatization” as well as the “decollectivization” of agriculture. As a result, during the first 
phase, a centrally collective model of the agriculture production system was gradually replaced by 
the private ownership of land. For example, in 1988, Resolution 10 in agricultural management 
was adopted, abandoning collectivization. Together with the introduction of Land Law in 1987, 
Resolution 10 granted and recognized longer-term land use rights for famers who could now 
exchange, mortgage, transfer, rent and inherit land. In 1989, Vietnam became the second largest 
rice exporter in the world (Statistical Year Book of Vietnam, 1990). 
In 1987, Vietnamese government launched policies to strengthen the financial markets by 
eliminating subsidies and imposing budget controls. It also started to liberalize the exchange rate 
and pricing system, so as to narrow the price disparity between free market and official market. A 
new currency was introduced in 1988, and the central treasury was established in 1987. 
Vietnamese government also separated commercial and central banking functions by the New 
Banking Laws in 1989.  
The disintegration of the main Vietnamese trading partner - the Soviet Union Bloc in 1990 also 
forced the government to find new trading partners. The Corporate Law and Private Enterprise 
Law initiated in 1990 allowed private enterprises and private property rights. As a result, the 
number of start-up entrepreneurial enterprises increased by 17,400 in 1994 (Vuong, 2014). 
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Moreover, starting from 1991, Vietnamese government also gave private enterprises permission 
to directly export and import goods and services. 
In 1992, a constitutional amendment was passed, officially recognizing human rights in all civil, 
political, social, economic and cultural fields including the right of access to information; the right 
to assembly, the right to association; the right to free movement and residence in the country, the 
right to demonstrate in accordance with law; the right to follow or not follow any religion. The 
constitution also recognized the multi-sectoral economy and deepened the Doi Moi Policy by 
reaffirming the leading role of the Communist Party of Vietnam with socialist orientations.  
Phase II: The period of political and economic integration: Implementing the Doi Moi Policy 
(1994 – 1997) 
The Communist Party of Vietnam continued extensive reforms in the second phase (1994-1997), 
the most active and busiest stage of the Doi Moi Policy. Vietnamese government continued further 
economic integration and diplomatic relations within the region and with the rest of the world. The 
second phase of Doi Moi was marked by the lifting of U.S trade embargo and the normalization 
of diplomatic relation with the United States in 1995. Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN); signed the agreements of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 
1995, cementing the international integration of its economy.  
In the second phase, the Law on State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) was enacted. This law placed the 
SOEs under direct supervision of Ministry of Finance in 1995. However, the leading role of the 
SOEs sector was still being debated among communist party members. During the Eighth Party 
Congress in 1996, some communist members agreed to remain the leading role of the SOEs sector, 
while the others pushed the shift from state-own enterprises to non-state-owned enterprises.  
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The state budget was also under better management by Law on the State Budget, initiated in 1996. 
The State Budget Law defines tax and expenditure responsibilities of the different levels of 
government. Preferential credit for selected sectors and disadvantaged regions was provided by 
the National Investment Fund.  
The Vietnamese government also used temporary import bans for selected goods such as cement, 
steel, paper, beer, sugar and confectionary to support the domestic market. They have given more 
rights to private enterprises to export rice but under certain conditions. The amended Law on 
Foreign Investment reduces import duty exemptions for FDI companies and clarifies some 
investment policies. Besides the open-door policy, Vietnamese government has also attempted to 
stimulate domestic investment through the Law on Promotional of Domestic Investment in 1995.  
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Vietnamese policy-maker and the newly opened market-
oriented economic mechanisms faced new challenges.  
Phase III: Facing with the first economic turmoil since Doi Moi Policy (1998 – 2000) 
The Doi Moi policy was deepened in the third phase from 1998-2000. The country became a 
member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in 1998 two years after 
applying for membership. However, the market-oriented economy was hurt by the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 and more active policy intervention was needed. In response to the crisis, the 
government started applying non-tariff measures and exchange-rate controls to restrict imports and 
protect domestic production in late 1998. New regulations were introduced to encourage and 
support exports such as the New Enterprise Law in 1999 and Decree 57 which gives more rights 
for export companies. For example, companies that were owned by foreign investors were 
permitted to export goods not specified in investment licenses.  
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The most significant achievements of the third phase was the introduction of a formal stock market 
in Ho Chi Minh city in 2000 and the commitment of the Communist Party of Vietnam at the Tenth 
Party Plenum to pursue the Doi Moi Policy in which the first priority was to continue with regional 
and global integration.  
Phase IV: Recovery from the Asian crisis and economic boom (2001 – 2007) 
The fourth phase of Doi Moi Policy was marked by the US-Vietnam bilateral trading agreement 
(the BTA) in 2001, which opened up new prospects and opportunities for bilateral trade. The open-
door policies towards international trade and investment of the Vietnamese government was 
strengthened by its relationships with the IMF and the World Bank who restarted structural 
adjustment lending to Vietnam in 2001.  
The Ninth National Party Congress in 2001 reaffirmed the leading role of the state government 
while recognizing the role of the private domestic sectors and foreign investors in economic 
development. Those policies facilitated restructuring and corporatization of state enterprises under 
the Enterprise Law. Enterprises, individuals, cooperatives and foreign investors have been 
permitted to export and import all permissible commodities by Decree 44/2001/ND-CP in 2001. 
Since 2002, communist party members have been permitted to establish and own private 
businesses.  
In January 2007, Vietnam has officially become a full member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) after eleven years long of negotiations. This has brought emerging opportunities and 
challenges for its economy and people. 
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Phase V: Market-oriented economy and the global financial crisis (2008 – 2012) 
The Vietnamese economy has been on the path to a market-oriented system since 1986. It has fully 
integrated with the global economy after becoming an official member of the World Trade 
Organization. This has also made the economy vulnerable to the global crisis. Vietnam’s unstable 
macroeconomy with two-digit inflation in 2008 together with spillover effect of the global crisis 
made the stock market bubble burst in 2009 resulting a dramatic decrease in VN-index16 from the 
peak of 1170 points in March 2007 to less than 250 points in February in 2009. The boom of stock 
market bubble also pulled down the real estate market in 2010.  
The contemporary state-run conglomerate model also poses problems of inefficiency, corruption 
and crony capitalism. The macro economy faced a chaotic period of high inflation, budget deficit, 
a decline in foreign exchange reserve, unformulated and mismanaged fiscal and monetary policies, 
high unemployment and sluggish commercial activities in late 2012 (Vuong, 2014). Many state-
run conglomerates such as Vinashin have suffered overwhelming losses, growing debt burdens, or 
corruption scandal.  
Despite its vulnerable macroeconomy, Vietnamese government has been continuing their open-
door policies and been very active with regional integration. Vietnam has been a full member in 
the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) which covers almost sectors 
of the economy included trade, investment, intellectual property rights, labor and environment 
since November 2010, until the recent stalling of the negotiations.  
                                                          
16
 “The Vietnam Stock Index or VN-Index is a capitalization-weighted index of all the companies listed on the Ho 
Chi Minh City Stock Exchange”, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/VNINDEX:IND. 
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Phase VI: Stabilization of the market-oriented economy: Lessons from the global financial crisis 
(2013 – present) 
Faced with the global financial crisis and the slump in the domestic stock market, banking and real 
estate sectors, as well as overwhelming business closures during the 2007- 2012 phase, Vietnamese 
government decided to reorient policy toward controlling inflation and stabilizing the 
macroeconomy, using direct tools and comprehensive monetary policies. For example, since 2011, 
the Vietnamese State Bank has devalued the national currency seven times. Resolution No.11/NQ-
CP was approved on 02/24/2011 to control inflation and stabilize the macroeconomy. In 2013, an 
economic stimulus package of VND 30,000 billion (about USD1.5 billion) was approved to revive 
the real estate market after its 2011 collapse. 
The Amended Constitution in 2013 was also one of the most remarkable transformations in this 
phase. This is the first time, the Vietnamese Constitution has determined subjects of human rights 
to “everyone”, not only “citizen”, which removed the confusion between human rights and 
citizens’ rights in the 1992 Constitution. A number of new rights, including the rights to life; the 
rights to live in a clean environment; the rights to conduct scientific research and the rights to access 
and enjoy culture values, have been supplemented in the 2013 Constitution, reflecting the progress 
of integration and development in Vietnam. The Constitution also introduces a new principle of 
mutual control among the three branches of government, based on the idea of direct democracy 
while continuing to give more rights to private enterprise. 
In April 2016, the Vietnamese government approved the Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(SEDP) for the period 2016-2020. The plan highlights the importance of structural reforms, 
environmental sustainability, social equity and also the need for stabilizing macroeconomic. The 
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plan also addresses some of the structural problems facing the economy by focusing on promoting 
skills-development for modern industry and innovation; improving market institutions, and further 
development of infrastructure. 
III. External Liberalization and Macroeconomics in Vietnam since Its Economic Reform 
The comprehensive economic and political reforms – under the Doi Moi Policy have been the 
major catalyst of economic growth and development in Vietnam since 1986. During thirty years 
of the Doi Moi Policy, economic domestic reforms and an open-door policy toward international 
investment have brought about higher growth rates of GDP, a massive influx of FDI, an impressive 
industrial performance as well as a higher level of inequality in Vietnam. This section analyzes the 
evolution of economic growth; inflation, exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves; trade 
openness; foreign direct investment (FDI); industrial performance and income distribution as well 
as inequality during the six phases of the Doi Moi Policy. 
1. Economic Growth of Vietnam since Its Economic Reform 
Since the launch of Doi Moi, Vietnam has transformed the nation from one of the poorest countries 
in the world to a middle-income country and from a closed centrally-planned economy to a 
socialist market-oriented economy (Bhatt, 2013). The country has displayed high rates of 
economic growth as well as an impressive performance in financial integration and trade 
liberalization. After Doi Moi, Vietnam has also been reducing its poverty rate and stabilizing its 
macroeconomic variables and has become one of the fast-growing economies in the South East 
Asia with GDP of US$202.62 billion and per capita GDP US$2,115 in 2016. The GDP growth 
rate of Vietnam was 6.1 percent in 2016 while it was 3.2 percent, 1.7 percent and 4.3 percent in 
Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia respectively. In terms of current US dollars, GDP of Vietnam 
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rose from $5 billion in 1986 to a 1996 level of $25 billion and about $202.62 billion in 2016. There 
has also been a dramatic increase in GDP per capita which rose from $81 in 1986 to a 1996 level 
of $276 and $2,115 in 2016. 
Figure II.1 presents the growth rate of GDP and GDP per capita of Vietnam since its Doi Moi. 
During the first phase of the Doi Moi Policy (1986-1993), the growth rate of GDP grew from 4 
percent in 1985 to almost 8 percent in 1989 after the introduction of the first Law on Foreign 
Investment in 1987 and other reforms. However, the disintegration of the most important trading 
partners – the Soviet Union Bloc led to a decline in GDP growth rate to 5 percent in 1991. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union was the catalyst to more extensive reforms. The Corporate Law and 
Private Enterprise Law initiated in 1990 granted private enterprises which led to an increase by 
17,400 start-up entrepreneurial enterprises in 1994. Finding new trading partners through an open-
door policy was also the first priority of Vietnamese economy during 1991-1993. Since 1991, the 
government has also given private enterprises permission to directly export and import. Those 
policies resulted in an increase in 8.5 percent in GDP growth rate in 1993.  
 
Figure II. 1. The Growth Rates of GDP and GDP Per Capita in Vietnam 
Source: Author’s computation from UN dataset 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
GDPgrowth
GDPpcptG
 92 
 
We see remarkable growth rates of both GDP and GDP per capita in Vietnam during the second 
phase of the Doi Moi Policy (1994-1997), especially after 1995 when Vietnam gradually integrated 
to the world economy through various trade agreement (Nguyen et al, 2012).  
The growth rate of GDP reached a peak of 9.8 percent in 1996, thanks to the comprehensive 
economic reforms in domestic in the second phase of the Doi Moi Policy. However, the growth 
rates of GDP and GDP per capita of Vietnam decreased to 4 and 3 percent respectively in 1999 
due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
The fourth phase of the Doi Moi Policy (2001-2007) experienced more stable economic growth 
rates at around 7 percent but fell to 6 percent after the world financial crisis in 2008. The 
Vietnamese government has focused on stabilizing macroeconomic performance and controlling 
inflation through an economic stimulus package of VND 30,000 billion (about USD1.5 billion) in 
early 2013 which has restored the growth rate of both GDP and GDP per capita in the current 
phase.  
In short, during thirty years (1986-2016) of the Doi Moi Policy, Vietnam has integrated her 
economy to the world and regional economic market and experienced a notable economic growth 
rate.  
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2. Inflation, Exchange Rate and Foreign Reserves in Vietnam 
Table II. 2. Inflation, Exchange Rates and Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Year Inflation (%) 
Exchange Rates 
(VND/USD) 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(% Nominal GDP) 
1995 5.67 11038.25 6.37 
1996 3.20 11032.58 7.11 
1997 7.26 11683.33 7.5 
1998 4.11 13268.00 8.01 
1999 -1.71 13943.17 13 
2000 -0.43 14167.75 12.11 
2001 3.83 14725.17 12.5 
2002 3.21 15279.50 13.23 
2003 7.75 15509.58 16.2 
2004 8.28 15746.00 15.9 
2005 7.38 15858.92 15.8 
2006 8.30 15994.25 20 
2007 23.11 16105.13 30.36 
2008 7.05 16302.25 25 
2009 8.86 17065.08 15 
2010 18.67 18612.92 11 
2011 9.09 20509.75 9.8 
2012 6.59 20828.00 17 
2013 4.08 20933.42 15 
2014 0.63 21148.00 17.62 
Source: The data of inflation and exchange rate is from UN datasets, the data of foreign exchange 
reserves is from CEIC (www.ceicdata.com/indicator/vietnam/foreign-exchange-reserves--of-gdp). 
 
Table II.2 presents the evolution of inflation, exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves in 
Vietnam during the period of 1995-2014. In Vietnam, the monetary policy, the exchange rate 
policy and foreign exchange reserves are administered and implemented by its central bank (the 
State Bank of Vietnam – SBV). The State Bank of Vietnam administers interest rate, exchange 
rates and control inflation and economic growth.  
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After thirty years of Doi Moi, the management of monetary policy has been more effective in 
easing and controlling inflation as well as stabilizing the macroeconomy. The Vietnamese 
government is pursuing a target of keeping inflation below 7 percent. However, the monetary 
policy is still not mature, and is sometimes conducted in a passive manner, reflecting the central 
banks limited capacity to control liquidity and inflation. For example, to deal with high inflation 
pressure, the State Bank of Vietnam pursued a tight monetary policy. Table II.2 shows mild 
inflation in Vietnam in the period of 1995 to the middle of 2007. During this period, the State Bank 
of Vietnam maintained a loose monetary policy and an expansive fiscal policy. The high inflation 
rate of 23 percent in late 2007 was eased by reducing required reserved ratio successively over a 
period of mid 2006-mid 2007. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the State Bank of Vietnam 
continues easing pressure of high inflation by loosening monetary policy. 
During the thirty years of Doi Moi, Vietnam’s exchange rate regime has transformed from a 
multiple exchange rates to an announced fixed rate mechanism, then to the current system of a 
narrow fluctuation range around the official rate, which is itself set on a daily basis and reflects 
the interaction of foreign exchange market with other market forces (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010). 
In Vietnamese foreign market, the US dollar has been considered as a key nominal anchor. Table 
II.2 presents the evolution of VND/USD exchange rate from 1995 to 2014. Since 1995, the 
VND/USD rate indicated major weakening of the VND against the USD. The State Bank of 
Vietnam is pursuing a policy of a controllable floating exchange rate regime to prevent increasing 
dollarization and the appreciation of Vietnamese Dong (VND) and also tightening the fluctuation 
range of USD/VND exchange rate. 
Table II.2 also shows the movement of foreign exchange reserves as percent of nominal GDP in 
Vietnam since 1995. Vietnam’s foreign exchange reserves as share of GDP was reported at only 
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6.37 percent in 1995 but rose to 30.36 percent in 2007, reflecting the buoyant exports of the 
country. Due to the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008, the foreign exchange reserves in 
Vietnam declined to 9.8 percent in 2011 and has experienced an upward trend since 2012.  
3. Trade Performance of Vietnam since Its Reform 
  
Figure II. 2. Ratio of Trade in Vietnam 
Source: Author’s computation from different issues (1970-2014) of General Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of Vietnam and Vietnam Foreign Trade’s dataset 
Under the Doi Moi policy regime, Vietnam underwent remarkable transformation thanks to 
integration with the world trade market. The export-led growth strategy gave a boost to Vietnamese 
economy. The contribution of exports to GDP rose from 26 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 1996 
and 86 percent in 2014 (Figure II.2). Trade openness measured by the sum of exports and imports 
as a percentage of GDP has increased from 62.3 percent in 1970 to 92.7 percent in 1996 and 169.5 
percent in 2014. 
Trade balance was always negative from 1970 to 2011 (see Figure II.2). Since 2012, the trade 
balance has been positive thanks to the export-led policies through six phases of the Doi Moi 
Policy such as the private enterprises’ permission to directly export and import in the first phase; 
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the New Enterprise Law in 1999 and Decree 57 which gives more rights for export companies in 
the third phase; the permission to enterprises, individuals, cooperatives and foreign investors to 
export and import all permissible commodities by Decree 44/2001/ND-CP in 2001. 
Figure II. 3. Shares of Export by Region 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1997-2012) of General Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of Vietnam 
Before Doi Moi, Eastern Europe which provided 57 percent of Vietnam’s imports used to be the 
main trading partner (Le, 2006). However, after Doi Moi and the disintegration of Soviet Union 
Bloc, Vietnam built trading relationship with other Asian countries. Figure II.3 and Figure II.4 
describes the shares of Vietnamese export and import by regions (Asia, Europe, America, Africa 
and Oceania) and economic regions (ASEAN, APEC EU, OPEC) from 1997 to 2012. Among five 
regions, Asia has been the main export and import partners of Vietnam. Figure III.3 shows a 
downward trend of Vietnamese export volumes to Europe. The export volumes to America has 
been increasing due to the normalization with the United States in 1995 and the bilateral trade 
agreement with the US in 2001. The share of export volumes to American region increased from 
0.3 percent in 1986 to 7.8 percent in 2011. Vietnam used to import mostly from Europe because 
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of the trading relationship with Western Europe. However, after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, import value from Europe decreased from 79 percent in 1986 to 10 percent in 2011. While, 
Vietnam import volume from Asia increased from 10 percent in 1986 to 78 percent in 2011. 
Among 4 economic regions, the main export and import partners of Vietnam are APEC, EU and 
ASEAN. Since the Doi Moi, APEC countries have always been the major export and import 
partners of Vietnam. The shares of export and import volumes to APEC were 74.8 percent and 
79.6 percent in 1995 respectively. The share of export volume to APEC declined slightly to 67.3 
percent in 2011, while the share of import volume from APEC increased slightly to 81 percent in 
2011.  
Figure II. 4. Shares of Import by Region 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1997-2012) of General Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of Vietnam 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Asia Europe America
Africa Oceania
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
ASEAN APEC EU OPEC
 98 
 
  
Figure II. 5. Export and Import Value by SITC Classification 
Source: Author’s computation from different issues (1995-2011) of General Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of Vietnam. Unit: USD million. 
 
The composition of Vietnamese exports had shifted during the period of 1995-2011. In the first 
few years of the launch of the Doi Moi, Vietnam only focused on the export of five main primary 
products: crude materials; food and live animal; beverage and tobacco; mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related material; animal and vegetable oils fat and wax. Later, Vietnamese export and import’s 
structure have changed from mainly primary products to manufactured products. Figure II.5 
depicts the shares of export and import value of primary and manufactured products. In the early 
stages of the comprehensive reform and external liberalization, Vietnam mostly exported primary 
products and imported manufactured products. The share of primary product’ export value 
decreased from 67 percent in 1995 to 34.8 percent in 2011, while the share of the manufactured 
product’ export value increased from 32.7 percent in 1995 to 65.1 percent in 2011. In contrast, 
Vietnam mostly imports manufactured product, which share accounts for 72 percent in 2011, while 
the share of primary product’ import value was 25.8 percent in the same year. 
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All in all, Vietnam has experienced substantial increase in international trade. During the period 
of 1970-2014, trade openness of Vietnam (measure by the sum of exports and imports as a percent 
of GDP) rose from 62 percent in 1970 to 169 percent in 2014 (Figure II.4). 
4. The Trend of FDI in Vietnam since Its Reform 
Vietnam has exhibited a substantial increase in FDI inflows since the approval of the Law on 
Foreign Investment in 1987 (which was amended in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003 and 2013). Also, in 
November 2005, the Unified Enterprise Law was passed and followed by the Unified Law on 
Investment in 2006, both laws supported foreign companies seeking to invest into Vietnam. These 
laws have had a positive impact on FDI inflows.  
 
Figure II. 6. FDI Inflows in Vietnam from 1988 to 2013 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1988-2013) of General Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of Vietnam 
Figure II.6 presents the trend of FDI in Vietnam in the period of 1988-2013 (both registered and 
implemented FDI17). The figure reflects the impact of Vietnamese reforms with new laws, which 
                                                          
17
 Registered FDI is the amount of FDI registered in the contract between foreign companies and Vietnamese 
government; implemented FDI is the real amount of FDI invested in Vietnam by foreign companies.  
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supported foreign investors and also the effects of trade liberalization through bilateral and 
multinational agreements. Registered FDI which represent ‘potential FDI flows should be 
distinguished from implemented FDI which is the actual inflow. The registered FDI inflows rose 
nearly 30 times between 1988-1996. Registered FDI decreased substantially in the year following 
the Asian financial crisis but resumed the upward trend after 2002 and reached the peak in 2008 
thank to the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2000 and the notable reform of FDI-related 
policy in late 2005. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the registered FDI inflows in Vietnam 
have been reduced by almost 75 percent in 2012 and resumed the upward trend since 2013. During 
the second phase of the Doi Moi Policy (1991-1997), the implemented FDI also increased nearly 
10 times between 1991-1997. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis 
in 2008, the implemented FDI inflows decreased in 1998 and in 2011, however it resumed the 
upward trend since 2012 following those tight policies of Communist Party of Vietnam to control 
inflation and stabilize the macroeconomy. 
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Table II. 3. Sectoral Composition of FDI Inflows by Sectors from 2010-2013 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery 0.18 0.91 0.61 0.44 
Mining & Quarrying 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Manufacturing 30.07 49.93 71.58 76.69 
Electricity, Gas, Air Con Supply 14.85 16.21 0.59 9.11 
Water Supply, Sewerage, Remediation 0.05 2.07 0.00 0.23 
Construction 9.13 8.31 2.12 0.99 
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Motor Repair 2.32 3.20 4.73 2.81 
Transportation, Storage 4.43 0.48 1.39 0.30 
Accommodation, Food Service 1.59 3.06 0.66 1.11 
Information, Communication 0.54 5.75 2.55 0.39 
Financial, Banking, Insurance 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Real Estate Activities 34.34 5.58 12.11 4.26 
Professional, Scientific, Tech 0.36 1.70 0.60 1.96 
Administration, Support Service 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Education, Training 0.38 0.07 0.64 0.57 
Human Health, Social Work 1.03 0.57 0.86 0.40 
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation 0.31 0.98 0.37 0.23 
Other Activities 0.08 0.51 0.13 0.07 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (2010-2013) of General Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of Vietnam and GSO’s website. Unit: Percent of total FDI capital 
Table II.3 presents share of FDI in Vietnam by sector from 2010 to 2013. FDI has flowed into 
almost all sectors in Vietnam. However, as shown in the table, the majority of FDI inflows in 
Vietnam were into manufacturing and real estate activities. The share of FDI inflows into 
manufacturing rose from 30.07 percent in 2010 to 76.69 percent in 2013 while the share of FDI 
inflows into real estate activities declined dramatically from 34.34 percent in 2010 to 4.26 percent 
in 2013 due to the effect of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the bubble and boom of property 
market in 2011. 
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Table II. 4. Top 21 Countries of Origin of FDI into Vietnam in 2015 
 
No Country of Origin Number of projects Percent of total FDI 
capital 
1 Korea 736 28.9 
2 Malaysia 29 10.2 
3 Singapore 138 8.6 
4 Japan 319 7.4 
5 Taiwan 115 6.1 
6 Samoa 24 5.3 
7 United Kingdom 32 5.3 
8 British Virgin Islands 56 5.1 
9 Hong Kong SAR (China) 96 4.7 
10 China. PR 175 3.1 
11 Turkey 2 2.7 
12 Netherlands 26 1.8 
13 Thailand 35 1.4 
14 Seychelles 19 1.3 
15 Cayman Islands 6 1.1 
16 United States 57 0.9 
17 Australia 36 0.83 
18 Brunei 20 0.81 
19 British West Indies 4 0.6 
20 India 24 0.5 
21 Switzerland 9 0.4 
Source: GSO website: https://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=776, download date 11/18/2016 
Most of FDI inflows to Vietnam have come from Asian countries and has been directed toward 
“oil and gas production, import-substituting industries, and export sectors such as garments and 
footwear” from 1990 to 2000 (Le, 2006) and toward manufacturing, real estates and construction 
since 2001. Table II.4 presents the distribution of FDI by country of origin in 2015. There are 21 
countries which invested more than US$100 million. Korea invested in 736 projects worth about 
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US$6,983.2 million and accounted for 29 percent of total FDI capital, was the biggest foreign 
investor in Vietnam in 2015 followed by Malaysia with US$2,478 million and Singapore with 
US$2,082.5 million. The other top five foreign investors in Vietnam are Japan with US$1,803.4 
million and Taiwan with US$1,468.2 million. Geographical proximity and propinquity is the main 
reason why most of FDI inflows into Vietnam originated from Asian countries.   
 
Figure II. 7. Investment by Ownership Sectors in Vietnam 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1988-2013) of General Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of Vietnam and GSO’s website. Unit: percent of total investment. 
Thus, FDI inflows have played an important role in Vietnamese economy in general and in total 
investment of the whole country. Figure II.7 depicts the shares of investment by ownership in 
Vietnam from 1976 to 2013, of which the investments of state government are majority. Before 
Doi Moi, the share of state investment was 100 percent. Private sectors launched investments in 
1986, while foreign investors began to enter in 1988. The share of FDI inflows in the total 
investment of Vietnam have been increasing during the period 1988-2013. Especially, FDI inflows 
accounted for 30 percent of the total investment in 1995, 1996 and over 31 percent in 2008. There 
has been a downward trend in the share of government investment relative to private and FDI 
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sectors since 1995 reflecting the transition from centralized to a market-oriented economy and 
from isolation to international integration.   
5. Industrial Performance of Vietnam since 1976 
During trade liberalization and the comprehensive economic reforms, Vietnam has experienced an 
impressive industrial performance. The growth rate of gross industrial output (GIO) fluctuated in 
the period of 1976 - 1994, then grew at a more stable rate of around 15 percent till 2007, and then 
declined after the global financial crisis of 2008. Before the Doi Moi Policy, the trade embargo 
from advanced capitalist countries made Vietnam into an effectively closed economy and domestic 
industries did not have to compete with foreign competitors and imports. After 1989, because of 
the collapse of Soviet bloc and the open-door economic policy which subjected domestic industry 
to new global competition, there was a sharp decline in GIO growth rate in 1990. However, during 
the period 1994-2007, Vietnam had enjoyed a stable and higher rate of GIO through 2007 until the 
global financial crisis of 2008 led to a decline of 6.3 percent in GIO growth rate in 2012 (Figure 
II.8).   
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Figure II. 8. Gross Industrial Output Growth Rate of Vietnam 
Source: The growth rates of Gross Industrial Output were calculated by General Statistical Office. The data 
was collected from different issues (1976-2012), Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam. 
 
Figure II.9 presents the growth rate of gross industrial output calculated by General Statistical 
Office (GSO) in the period of 1976-2012 and the gross industrial output from 1996 to 2013 by 
ownership: state, non-state and foreign investment sector. As shown in the figure, from 1976 to 
1986, the gross industrial output of state owned companies grew fast in 1976 after the country’s 
reunification then declined significantly in 1982. After 1986, growth rate of GIO in the state-
owned sector rose steadily until 1995. The growth rate of GIO of state owned sections decreased 
while the GIO growth rates of non-state owned and foreign investment sectors increased 
significantly and reached their peak in 2005 with 25 percent and 21 percent growth respectively. 
However, after the global financial crisis in 2008, the GIO growth rate of non-state-owned 
companies was only 0.4 percent in 2012 while they are 6.3 percent and 6.5 percent for state owned 
and foreign investment sectors. 
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Figure II. 9. Gross Industrial Output and GIO Growth Rate by Ownership Sectors 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues of Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam (General Statistical 
Office) from 1976 to 2012 for GIO growth rate and from 1996 to 2013 for the share of GIO. 
The gross industrial output of Vietnam has been increasing significantly since 1996 for all sectors 
by ownership. A rise in the shares of non-state and foreign investment sector in the gross industrial 
output of Vietnam during the period 1996-2013 is observed. In 1996, the share of GIO in the state-
owned sectors was about 50 percent while it was only 24 percent for non-state owned and 26 
percent foreign investment sectors. Yet, in 2013, the shares of GIO in FDI sectors rose to about 50 
percent, while the share of state-owned sector declined to about 16 percent. This is a reversal of 
the relative positions of the two sectors and suggests that the foreign investment sectors have 
grown in importance in Vietnam’s industrial sector. 
6. Income Distribution, Inequality and Poverty in Vietnam since Doi Moi 
The Doi Moi reforms and liberalization have brought prosperity to Vietnamese economy and also 
improved Vietnamese people’s living standards in both urban and rural areas. After thirty years of 
the Doi Moi Policy, income distribution in Vietnam has experienced impressive changes. For 
example, during the period of 2005-2015, per capita GDP grew annually at rate of 5 percent while 
-40.000
-20.000
0.000
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
GIO GROWTH RATE
State Non State FDI
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
SHARE OF GIO
State Non State FDI
 107 
 
the expenditure per month of Vietnamese family has increased by from VND 792 (US$40) in 2008 
to VND 1,888 (US$80) in 2014.  
However, there is a growing urban-rural gap in average income per capita in Vietnam, which can 
be explained by the widening labor productivity growth gap between the primary (agriculture, 
forestry and fishing), manufacturing, construction and service sectors. The monthly average 
income per capita in both urban and rural areas has grown which were VND 517 thousand (US$30) 
and VND 225 thousand (US$15) in 1999, respectively, while it was VND 3,964 thousand (about 
US$200) and VND 2,038 thousand (US$100) in 2014, respectively (see Table II.5 and Table A.II.1 
in appendix).   
Table II. 5. Monthly Average Income Per Capita and GINI Index 
 
Year 
Whole Country Urban Rural 
Per Capita 
Income GINI 
Per Capita 
Income GINI 
Per Capita 
Income GINI 
1999 295 n.a 517 n.a 225 n.a 
2002 356 0.42 622 0.41 275 0.36 
2004 484 0.42 815 0.41 378 0.37 
2006 636 0.424 1058 0.393 506 0.378 
2008 995 0.434 1605 0.404 762 0.385 
2010 1387 0.433 2130 0.402 1070 0.395 
2012 2000 0.424 2989 0.385 1579 0.399 
2014 2637 0.43 3964 0.397 2038 0.398 
Source: GSO, Unit: Thousand Vietnamese Dong at current prices 
Vietnamese inequality (Gini coefficient) has continually increased since the Doi Moi and opening-
up policies.  For example, the Gini coefficient of the whole country increased from 0.42 in 2002 
to 0.43 in 2014. However, the Gini coefficient of urban area has declined from 0.41 in 2002 to 
0.397 in 2014, while the Gini coefficient of rural area has increased from 0.36 to 0.398 (see Table 
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II.4). Thus, while inequality in rural Vietnam has declined, inequality is seen some increase in 
urban Vietnam.  
The adoption and implementation of the Doi Moi Policy has brought spectacular changes in the 
socio-economic-political situation of the country in the past 30 years (1986-2016). Poverty 
reduction is one of the most remarkable achievement of Doi Moi Policy. Table II.6 exhibits some 
key social indices with some improvements evident in all social indicators such as HDI.  
Table II. 6. Some Key Social Indicators 
 
Year 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Human Development Index (HDI) n.a. n.a. 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Patient bed per 10000 inhabitants 
(Bed) n.a. n.a. 22 24.9 25 26.3 27.1 
Doctor per 10000 inhabitants (Pers.) n.a. n.a. 7.1 7.3 7.6 7.9 8 
Monthly average income per capita 
at current prices (Thous. VND) 636 995 1387 2000 n.a. 2637 n.a. 
Monthly average expenditure per 
capita at current prices (Thous. 
VND) 
511 792 1211 1603 n.a. 1888 n.a. 
Percentage of household having 
hygienic water (%) 89.1 92.1 90.5 91 n.a. 93 n.a. 
Percentage of household using toilet 
(%) 59.1 65 75.7 77.4 n.a. 83.6 n.a. 
Percentage of household using 
electricity (%) 96 97.6 97.2 97.6 n.a. 98.3 n.a. 
Percentage of households having 
durable goods (%) 99 99 98.4 99.4 n.a. 99.7 n.a. 
Average dwelling area per capita 
(m2) 14.7 16.3 17.9 19.4 n.a. 21.4 n.a. 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues of Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 
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Table II. 7. General Poverty Rate by Residence in Vietnam 
 
Year 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Whole 
Country 37.4 28.9 18.1 15.5 13.4 14.2 12.6 11.1 9.8 8.4 7 
Urban 9 6.6 8.6 7.7 6.7 6.9 5.1 4.3 3.7 3 2.5 
Rural 44.9 35.6 21.2 18 16.1 17.4 15.9 14.1 12.7 10.8 9.2 
Source: GSO website 
During the period of 1998-2015, the poverty rate has decreased from 37.4 percent in 1998 to 7 
percent in 2015. However, Doi Moi Policy has also brought growing inequality between the rich 
and the poor, between the rural and urban population and between ethnic minorities and the 
majority of the population. Table II.7 presents the general poverty rate by residence and region in 
Vietnam which shows a big difference in poverty rate between the urban and rural area. In 1998, 
the rate was 9 percent in urban area while it was much higher of 44.9 percent in rural area. The 
gap was narrowed by 2015 with the poverty rate falling to 2.5 percent and 9.2 percent respectively. 
Moreover, according to Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) in 2000, per capita income in 
the richest region is 4.5 times higher than that of the poorest (Tran & To, 2000). There is also 
greater disparity between the access of the rich and the poor to basic social services especially in 
health care and education. For example, illiteracy rates and the quality of education are very high 
in a poor region based on VLSS in 1992 and 1998. The disparity in access to health care services 
between the rich and the poor has also increased.  
IV. Decomposition of Shifts in Effective Demand 
1. The Decomposition Technique of Effective Demand 
Thus, Vietnam has exhibited notable economic growth and development during the past thirty 
years thanks to the comprehensive reforms with an open-door policy toward international trade 
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and investment. This section will examine the role of external liberalization as a determinant of 
macroeconomic performance in Vietnam during this period. Following Berg and Taylor (2000), I 
decompose aggregate demand with a two-step process. We distinguish the foreign sector from the 
domestic sector in the first step and decompose the domestic demand into government and private 
sectors in the second step.  
Effective demand is the outcome of the balance between demand “injections” and “leakages” 
(Taylor, 2006, page 2). The injections are private investment in fixed capital and inventories, 
government spending and exports, while leakages are private saving, taxes and imports.  
The total value of supply (X) is determined by injections and leakages. The injections of public 
sector, private sector and external sector are total government spending (G), private investment 
(Ip) and exports (E), respectively. The corresponding leakages of the three sectors are taxation 
(tX), savings (sX) and imports (mX).  
Then the decomposition of the sources of effective demand is the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0I sX G tX E mX− + − + − =  
Where: X is the total supply; I is investment and s is saving rate; G is government spending, t is 
tax rate and; E is export, m is the propensity to import. 
2. Analyzing the Sources of Effective Demand in Vietnam 
In the gross domestic product by expenditure approach, Vietnamese’s GDP is divided into three 
parts: consumption, investment and exports. Table II.8 presents the average growth rate of 
consumption, investment, and exports and imports of goods and services in real term since 1990, 
while the decomposition of foreign and domestic sectors is presented in Table II.9. As shown in 
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Table II.8, the second phase of the Doi Moi Policy (1994-1997) experienced the highest growth 
rates of GDP, consumption spending, aggregate investment and export growth. For example, 
aggregate investment spending grew to its peak in 1995, increasing by nearly 15 percent, GDP 
growth rate reached to its peak of 9.5 percent in the same year, suggesting that the implementation 
phase of the Doi Moi Policy brought better macroeconomic performance in Vietnam. The growth 
rate of exports and imports also reflect impact of the Doi Moi Policy. The export-led strategy 
adopted under the Doi Moi Policy lead to high growth rates of exports, with a peak of 29.8 percent 
in 1991. Vietnamese exports continued to grow at high rates through the period of 1994-2008. 
However, the growth rate of export fell by 5 percent in 2009 following the global financial crisis 
in 2008. Following the comprehensive policies to control inflation and stabilize domestic 
macroeconomic as well as comprehensive monetary policies to devalue currency and the stimulate 
package of USD1.5 billion in 2013, exports grew at higher rates of 15 percent and 17 percent in 
2012 and 2013.  
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Table II. 8. GDP Expenditure Components: Average Annual Growth Rate 
 
Year GDP (%) 
Consumption 
(%) 
Private 
Consumption 
(%) 
Government 
Consumption 
(%) 
Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
(%) 
Exports 
of Goods 
and 
Services 
(%) 
Imports 
of Goods 
and 
Services 
(%) 
1990 5.10 3.54 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.93 -4.50 
1991 5.96 0.08 n.a. n.a. n.a. 29.86 -6.36 
1992 8.64 3.87 n.a. n.a. n.a. 24.67 18.79 
1993 8.07 10.38 n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.13 41.82 
1994 8.83 7.43 n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.00 31.47 
1995 9.54 7.41 7.21 8.40 14.75 20.00 16.27 
1996 9.34 8.14 9.09 7.43 14.01 24.00 21.30 
1997 8.10 6.01 5.91 4.00 10.16 16.00 9.65 
1998 5.76 4.29 4.47 3.22 12.41 19.00 18.39 
1999 4.77 2.19 2.60 -5.70 1.58 23.00 12.56 
2000 6.78 3.92 3.08 5.01 10.18 21.10 16.61 
2001 6.19 4.37 4.47 6.60 10.72 17.18 16.44 
2002 6.32 7.41 7.63 5.38 12.86 10.37 15.79 
2003 6.89 7.22 8.01 7.19 11.90 19.95 22.72 
2004 7.53 4.49 7.09 7.77 10.44 25.62 21.94 
2005 7.54 3.39 7.26 8.20 9.75 17.78 14.18 
2006 6.97 5.77 7.47 8.50 9.90 11.20 11.99 
2007 7.12 13.12 9.78 8.90 24.16 12.50 26.93 
2008 5.66 7.80 7.67 7.52 3.84 13.70 15.01 
2009 5.39 2.37 2.25 7.60 8.73 -5.09 -6.82 
2010 6.42 4.55 8.19 12.28 10.89 8.45 8.22 
2011 6.24 5.79 4.10 7.12 -7.81 10.78 4.10 
2012 5.25 -0.20 4.88 7.19 1.87 15.71 9.09 
2013 5.42 5.19 5.18 7.26 5.30 17.37 17.34 
2014 5.98 6.24 6.12 7.00 9.27 11.56 12.80 
2015 6.68 13.29 6.33 9.96 9.37 12.64 18.12 
Source: Author’s calculation from WDI (2016) 
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Table II. 9. Decomposition of Foreign and Domestic Sectors 
 
Year X=GDP+M m=M/X s=(GDP-C)/X I/s E/m 
1994 23,364 0.30 0.11 35,372 18,285 
1995 29,426 0.30 0.13 41,446 23,039 
1996 37,439 0.34 0.11 57,508 29,517 
1997 40,598 0.34 0.13 53,765 34,150 
1998 41,400 0.34 0.14 51,444 35,601 
1999 43,834 0.35 0.16 45,477 41,465 
2000 51,562 0.35 0.16 54,753 48,357 
2001 53,887 0.35 0.18 53,538 52,152 
2002 59,672 0.36 0.15 71,460 52,720 
2003 69,476 0.39 0.14 94,725 58,199 
2004 82,716 0.40 0.12 125,537 67,417 
2005 96,256 0.40 0.18 98,887 91,493 
2006 113,227 0.41 0.19 112,181 108,608 
2007 142,510 0.46 0.14 192,451 119,512 
2008 182,380 0.46 0.12 253,868 152,749 
2009 183,764 0.42 0.15 232,194 157,787 
2010 208,926 0.45 0.15 248,176 187,535 
2011 248,747 0.46 0.14 260,395 236,438 
2012 275,061 0.43 0.17 216,480 287,653 
2013 310,713 0.45 0.16 254,792 318,943 
2014 340,996 0.45 0.16 269,913 354,430 
2015 365,879 0.47 0.15 317,181 369,132 
Source: Author’s calculation from WDI (2016). Unit: billion VND. 
Note: GDP: gross domestic product. C: final consumption expenditure. I: gross capital formation. M: 
import of goods and services. E: Export of goods and services. Unit: Vietnamese Dong (VND) 
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Figure II. 10. Contribution of Components of Aggregate Demand to GDP 
 
 
Figure II. 11. Sources of Demand: Direct Multiplier Effects minus Total Supply 
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Figure II. 12. Leakages: Saving, Tax and Import Propensities 
 
Figure II.10 and Figure II-11 indicate that Vietnamese economy has not shown a definitive export 
orientation during 1994-2011. The total supply (X) was always higher than the contribution of 
exports to GDP (E/m) since 1994 to 2011. However, E/m has been higher than X since 2012, with 
a greater contribution of exports to the total supply or total output. With the Doi Moi policy reforms, 
Vietnam shifted the country to a more market oriented economy, and the export of goods and 
services has been an important priority. However, Vietnam’s economy has still been recovering 
from the impact of war, the collapses of Soviet Union Bloc, as well as from Asian economic crisis 
in 1997 and global financial crisis in 2008. The greater contribution of external sector since 2011 
has convinced many that the liberal reform of Vietnamese government since Doi Moi was correct.  
Figure II.10 also suggests that private investment’s contribution (Ip/s) was always greater than X, 
and private investment a strong impetus to Vietnamese economic growth after Doi Moi until 2011. 
However, private investment has no longer been the main determinant of total output in Vietnam 
since 2012.  
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Between 1997 to 2005, there was a decline in government contribution to output due to the 
transition to a market oriented system, the weak ability of the government to tax the emerging 
private sector. The contributions of state sector to government revenues has declined even as that 
of the private sector increased. Government budget rose after 2005 and become the main driving 
force of Vietnamese output since 2012. The increase from 7.2 percent to 12.2 percent annual 
growth rate in government spending from 2010 to 2015 (see Table II.8) were offset by an increase 
in government revenues as a share of GDP.  
In short, government spending and private investment were the main drivers of Vietnamese 
economic growth during 1994 – 2011, while the very high propensity of imports (Figure II.12) led 
to the negative impact of exports on overall demand throughout this period. The external sector 
together with government expenditure have become the important driving factors of Vietnamese 
economic growth since 2012. 
V. Employment Changes and Decompositions of Labor Productivity Growth in Vietnam 
1. The Decomposition Technique of Labor Productivity 
1.1.The Decomposition Technique 
This section presents the decomposition of movements across sectors and time in labor 
productivity growth, as well as employment following Berg and Taylor (2000).  
The decomposition is as follows: 
X is output, L is employment, which x and l denote the growth rate of output and employment 
respectively. Subscript i denote the ith sector. ���   is share of sector i output and ���  represents the 
share of sector i employment. Then labor productivity in sector i is given by ����  and the growth rate 
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of labor productivity is �� = �� − ��. The growth rate of labor productivity for the whole economy 
is decomposed into two parts as the following: 
 [ ( ) ]i i iL i i
i
X X L l
X X L
ε ε= + −∑  
1.2.Challenges of Measuring Labor Productivity in Service Sectors 
Labor productivity is defined as a ratio of a volume measure of output to a volume measure of 
input use and productivity measurement in manufacturing sector has been mostly based on 
comparing input and output (OECD, 2001). However, measuring the productivity of services has 
been challenging because of its difficulty in how to measure output and input.  
The problem of measuring a service output is that the output indexes have to be quantifiable and 
independent of input indicators (Mark, 1982). For example, we cannot count boxes as the output 
for a day of a broker, an expediter or a quality control officer. We must find a way to quantify 
service output by measuring the number of services, number of customers or number of problems 
which are solved. There is quantity data available in some service sectors such as for utilities and 
transportation services. Price deflation may be used to measure output for gasoline service stations 
or retail food stores. The problem of measuring a service input is data gaps. Employment data, 
working hours by age and occupation of service sector are limited.  
2. Employment Growth and Changes in Employment Structure in Vietnam 
Since the adoption of its reform and opening-up policy, there has been a continuous growth in 
employment in Vietnam. The total of employed persons was 37.07 million in 2000 and up to 52.8 
million after 15 years in 2015 (see Table II.11). There are significant changes in the structure of 
employment in Vietnam in the past 10 years. As shown in Table II.10, the share of the total 
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employed persons in the primary sector18 (AFF) has declined from 69 percent in 1999 to 55.1 
percent in 2005 and to 44 percent in 2015, a reduction of 25 percent (GSO’s website). Meanwhile, 
the employment shares of other sectors such as manufacturing, construction and services have 
increased from 11.8 percent; 4.6 percent and 26.7 percent in 2005 to 15.3 percent; 6.5 percent and 
32.5 percent in 2015 respectively. These trends reflect and are consistent with external 
liberalization in Vietnam during 2005-2015.  
Table II. 10. Employment by Industry 
Year 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing (AFF) 55.1 52.9 52.3 51.5 49.5 48.4 47.4 46.7 46.3 44 
Manufacturing 11.8 12.5 12.9 13.5 13.5 13.8 13.8 13.9 14.1 15.3 
Construction 4.6 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.5 
Services 26.7 27.7 28 28.2 29 29.9 30.8 31.3 31.7 32.5 
Source: GSO, unit: percentage 
The share of the foreign investment sector in employment has increased in Vietnam. The share of 
total employed persons working in enterprises with foreign investment was 1 percent in 2000, and 
increased to 4.2 percent in 2015, which is consistent with trade-integration activities in Vietnam 
during the fifth and sixth phase of the Doi Moi Policy. Employment in the non-state sector remains 
high in Vietnam with the shares of 87.3 percent in 2000 and 86 percent in 2015 (Table II.11) due 
to the massive restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the Doi Moi policy and the 
requirements of being an official member of WTO.  
  
                                                          
18
 The primary sector includes agriculture, forestry and fishing, and denoted as AFF. 
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Table II. 11. Employment by Types of Ownership in Vietnam 
Year Total (Thous. Persons) State (%) Non-state (%) 
Foreign 
investment 
sector (%) 
2000 37,075.3 11.7 87.3 1 
2001 38,180.1 11.7 87.4 0.9 
2002 39,275.9 11.8 87.1 1.1 
2003 40,403.9 12.1 86 1.9 
2004 41,578.8 12.1 85.7 2.2 
2005 42,774.9 11.6 85.8 2.6 
2006 43,980.3 11.2 85.8 3 
2007 45,208 11 85.5 3.5 
2008 46,460.8 10.9 85.5 3.6 
2009 47,743.6 10.6 86.2 3.2 
2010 49,048.5 10.4 86.1 3.5 
2011 50,352 10.4 86.2 3.4 
2012 51,422.4 10.4 86.3 3.3 
2013 52,207.8 10.2 86.4 3.4 
2014 52,744.5 10.4 85.7 3.9 
2015 52,840 9.8 86 4.2 
Source: GSO 
3. Decomposition Results of Overall Labor Productivity Growth 
During every stage of the Doi Moi Policy and liberalization since 1986, foreign investment and 
the participation of domestic enterprises in international trade play a very important role in 
boosting domestic production as well as overall labor productivity. Labor productivity has 
increased impressively from 22.8 percent in 2005 to 23.8 percent in 2008. However, it decreased 
to 5.84 percent in 2010 after the global financial crisis (see Table II.14). There was an upward 
trend of the growth of labor productivity in 2011 thank to the stimulus package of the Vietnamese 
government. However, the growth rate of labor productivity has been declining since 2013 due to 
the crash of domestic stock market and, the banking and real estate sectors, as well as 
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overwhelming number of business closures during the period of 2007- 2012. Labor productivity 
grew at different rates in different sectors, and the service sector productivity was the fastest 
growing during the period 2005-2015.  
The decomposition of overall productivity in Table II.12, Table II.13 and Table I.14 show that 
sectoral productivity growth, especially in the case of the service sector in 2005, 2008 and 2010, 
played an important role in the improvement of overall productivity in Vietnam (see Table II.13). 
Meanwhile, labor productivity of AFF and construction sectors remained lower. However, the 
AFF sector was still the second contributor to employment growth, although its labor share 
declined by 11 percent after 15 years (see Table II.10). The decomposition also shows that in the 
fifth phase of the Doi Moi policy when the domestic economic market faced with the global 
financial crisis (2008 – 2012) employment growth in manufacturing sector in 2011, 2013, 2014 
and 2015 and construction sector in 2008, 2011 and 2012 (see Table II.13) had a negative effect 
on overall productivity.  
The decomposition indicates that sectoral productivity growth was the main driver of overall 
productivity in Vietnam from 2005-2015. The service sector accounted for significant sectoral 
productivity gains due to its large output share, while the employment reallocation of 
manufacturing, and construction sectors slowed down the productivity gains (see Table II.12 and 
Table II.13). We can link these results to the macroeconomic performance in Vietnam. Under the 
Doi Moi Policy and external liberalization, services have been attractive and profitable sectors 
thank to emerging demand in wholesaler, retailer, tourism and education as well as encouraging 
policies of the Vietnamese government on these sectors. There was a significant movement of 
labor into the services sector during the period 2005-2015. The employment share of service sector 
increased from 26.7 in 2005 to 32.5 in 2015 (see Table II.10). However, the growth of output share 
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in service sector was the highest rate compared to other sectors that contributed mainly to the 
sectoral productivity growth. Meanwhile, the contribution of the industry sector (manufacturing 
and construction) was unexpectedly weak because of the massive shifts from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to private enterprises and their greater involvement in a more liberalized and 
competitive market. As a result, a large number of workers from SOEs shifted over to the private 
service sectors in urban areas during 2005-2015 and it became an important driver of employment 
growth in Vietnam. Moreover, the Doi Moi and opening-up policies have been bringing in more 
FDI during this period leading to new demand and labors for service sectors.  
In short, the analysis of Vietnamese employment and the decomposition of labor productivity 
growth during 2005-2015 suggests that labor reallocation between sectors (AFF, manufacturing, 
construction and services) and growth in sectoral productivity are important. However, we should 
note that productivity gains from employment reallocation between sectors have not been 
particularly significant during this period, while sectoral productivity growth in service sector was 
the main driver of overall productivity growth.  
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Table II. 12. Contributions of Sectoral Productivity Growth to Overall Productivity 
Year ∑ ����� ��  
(%) 
����� �� 
AFF (%) Manufacturing (%) 
Construction 
(%) Service (%) 
2005 19.06 4.81 2.64 2.01 9.6 
2006 7.34 1.5 2.28 0.72 2.84 
2007 13.15 3.68 2.28 0.74 6.44 
2008 23.04 8.21 3.22 0.92 10.70 
2009 6.7 0.7 0.44 0.58 4.98 
2010 3.36 2.87 -2.35 0.03 2.81 
2011 22.39 7.2 3.56 0.76 10.87 
2012 11.83 2.84 1.87 0.54 6.57 
2013 5.41 0.56 1.12 0.21 3.51 
2014 7.77 1.47 0.84 0.47 4.98 
2015 5.38 1.19 0.02 0.52 3.48 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Vietnamese Statistical Yearbook (various issues from 2005 to 2015) 
Table II. 13. Contributions to Employment Reallocation Effect on Overall Productivity 
Growth 
 
Year  ∑���� − ���� �� 
(%) 
���� − ���� �� 
AFF (%) Manufacturing (%) 
Construction 
(%) Service (%) 
2005 3.379 0.639 1.2 0.14 1.4 
2006 2.364 1.344 0.32 0.08 0.62 
2007 1.01 0.06 0.12 0.73 0.1 
2008 0.76 0.36 0.18 0.02 0.2 
2009 0.72 0.5 0.22 -0.01 0.01 
2010 2.12 1.21 0.01 0.1 0.8 
2011 0.81 0.64 -0.01 -0.02 0.2 
2012 0.98 0.58 0.01 -0.01 0.4 
2013 0.63 0.42 -0.01 0.02 0.2 
2014 0.21 0.2 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
2015 1.47 1.34 -0.01 0.13 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Vietnamese Statistical Yearbook (various issues from 2005 to 2015) 
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Table II. 14. The Growth Rate of Overall Labor Productivity 
 
Year  
 [ ( ) ]i i iL i i
i
X X L l
X X L
ε ε= + −∑  
(%) 
∑ ����� ��  
(%) 
∑���� − ���� �� (%) 
2005 22.439 19.06 3.379 
2006 9.704 7.34 2.364 
2007 14.16 13.15 1.01 
2008 23.8 23.04 0.76 
2009 7.42 6.7 0.72 
2010 5.84 3.36 2.12 
2011 23.2 22.39 0.81 
2012 12.81 11.83 0.98 
2013 6.04 5.41 0.63 
2014 7.98 7.77 0.21 
2015 6.85 5.38 1.47 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Vietnamese Statistical Yearbook (various issues from 2005-2015) 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This essay attempts to investigate Vietnamese macroeconomic performance since its 
comprehensive reforms in 1986 (the Doi Moi Policy). It seeks to shed some light on the main 
driver of aggregate demand, employment and labor productivity. To this end, the author 
investigates the main mechanisms driving the remarkable performance of Vietnamese economy 
since the Doi Moi Policy. The author tried to explore factors resulting the upward trend in 
economic growth of Vietnam recently and elaborate the relationship between economic growth 
and the Doi Moi policy as well as external liberalization. The results of the decomposition of 
aggregate demand highlighted the following aspects:  
• Private investment was the most important determinants of Vietnamese economic growth 
during 1994 – 2011, while government expenditure has contributed its influences on total 
output since 2005. 
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• The very high propensity of imports had resulted in the negative stance of exports through the 
period of 1994-2011. 
• The external sector together with government expenditure have become important driving 
factors of Vietnamese economic growth since 2012.   
The analysis of employment growth and the decomposition of overall labor productivity 
highlighted the following aspects: 
• During the Doi Moi and opening-up policies, employment has grown dramatically in Vietnam, 
with the total of employed persons of 52.8 million in 2015. The share of total employed persons 
in the primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fishing - AFF) has declined while employment 
share of the foreign invested sectors has increased.  
• The decomposition of labor productivity shows that that sectoral productivity growth, 
especially in the case of the service sector, plays an important role in the improvement of 
overall productivity in Vietnam.  
• During the thirty years of the Doi Moi Policy and opening their economy, the income gap 
between regions and people in Vietnamese urban and rural areas has continued to be apparent 
however it has been narrowed.   
The success of government’s intensive reforms underlines the important role of government 
policies on Vietnamese economy. To continue benefiting from trade liberalization, Vietnamese 
government should preserve and extend their role in managing the market-oriented economy by 
formulating rules and regulations for the external sectors, while encouraging private investment. 
The State Bank of Vietnam should pursue a flexible of loosening or tightening monetary policy to 
ease pressure of high inflation and stabilize macroeconomic. Restructuring of commercial banking 
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sectors and stabilizing exchange rate seem to be a necessary policy to maintain macroeconomic 
stability.    
The decomposition of effective demand and labor productivity growth suggests that Vietnamese 
government should promote the private sector, which plays very important role in accelerating 
economic growth. This can be achieved by streamlining bureaucratic procedure for business start-
up, giving private enterprises equal rights with state-owned companies, while removing any 
limitation to them to access to international market. Vietnamese government should encourage and 
support domestic enterprises in trading in the international market by more open regulations, 
intensive training and education for their employees as well as continuing the shift from state-
owned enterprises to non-stated owned enterprises. Since the sectoral productivity growth of the 
service sector seems to be the most important driver of overall productivity growth in Vietnam 
during the past ten years, it would appear that the government should pay more attention on this 
sector by investing and building more infrastructure as well as improving regulations governing 
service activities. At the same time steps can be taken to improve productivity in the manufacturing 
sector which constitutes a significant share of employment. This is particularly important if 
Vietnam is to avoid premature deindustrialization that external liberalization has given rise to in 
many developing countries. 
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CHAPTER III 
TRADE OPENNESS, VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INDUSTRIAL 
PERFORMANCE AT REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS 
I. Introduction 
Trade liberalization and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have catalyzed economic growth and 
industrial performance in developing countries and there has been a lot of research investigating 
these impacts in different countries. Some positive effects of trade openness and FDI on economic 
growth and industrial performance have been observed in empirical studies in developing 
countries. External liberalization leads to a faster rate of technological absorption and generates 
the positive spillover effects and accelerates economic growth (Dutta & Ahmed, 2006). In the long 
run, a more open economy generates economic of scale due to research and development, and 
knowledge spillover; accumulation of human capital and learning by doing (Lucas, 1988). 
Empirical studies have shown positive effects of FDI, such as raising employment and wages or 
income share of labor; leading to technological spillovers in the host country. This results in an 
increase in overall productivity; enhancing export activities both for the countries where FDI 
comes from and for the host countries thus improving the balance of payments (Milberg, 1999). 
The benefits of trade openness and FDI on macroeconomic variables have been of enduring interest 
of economists. However, empirical studies on the effects of trade liberalization as well as FDI on 
economic growth especially on industrial performance at both regional and provincial levels in 
Vietnam and other emerging countries are rare. 
Vietnam is composed of 68 provinces and cities divided into eight regions including Southeast, 
Red River Delta, Mekong River Delta, Northeast, Northwest, North Central Coast, South Central 
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Coast and Central Highlands19. Since the Doi Moi Policy, Vietnam has experienced one of the 
highest rates of economic growth and development as well as high volumes of external 
liberalization. The results of the decomposition of effective demand and productivity growth in 
Essay 2 show that the external and government sector have been crucial drivers of Vietnamese 
economic growth, while the growth of labor productivity in service sector plays an important role 
in the improvement of overall productivity in Vietnam. Moreover, Vietnam is also one of the few 
countries in Asia that has been able to sustain manufacturing growth and has become a significant 
FDI destination in Asia. However, the volume of FDI inflows into each of these eight regions is 
different depending on their economic conditions. In this essay, the author continues elaborating 
the correlation of trade openness and economic growth, as well as industrial performance by 
focusing on the regional and provincial levels. This essay investigates the main drivers of 
economic growth and industrial performance in Vietnam at the regional and provincial levels in 
the most recent phases of the Doi Moi Policy.  
This essay is organized into six sections. The second section reviews regional and provincial 
economic and industrial performance in Vietnam during the period of vigorous reforms and 
external liberalization (1995-2015). The third section summarizes the literature of the relationship 
between external liberalization, economic growth, and industrial performance. The fourth section 
will introduce the factors driving the relation between openness and economic performance at 
provincial and regional levels as well as data and econometric models. The results of empirical 
investigation will be analyzed in the fifth section. Conclusions with some recommendations are 
provided in the sixth section.  
                                                          
19
 Vietnam Briefing, GSO, 2012 
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II. Regional and Provincial Economic and Industrial Performances in Vietnam 
1. Regional and Provincial Economic Performance in Vietnam 
Vietnam is composed of 68 provinces and centrally-governed cities which are divided into eight 
geographical regions and three key economic zones. The Northern key economic zone includes 
seven municipalities and provinces: Hanoi, Hai Phong, Quang Ninh, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Bac 
Ninh and Vinh Phuc. The economic growth of the Northern economic zone is based on agricultural 
manpower. The Southern key economic zone covers seven provinces and cities which are Ho Chi 
Minh city, Binh Duong, Ba Ria – Vung Tau, Dong Nai, Tay Ninh, Binh Phuoc and Long An. The 
economy in this zone is driven by the development of commerce, exports, telecommunications, 
tourism, finance, banking, services, technology. Agriculture which mainly produces rubber, 
coffee, cashew nuts, sugarcane is also an important drivers of the zone’s economic growth. The 
Central key economic zone includes 5 provinces: Thua Thien Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh 
Dinh and Da Nang. This zone’s economic growth mostly relies on oil and gas, shipbuilding, 
logistics, high-tech industries and coastal tourism.  
The Vietnamese government and the General Statistics Office divides the eight geographical 
regions into six economic regions (see Figure III.1). The Red River Delta constitutes the industrial 
heart of Vietnam and is one of the richest and most developed regions in the country with the 
second lowest poverty rate of 3.2 percent in 2015 (see Table II.1) and the second highest average 
income of VND4,113 thousand in 2014 (USD200, see Table A.III.1 in appendix). The capital of 
Vietnam - Hanoi, which is located in this area, is the economic center of the Red River Delta. The 
region is highly industrialized, resulting in high electricity demand but consists mainly of flood 
plains. The Red River Delta is one of the most attractive destinations of FDI in the nation as well.  
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Figure III. 1. Maps of Vietnamese Economic Regions and Key Economic Zones 
Source: http://www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/vietnams-regions-key-economic-zones.html/, last updated 
10/10/2017. 
The northern midlands and mountain areas includes two geographical regions: Northeast and 
Northwest. The Northeast includes the mountainous areas in the north and center, bordered by 
China to the north and northeast. The region is rich in mineral resources such as coal, metals, 
building materials, industrial minerals with more than 300 mines of different types of minerals. 
The Northeast’s economy mostly focuses on high technology, engineering and energy sectors. 
However, agriculture, in particular, the cultivation of rice, maize, potatoes, tea, lemongrass and 
vegetables, remains an important driver of their economy. The Northeast also focuses on forestry 
which can produce approximately 3.5 million cubic meters of wood and 500 million trees of 
bamboo and neohouzeaua per year20. Besides agriculture and forestry, the region also has a power 
sector with several hydro-electric power plants and coal fired thermal power plants. Tourism is an 
important source of GDP with few popular tourist destinations such as Sapa (Lao Cai) and Ha 
                                                          
20
 The author summarized from Vietnam Briefing: http://www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/vietnams-regions-key-
economic-zones.html/, “Vietnam’s Provinces, Regions and Key Economic Zones” by Samantha Jones and Julia Gu, 
posted on 5/29/2012. 
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Long Bay (Quang Ninh). The Northwest, which is covered by a number of mountains is one of the 
poorest regions in Vietnam with the highest poverty rate of 16 percent in 2015 (see Table III.1) 
and the lowest average income of VND1,613 in 2014 (about USD81, see Table A.III.1 in 
appendix). Its economy mostly focuses on the cultivation of products such as tea, medicinal and 
aromatic herbs, and fruits and the region has recently begun mining coal, clay, iron and gold, which 
include a large number of self-employed workers resulting in a lower rate of unemployment (see 
Table III.3)  
The General Statistics Office (GSO) combines the North and South-Central Coast as the third 
economic region, called as North Central and Central Coastal area. The economy of the region 
with a long coastline, large estuaries, ports and excellent coastal lagoon system, is based mainly 
on aquaculture. The region has several minerals such as iron, gold, titanium, lead and also relies 
heavily on hydropower plants. Moreover, tourism is one of the most important sector of their 
economy.  
The central highland area’s economy is based heavily on the manufacturing sector, agriculture and 
forestry exports, which account for 60 percent of the region’s GDP. The region’s economy exports 
a high volume of coffee, sugar, vegetable oil and meat products. This region has the lowest rate of 
unemployment. The unemployment rate was 1.03 percent in contrast to the Mekong River Delta, 
which had the highest rate of unemployment of 2.77 percent in 2015 (Table III.3). However, 
Central highlands is also the least attractive destination of FDI in the country (see Table II.2).  
The Southeast region (Ho Chi Minh city area) has been the primary destination of foreign 
investment in Vietnam. This region’s economy is based on heavily industry production such as 
rubber products and polyethylene production. The region is endowed with a wide variety of 
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minerals including sand glass, granite, bentonite clay. More recently, the Southeast economy has 
begun focusing heavily on oil and gas production. The South East region always has the lowest 
poverty rate and the highest monthly average income in the nation which was VND4,125 thousand 
in 2014 (about USD202, see Table A.III.I in appendix). 
Table III. 1. Poverty Rates by Regions in Vietnam 
 
Year 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Red River 
Delta 30.7 21.5 12.7 10 8.6 8.3 7.1 6 4.9 4 3.2 
Northern 
midlands and 
mountain areas 
64.5 47.9 29.4 27.5 25.1 29.4 26.7 23.8 21.9 18.4 16 
North Central 
area and 
Central coastal 
area 
42.5 35.7 25.3 22.2 19.2 20.4 18.5 16.1 14 11.8 9.8 
Central 
Highlands 52.4 51.8 29.2 24 21 22.2 20.3 17.8 16.2 13.8 11.3 
South East 7.6 8.2 4.6 3.1 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.3 1.1 1 0.7 
Mekong River 
Delta  36.9 23.4 15.3 13 11.4 12.6 11.6 10.1 9.2 7.9 6.5 
Source: GSO website 
Table III. 2. Foreign Direct Investment Projects Licensed in 2015 by Regions 
Region 
Number of 
projects 
Total registered capital 
(Mill. USD)21 
Whole Country 2120 24,115 
Red River Delta 725 7,812 
Northern midlands and mountain areas 105 856 
North Central area and Central coastal area 146 1,140.6 
Central Highlands 8 40.9 
South East 977 10,594.5 
Mekong River Delta 158 3,656 
Source: GSO’s website, last updated 01/25/2017 
 
                                                          
21 Including supplementary capital to licensed projects in previous years. 
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Table III.2 displays foreign direct investment projects licensed in 2015 by six economic regions in 
Vietnam. South East and Red River Delta have attracted almost FDI projects with the total of 
capital of $10,594.5 and $7,812 million USD in 2015 while the Central Highlands is the least 
attractive destination of FDI with $40.9 million USD.  
Mekong River Delta focuses on various sectors ranging from tourism to oil and gas, however, 
agriculture with products of rice, coconuts, tobacco, sugarcane and cocoa remains the most 
important sector. The region’s economy mostly depends on agriculture, while the fisheries sector 
in the region is the largest and most developed in the country. The region has been the third 
attractive destination of FDI inflows in the nation, which is USD 3,656 million in 2015 (see Table 
III.2) 
Table III. 3. Unemployment Rate by Regions 
Region 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Whole country 2.38 2.9 2.88 2.22 1.96 2.18 2.1 2.33 
Red River Delta 2.29 2.69 2.61 1.99 1.91 2.65 2.82 2.42 
Northern midlands and mountain 
areas 1.13 1.38 1.21 0.87 0.75 0.81 0.76 1.1 
North Central area and Central 
coastal area 2.24 3.11 2.94 2.28 2.21 2.15 2.23 2.71 
Central Highlands 1.42 2 2.15 1.31 1.47 1.51 1.22 1.03 
South East 3.74 3.99 3.91 3.2 2.64 2.7 2.47 2.74 
Mekong River Delta 2.71 3.31 3.59 2.77 2.17 2.42 2.06 2.77 
Source: GSO’s website, last updated 01/25/2017 
2. Regional and Provincial Industrial Performance in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s domestic industry is mostly concentrated in and around the South East (Ho Chi Minh 
City and its neighboring provinces) and in the Red River Delta (the Hanoi-Haiphong area). As 
shown in Figure III.2, two-thirds of all Vietnamese industry during the period 1995-2013 was 
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concentrated in these two regions. The gross industry output in the Red River Delta and the South 
East of Vietnam in 2013 were VND1,607,154.8 billion (approximately USD80,400 billion) and 
VND2,423,563.1 (about USD122,178 billion) respectively. Most of the rest was distributed in the 
Mekong River Delta.  
 
Figure III. 2. Gross Industrial Output by Region in Vietnam 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1995-2013) of General Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook of 
Vietnam and Vietnam Production’s Dataset. 
 
Table III.4, III-5 and III-6 display gross industrial output by state, non-state and foreign invested 
companies in six economic regions. The gross industrial output of the three categories is also 
concentrated in South East and Red River Delta and followed by Mekong River Delta.  
Gross industrial output from foreign invested companies is mostly concentrated in South East area 
where is the most attractive destination of FDI. They were VND20,958.900 billion (approximately 
USD 1 billion) in 1995 but reached the peak of VND200,946.500 (about USD10 billion) in 2010. 
However, the gross industrial output of foreign invested companies has decreased from 80.82 
percent in 1995 to 57.6 percent in 2015 in South East, while it has increased from 11.42 percent in 
1995 to 33.3 percent in 2015 in the Red River Delta which reflects shift of FDI inflows from South 
East region to the Red River Delta recently.   
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Table III. 4. The Share of Gross Industrial Output by State Companies 
Region 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Red River Delta 26.49 26.37 28.40 29.61 30.1 
Northern Midlands & Mountain Areas (NM) 6.99 6.93 6.89 6.98 6.1 
Northern Central & Central Coastal Area (NC) 11.63 12.62 14.10 20.34 22.2 
Central Highlands 0.90 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
South East 42.01 41.25 39.08 34.40 37 
Mekong River Delta 11.97 12.08 10.77 7.92 4.85 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1995-2010) of GSO, Unit: percent of total gross 
industrial output of state companies 
Table III. 5. The Share of Gross Industrial Output by Non-State Companies 
Region 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Red River Delta 19.59 20.74 26.01 27.30 29 
Northern Midlands & Mountain Areas (NM) 3.19 2.94 3.67 4.53 4.7 
Northern Central & Central Coastal (NC) 12.85 13.90 12.67 13.76 14.2 
Non-State: Central Highlands 2.82 2.71 1.87 1.97 2.1 
South East 39.11 42.35 39.09 33.39 24.6 
Mekong River Delta 22.44 17.36 16.68 19.05 25.4 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1995-2010) of GSO, Unit: percent of total gross 
industrial output of non-state companies 
Table III. 6. The Share of Gross Industrial Output by Foreign Invested Companies 
Region 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Red River Delta 11.42 22.08 23.72 29.75 33.3 
Northern Midlands & Mountain Area (NM) 1.59 1.47 1.15 1.24 1.3 
Northern Central & Central Coast (NC) 2.19 3.70 4.61 4.71 5.9 
Central Highlands 0.34 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.8 
South East 80.82 69.71 67.49 60.15 56.6 
Mekong River Delta 3.64 2.79 2.80 3.96 2.1 
Source: Author’s computation from various issues (1995-2010) of GSO, Unit: percent of total gross 
industrial output of foreign invested companies 
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III. Literature Review 
1. The Impact of Trade Openness on Economic Growth and Industrial Performance 
The relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth as well as industrial 
performance has been a contentious topic in the field of international economics and development.  
Most empirical studies support the positive impact of trade liberalization on economic growth 
(Krueger, 1978; Cline, 1979; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Dollar, 1992; Odusola 
& Akilo, 1995; Edwards, 1998; Ahmed, 1999; Tybout, 2000; Adenikinju & Olofin, 2002; Dollar 
& Kraay, 2004). Cline (1979), Pack (1988) and Tybout (1992) suggested a positive effect of 
opening up the economy on economic growth due to increasing returns to scale with an increase 
in output and a reduction of costs per unit. Technological innovation which is generated from trade 
openness plays an important role in accelerating economic growth because it creates more 
investment in product development (IMF, 2010). Exports generates higher levels of competition 
and improvements in production and leading to economies of scale and accelerated economic 
growth in both developing and advanced countries (Krueger, 1978). In addition, imports can also 
generates higher rate of economic growth by promoting technology transfer from advanced 
countries to developing countries.  
Trade openness can also play a crucial role on accelerating growth rates of industrial sectors in 
developing countries. Martin and Page (1992); Grossman and Helpman (1991) showed evidence 
that an open economic policy generates a rise in foreign competition and provides access to 
imported inputs. More advanced technologies are imported and more innovations are generated 
resulting in productivity improvements and higher growth rates of industrial sectors. Turning to 
country studies, Udegbunam (2002). Umoru & Eborieme (2013); Edeme & Karimo (2014) found 
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a positive and significant correlation between trade openness and growth rate of industrial sectors 
in Nigeria. In particular, Edeme & Karimo (2014) found the positive effects of trade liberalization 
only on Nigerian manufacturing, mining and quarrying and power subsectors. Trade liberalization 
was also found to be the main determinant of industrial growth in Pakistan during the period 1973-
1995 (Dutta & Ahmed 2006). In short, the efficiency gains from an open trade policy seem to be 
one of the most important mechanisms of higher industrial growth rate (Krueger & Tuncer, 1982; 
Page, 1984; Edwards, 1992; Paulino, 2002; Ynikkaya, 2003). 
The positive effects of trade liberalization on economic growth as well as industrial performance 
have been observed in most empirical studies. Yet, few studies show negative or even ambiguous 
impacts. For example, Helleiner (1986) and Havrylyshyn (1990) found no strong and significant 
linkage between openness and productivity. Okamoto (1994) found no clear impacts of effective 
rates of protection on TFP growth. Havrylyshyn (1990) concluded that protection at moderate 
degrees would generate direct benefits to an economy and increase productivity. However, too 
much protection in the economy might result in a “sharp deterioration” in productivity. Rodrik 
(2015) studied deindustrialization in advanced countries and premature deindustrialization in 
developing countries and pointed out that developing economies becoming service economies 
without going through a proper phase of industrialization and at lower levels of income due to a 
drying up of opportunities in the context of globalization. The study found that premature 
deindustrialization in Latin America leads to a decline in manufacturing growth and an increase in 
informality which lowers the overall productivity, while it is associated with an expansion of 
employment share in African service sectors instead of manufacturing. The premature 
deindustrialization in developing countries also limits the possibilities for keeping up with the 
developed countries.  
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In sum, empirical studies show external liberalization and trade openness can have both positive 
and negative impacts on economic growth and industrial performance.  
2. The Effects of FDI on Economic Growth and Industry Sector 
The world has experienced a notable growth of FDI in the past three decades in both advanced and 
emerging countries (Contessi & Weinberger, 2009). However, the effects of FDI on economic 
growth are also a disputed topic and the real benefits of FDI for economic growth and domestic 
industrial performance is not a settled question.  
Together with import and export trade, FDI is considered as a catalyst of economic growth and 
industrial performance (Findlay, 1978; Aitken & Harrison, 1994; Alexynska, 2003; Toulanoe et 
al, 2009; Akulava, 2011, Trinh & Nguyen, 2015). The positive impacts of FDI inflows are 
enhanced by its effects on technology spillover. Technology spillovers lead to a higher rate of 
factor productivity and efficiency in utilizing the host countries’ resources hence results in 
economic growth. Findlay (1978) points out that FDI inflows increase the rates of technological 
progress and lead to higher rates of industrial growth. FDI inflows generate higher rates of 
competition and require improvements in domestic production. Aiken and Harrison (1994) 
examined the performance of 4000 Venezuelan firms during 1975-1989 and found that FDI sectors 
experienced better industrial performance than domestic sectors and concluded that FDI inflows 
is positively correlated with productivity growth.  
Empirical studies also highlight the negative effects of FDI on growth (Boyd and Smith, 1992; 
Milberg, 1999; Aiken and Harrison, 1999). For instance, Boyd and Smith (1992) argued that FDI 
might slow down economic growth because of distortions in resource allocation, financial, prices 
and trade. Provisions favoring FDI would therefore be harmful to the economy. FDI intensifies 
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competition and crowds out domestic firms, due to the entry of multinational companies (Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999). Milberg (1999) pointed out that social standards might be undermined by 
policies adopted by governments to attract FDI such as the repression of labor income share or a 
reduction of labor standards. This would also lead to an increase in wage inequality, especially in 
developing countries.  
In sum, FDI’s contribution to economic growth depends on the absorptive capacity of the recipient 
country. Countries with higher levels of financial development gain significantly from FDI, while 
countries with weak-developed financial market might have a negative effect of FDI on economic 
growth (Alfaro et al, 2004). 
IV.  Theoretical Framework, Data and Empirical Model 
1. The Determinants of Economic Growth and Industrial Performance 
This paper examines the relationship between trade openness, and macroeconomic and industrial 
performance at the provincial and regional levels in Vietnam. This section discusses the main 
mechanisms through which external liberalization and FDI affect economic growth rates and 
industrial performance in Vietnam during the period of 1995-2015. According to IMF (1990), 
countries with more open economies will grow faster if they experience stable macroeconomic 
policies, minimal financial distortions, higher rates of capital formation and domestic investment. 
1.1.Macroeconomic stability 
Macroeconomic stability is one of the most important mechanisms driving economic growth and 
industrial performance. Inflation rate has been used as an indicator of macroeconomic stability 
(Friedman, 1977). Recently the real exchange rate has also been widely used as a measure of 
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macroeconomic stability since it reflects the effects of macroeconomic policies, which may lead 
to a fluctuation of exchange rate market (Husain et al, 2005). Moreover, Agarwal (1983) confirmed 
that exchange rate policy plays a vital role in international trade activities and the economic growth 
of developing countries. He further argued that countries with a major and appropriate exchange 
rate policy are very likely to grow faster since they can eliminate misalignments of real exchange 
rate. Hence, exchange rate can serve as proxy of macroeconomic stability in this paper. 
1.2.Human capital and Education 
Human capital plays a vital role in economic growth (Barro and Sal-i-Martin, 2004) and is the 
main “engine” of economic growth (Lucas, 1988). Human capital drives economic growth 
positively through its interaction with FDI and productivity of both labor and physical capital. In 
addition, industrial output grows faster with a higher level of human capital which is measured by 
a high level of educational attainment (Mankiw et al, 1992). A number of proxies have been used 
to measure human capital. The number of pupils of upper secondary school will be used as a proxy 
for human capital in Vietnam in this paper. 
1.3.Population 
The growth of fertility rate and population especially the working-age population is also one of 
the most important determinants of economic growth and industrial performance.  
On one hand, growing populations give rise of the numbers of both workers and consumers who 
are the main contributions to the growth of economies. Gamble (2014) argued that Western 
economies have experienced the substantial success of in the past 200 years due to higher rate of 
their population growth. The Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI, 2014) found 
evidences of a positive relation between population growth and economic growth during the period 
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of 1960 – late 1990s in the UK, however, the link between them has been weakened down in recent 
decades since the UK’ strong population growth and outpacing productivity may motivate 
enterprises to invest in labor-intense but low-valued sectors, which would lead to a downward 
trend of both productivity and economic growth.  
On the other hand, a very strong population growth also affects GDP per capita negatively and 
leads to lower rates of economic growth. For instance, Barro (2003) found that a higher fertility 
rate is associated with a negative impact on economic growth. The study suggests that a one-
standard-deviation decline in the log of the fertility rate by 0.54 in 1980 resulted in an increase in 
the economic growth rate by 0.007. 
1.4.Law 
The economic policies of government, during periods of liberalization play a crucial role, 
especially the laws governing foreign investment in developing countries. Empirical studies on 
FDI inflows in Vietnam show that after the first Law on Foreign Investment in 1987 and Law on 
Investment and Unified Law on Enterprises in 2005, there was a substantial increase in FDI inflows 
in the Central and North Central Coast of Vietnam (Nguyen & Zhang, 2012). Therefore, we create 
a dummy variable of this law to examine the effects of these laws on economic growth as well as 
on industrial performance. 
1.5. Economic Condition and Infrastructure Development 
Economic precondition also plays an important role in economic growth and manufacturing 
growth as well as attracting FDI in host countries.  Studies shows that countries with better 
infrastructure development and economic condition attract more FDI or get more benefits form 
external liberalization (Anwar & Nguyen, 2010). In this paper, the author employs the Provincial 
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Competitiveness Index (PCI) as a proxy of economic conditions for both regional and provincial 
level estimations. PCI is the result of an annual business survey conducted by Vietnam Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (VCCI). The survey assesses and ranks the economic and governance 
condition and infrastructure quality of 68 provincial administrations in creating a favorable 
business environment for development of the private sector. 
The overall PCI is composed of ten sub-indices reflecting economic governance and infrastructure 
development, including: low entry costs for business start-up;  access to land and security of 
business premises; transparence of business environment and equitable business information; 
minimal informal charges22; has limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and 
inspections; limit crowding out of private activity from policy biases toward state, foreign, or 
connected firms; high expenditure on road transport; low cost of transportation; sound labor 
training policies; and fair and effective legal procedures for dispute resolution23. 
2. Hypotheses 
This paper examines the relationship between trade liberalization which is proxied by export and 
import volume, as well as FDI inflows and Vietnamese economic growth and industrial 
performance both in general and at provincial levels. The author tries to test the following 
hypotheses: 
1) Higher levels of FDI inflows lead to a higher rate of economic growth at both regional and 
provincial levels in Vietnam.  
                                                          
22
 The informal charges are an obstacle extra fees which may be charged by provincial officials while administering 
business activities. 
 
23
 The author summarized from website of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI): 
http://eng.pcivietnam.org/gioi-thieu-pci-c2.html 
 142 
 
2) Provinces with better infrastructure and located in the key economic regions (proxied by 
Provincial Competitive Index - PCI) get relatively more benefits from trade liberalization. 
3) Economic growth is one of the most important driving forces attracting FDI at provincial 
level in Vietnam. 
4) Provinces with better economic conditions have attracted more FDI. 
5) Higher levels of trade openness and FDI lead to greater industrial performance at both 
regional and provincial levels in Vietnam. 
3. Data 
3.1.The Definitions of Data 
For the purpose of testing these hypotheses, we make use of a recently released panel dataset which 
provides annual data and monthly data on 61 provinces of Vietnam for the period 2005-2015. 
Table III.7 presents variables, definitions and sources of data in this paper. The data of exchange 
rate is from the dataset of United Nations. Other variables such as the growth rate of GDP, FDI, 
working-age population, import, export, GIO ang IPI growth rates are from General Statistical 
Office of Vietnam (GSO).  
To test the impact of trade liberalization on Vietnamese industrial performance, this paper utilizes 
both the Industrial Production Index (IPI) and Gross Industrial Output (GIO). The Industrial 
Production Index (IPI) is defined as an economic indicator which measures the output of 
businesses in the industrial sector of the economy such as manufacturing, mining, and utilities. 
Industrial production indexes are computed mainly as Fisher indices with the weights based on 
annual estimates of value added by GSO. The data of IPI is monthly, while Gross Industrial Output 
which is measured as the sum of an industry's value added and intermediate inputs is annual. 
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3.2.The Analysis of Data 
To ensure the goodness of fit of the estimated model, the author employed few diagnostic tests 
including Breusch-Pagn Lagrange multiplier (LM) for random effect and the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test for endogeneity. There was evidence of significant differences across provinces, 
therefore ordinary least square (OLS) estimates might be biased and inconsistent. The Pasaran CD 
and the Pagan-Hall tests were used to test whether the residuals are correlated across provinces 
and for the presence of significant heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis that residuals are not 
correlated and the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity were rejected, suggesting that Driscoll and 
Kraay standard errors might be consistent for the estimations. The Hausman test to choose a better 
estimation between fixed and random effects suggested that the fixed effects model was more 
appropriate (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
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Table III. 7. Summary of Variables 
Variables Definitions Sources 
GDP Growth Regional and provincial economic growth rate (annual %) GSO 
Exports Exports, USD GSO, WDI 
Imports Imports, USD GSO, WDI 
FDI Net inflows of Foreign Direct Investment, USD GSO 
Exchange Rate IMF based exchange rate UN dataset 
Industrial Production 
Index(IPI) Industrial Production Index: VSIC 2007: 2010=100 GSO 
Gross Industrial 
Output (GIO) Gross Industrial Output: 1994p: VSIC 2007 GSO 
Education Number of pupils of general education (Upper secondary) as of 30th, September by province  GSO 
Population The working-age population (in thousands) GSO 
Law Common Investment Law and Unified Enterprise Law, before 2005, LAW=0; if after 2005, Law=1. 
Adopted the idea from 
Nguyen and Zhang 
(2012) 
Lib Liberalization: before 1995, Lib=0; if after 1995, Lib=1 
Based on massive 
bilateral and 
multilateral 
agreements with the 
United States and 
other important 
economic partners 
WTO 
The effect of joining the World Trade Organization on 
Vietnamese economic growth and industrial performance, if 
before 2007, WTO=0; if after 2007, WTO=1. 
Adopted the idea from 
Nguyen and Zhang 
(2012) 
PCI The Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI)  VCCI Vietnam 
 
4. Empirical Models 
4.1.The Correlation between Economic Growth and Trade Liberalization 
The paper employs the fixed effect regression to test the correlation of economic growth at both 
regional and provincial levels, trade liberalization and other control variables. The log-linear form 
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(with an error term, ) is utilized to estimate the coefficient of variables. The value of coefficients 
could then be interpreted in terms of percentages or elasticities (Trinh & Nguyen, 2015). The 
baseline specification for the sample with all provinces in is as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 2 2* * ...
it it it it it
n n it
LogGDPrate LogFDI PCI Logpop LogEXR LogEDU
FDI PCI FDI EDU E E
β β β β β β
β β γ γ ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +  
Where i and t designate province and region and time period respectively. The dependent variable 
is the provincial and regional GDP growth rate. FDI is Foreign Direct Investment and it can proxy 
for the degree of trade openness in each province; PCI is provincial competitive index; Pop is the 
working-age population; EXR is the exchange rate, EDU is the number of pupils of general 
education (Upper secondary) as of 30th, September by province. kβ is the coefficient for the 
independent variables. itε is the error term. nE  is the entity n. nγ  is the coefficient for the binary 
country regressors, while 
nδ is the coefficient for the binary time regressors.  
4.2.The Correlation between Industrial Performance and Trade Liberalization 
To address the relationship between industrial performance, trade liberalization and other control 
variables, the paper employs the following aggregate industrial production function: 
( , , , , , , )GIO F Export Import FDI Pop EDU Law Lib=   
Specifying the aggregate industrial production function in log-linear form, the baseline 
specification for the sample with all provinces in Vietnam using an annual dataset and a monthly 
dataset as is follows: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 2 2
xp
...
it it it it it
n n it
LogGIO Loge ort Logimport Logpop LogEXR Law
Lib E E
β β β β β β
β γ γ ε
= + + + + + +
+ + +  
itε
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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 2 2
xp
...
it it it it it
it n n it
LogIPI Loge ort Logimport LogFDI Logpop
LogEXR Law WTO E E
β β β β β
β β β γ γ ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +  
Where itGIO  and itIPI are the gross industrial output and industrial production index in province 
and region i in period t. 
itGIO  and itIPI  are used as dependent variables for the annual and 
monthly dataset respectively. Export and import values as well as FDI inflows are used as proxies 
of trade openness (the uses of export, imports and FDI as a proxy for trade openness is depending 
on how is the availability of data). 
V. Analysis of Estimation Results 
1. The Impact of Trade Openness on Regional Economic Growth and Industrial 
Performance in Vietnam 
1.1.FDI and Regional Economic Growth 
This section analyzed the correlation of FDI and economic growth of six economic regions in 
Vietnam. The dataset was divided into six regions including the Red River Delta, Northern 
midlands and mountain areas, North and South Central Coast, Central Highlands, South East and 
Mekong River Delta, respectively.  
Table III.8 and Table III.9 report the results for regional economic growth and industrial 
performance. The estimation results in Table III.8 indicate that the effect of FDI on economic 
growth is positive and strongly significant for five economic regions in Vietnam namely Red River 
Delta (Region 1), Northern midlands and mountain areas (Region 2), North and Central coastal 
area (Region 3), South East (Region 5) and Mekong River Delta (Region 6). The impact of FDI 
on growth is negative but not significant in the Central highlands (Region 5). This region might be 
less attractive for FDI in Vietnam due to poorer economic conditions as well as lack of 
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infrastructure. Similarly, the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) has positive and strongly 
significant effect on economic growth in South East and Mekong River Delta. 
The effect of the exchange rate which proxied for macroeconomic stability is positive and strongly 
significant for all six economic regions which indicates that the higher degree of macroeconomic 
stability leads to higher growth rates of GDP in every economic region of Vietnam. The working-
age population (logpop) is also positively correlated with economic growth in Red River Delta, 
North Central area and Central coastal area, Central Highlands and South East since it creates more 
labor supply for those four regions.  
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Table III. 8. The Results of Fixed Effect Model for Six Economic Regions: Dependent Variable – GDP Growth Rate 
 
VARIABLES Red River 
Delta 
Northern & 
Mountain Areas 
North & 
South Central 
Central 
Highlands 
South 
East 
Mekong 
River Delta 
logFDI 0.319*** 0.0427** 0.0796*** -0.00369 0.190*** 0.0740*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0203) (0.0144) (0.0341) (0.0689) (0.0262) 
PCI 0.00420 -2.04e-05 0.00274 -0.00327 0.0151** 0.00652* 
 (0.00541) (0.00379) (0.00351) (0.00741) (0.00710) (0.00359) 
logEXR 2.519*** 3.894*** 3.525*** 3.207*** 2.840*** 3.110*** 
 (0.371) (0.239) (0.205) (0.418) (0.345) (0.224) 
logpop 1.223*** 0.722 2.349*** 4.457*** 1.273** -0.0174 
 (0.324) (0.746) (0.715) (1.107) (0.499) (0.0657) 
logEDU -0.468 -0.539*** -0.200 -0.286 0.495 -0.452* 
 (0.287) (0.174) (0.153) (0.462) (0.342) (0.243) 
Constant -27.57*** -35.51*** -46.82*** -56.63*** -40.81*** -23.20*** 
 (4.259) (4.005) (4.638) (6.466) (4.858) (4.103) 
Breusch-Pagn Lagrange 
test (p – value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  
(p – value) 
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Pasaran CD test (p – 
value) 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pagan-Hall test (p – 
value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman (p – value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 108 120 153 40 55 130 
R-squared 0.932 0.933 0.936 0.968 0.939 0.908 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.2.FDI and Vietnamese Industrial Performance at Regional Level 
Table III.9 reports the relationship between FDI and industrial performance in the six economic 
regions. The estimated results indicate that the effect of FDI on the gross industrial output is 
positive and strongly significant in Red River Delta, Northern Midlands and Mountain areas, South 
East and Mekong River Delta. FDI has a negative, but insignificant effect on industrial 
performance in Central Highlands. 
The coefficient of exchange rate is statistically significant at 10% level in Region 1, Region 2, 
Region 3 and Region 6 which suggests that an increase in exchange rate would lead to increases 
in the gross industrial output in Red River Delta, Northern midlands and mountain areas, North 
Central area and Central coastal area and Mekong Delta River.  
The coefficient of logpop is strongly significant in Model (4) and Model (5) which indicates that 
an increase in working-age population in the Central Highlands and South East leads to around 9 
and 3 percentage point increase in the gross industrial output of these two regions.  
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Table III. 9. The Results of Fixed Effect Model for Six Economic Regions: Dependent Variable – GIO Growth Rate 
 
VARIABLES Red River 
Delta 
Northern & 
Mountain Areas 
North & South 
Central 
Central 
Highlands 
South 
East 
Mekong 
River Delta 
logFDI 0.268*** 0.163*** 0.0195 -0.0986* 0.120 0.155*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0488) (0.0280) (0.0468) (0.0809) (0.0413) 
PCI 0.000273 0.000503 -0.00585 -0.0320*** 0.0112 0.0111** 
 (0.00477) (0.00513) (0.00804) (0.00822) (0.00931) (0.00509) 
logEXR 2.379*** 2.089*** 4.354*** 1.682** 0.292 2.253*** 
 (0.524) (0.488) (0.695) (0.652) (0.619) (0.577) 
logpop 0.913 1.282 -2.178 9.057*** 3.015*** -0.00912 
 (2.074) (1.097) (2.250) (1.603) (0.684) (0.0721) 
logEDU -0.382 0.152 0.651 -1.855** 0.786 -0.0888 
 (0.403) (0.317) (0.592) (0.675) (0.511) (0.379) 
Constant -18.27 -24.48*** -25.77* -50.87*** -25.49*** -13.99* 
 (15.77) (8.625) (13.98) (8.315) (7.269) (8.229) 
Breusch-Pagn 
Lagrange test (p – 
value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test  
(p – value) 
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Pasaran CD test (p 
– value) 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pagan-Hall test (p – 
value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman (p – 
value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 60 72 84 24 31 72 
R-squared 0.875 0.725 0.522 0.858 0.819 0.696 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2. The impact of External Liberalization on Provincial Economic Growth and Industrial 
Performance in Vietnam 
2.1.FDI and Provincial Economic Growth 
The correlation of FDI and economic growth at provincial level will be analyzed in this section. 
Table III.10 suggests that FDI has a positive and significant impact on economic growth at the 
provincial level in Vietnam as expected. Column (1) gives results on regression without education 
and the interaction variables. Column (2) is the results of estimation with education. The 
interaction terms between FDI and PCI and FDI and education are introduced in estimations (3) 
and (4) respectively.  
The estimated results indicate that FDI is an important determinant of the provincial economic 
growth in Vietnam. The coefficient of FDI is positive but only strongly significant in Model (1) 
and (2). A one percent increase in FDI inflows would result in an increase of 8 percent in provincial 
economic growth. Other important determinants of economic growth at provincial level in 
Vietnam are PCI, the exchange rate and the working-age population. The coefficient of PCI is 
statistically significant at 10% level in Model (1), (2) and (4) while the coefficient of exchange 
rate is positive and significant at 10% level in all specification, which suggests that a one percent 
increase in the exchange rate would lead to around 3.9 percentage points increase in economic 
growth. The working-age population is also positively correlated to economic growth since it 
creates more labor supply for the economy. 
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Table III. 10. The Results of Fixed Effect Model for Provincial Level: Dependent 
Variable - GDP Growth Rate 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GDPrate GDPrate GDPrate GDPrate 
logFDI 0.0870*** 0.0853*** 0.0482 0.0753 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0458) (0.106) 
PCI 0.00619*** 0.00609*** 0.00230 0.00619*** 
 (0.00185) (0.00185) (0.00483) (0.00186) 
logEXR 3.922*** 3.859*** 3.924*** 3.925*** 
 (0.0819) (0.0937) (0.0819) (0.0863) 
logpop 0.105 0.128* 0.109* 0.103 
 (0.0661) (0.0681) (0.0664) (0.0679) 
logEDU  -0.120   
  (0.0861)   
FDI*PCI   0.000691  
   (0.000793)  
FDI*EDU    0.00113 
    (0.0101) 
Constant -36.99*** -35.25*** -36.82*** -37.01*** 
 (0.769) (1.468) (0.793) (0.789) 
Breusch-Pagn Lagrange test 
(p – value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  
(p – value) 
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Pasaran CD test (p – value) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Pagan-Hall test (p – value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman (p – value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 637 637 637 637 
R-squared 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907 
Number of id 61 61 61 61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results in both estimations (4) and (5) show positive but insignificant signs of the interaction 
term FDI*PCI and FDI*EDU. The provincial competitive index is a proxy for infrastructure and 
economic conditions in each province. The positive coefficient of the interaction term between 
FDI and PCI indicates that the higher degree of PCI would lead higher positive effect of FDI on 
provincial economic growth. Similarly, the interaction term between FDI and education proxied 
by the number of pupils of general education (Upper secondary) as of 30th, September by province 
is positive but insignificant.  
Table III. 11. The Results of Fixed Effect Model for Provincial Level: Dependent Variable 
– FDI 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES logFDI logFDI logFDI logFDI logFDI 
GDPrate 1.001*** 1.017*** 1.111*** 1.122*** 1.097*** 
 (0.0430) (0.0489) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
PCI  0.00312 0.00248 0.00137 0.00194 
  (0.00670) (0.00671) (0.00672) (0.00671) 
logEXR   0.428 0.488 0.543 
   (0.658) (0.658) (0.669) 
logpop    0.410* 0.398 
    (0.237) (0.245) 
logEDU     0.515** 
     (0.308) 
Constant 3.009*** 2.775*** 6.982 9.314 17.55** 
 (0.141) (0.361) (6.062) (6.192) (7.426) 
Breusch-Pagn Lagrange test (p 
– value) 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  
(p – value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pasaran CD test (p – value) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pagan-Hall test (p – value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman (p – value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 672 637 637 637 637 
R-squared 0.471 0.465 0.466 0.469 0.472 
Number of id 61 61 61 61 61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This paper also attempts to investigate the two-way linkage between FDI and provincial economic 
growth in Vietnam. Table III.11 shows that economic growth has a significant positive influence 
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on FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam. The estimated coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
The estimated coefficient indicates that, other things remaining constant, a 1% increase in 
provincial economic growth would lead to an increase in the stock of FDI flows to province by 
1%. This result is consistent and suggests that higher provincial economic growth in Vietnam is 
an important determinant of FDI inflows. The provincial competitive index also seems to have a 
positive impact on attracting FDI inflows however the coefficient is not significant. 
2.2.Trade Liberalization and Vietnamese Industrial Performance at Provincial Level 
To investigate the relationship between external liberalization and industrial performance at 
provincial level in Vietnam, we employ both annual and monthly dataset. The choice of two 
proxies for industrial performance is dictated by the availability of data. 
Table III.12 and Table III.13 present the results of fixed and random effects models, which estimate 
the relationship between Vietnamese industrial performance proxied by gross industrial output 
(GIO) and industrial production index (IPI) and trade openness proxied by exports and imports.  
There are positive and strongly significant impacts of exports on gross industrial output in almost 
all specifications (see Table III.12), while the coefficients of imports are positive but insignificant 
except for model (8) when random effects are employed. A one percent increase in export value 
leads to an increase of 5 to 10 percent in gross industrial output.  
Exchange rate and population also influences industrial output positively and significantly. The 
estimated coefficient of exchange rate and the working-age population are significant (at 10% 
level). For example, an increase in real exchange rate by 1 percent results in around 1.8 percentage 
points increase in gross industrial output. The working-age population is also positively correlated 
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to gross industrial output. This result is consistent since an increase in population at working age 
leads to an increase in labor supply which is the main determinant of industrial performance.  
The positive coefficients of dummy variable of law indicates that the passage of the Law on 
Foreign Investment and Unified Law on Enterprise have positive and strongly significant impacts 
on industrial performance since it gave more benefits for manufacturing companies such as it is 
easier to start up an enterprise than before.   
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Table III. 12. The Results of Fixed and Random Effects Models Using Annual Data: Dependent Variable – GIO Growth Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
logexport 0.0468** 0.0729***   0.0736*** 0.0945***   
 (0.0203) (0.0198)   (0.0209) (0.0203)   
logEXR 1.948*** 1.663*** 1.893*** 1.660*** 1.824*** 1.743*** 1.836*** 1.825*** 
 (0.163) (0.125) (0.150) (0.118) (0.167) (0.117) (0.156) (0.109) 
logpop 0.285 1.266*** 0.395 1.310*** 1.250*** 1.348*** 1.438*** 1.396*** 
 (0.461) (0.148) (0.440) (0.144) (0.456) (0.147) (0.446) (0.145) 
Law 0.650*** 0.563*** 0.713*** 0.628***     
 (0.0991) (0.0960) (0.0939) (0.0936)     
Lib 0.0338 0.0145 0.0612 0.0475     
 (0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0378) (0.0388)     
logimport   -0.00211 0.0162   0.0221 0.0403** 
   (0.0154) (0.0157)   (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Constant -13.63*** -18.08*** -13.77*** -18.20*** -19.44*** -19.47*** -20.75*** -20.38*** 
 (2.522) (1.363) (2.411) (1.279) (2.360) (1.288) (2.284) (1.188) 
Observations 424 424 417 417 424 424 417 417 
R-squared 0.652  0.661  0.610  0.605  
Number of id 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table III. 13. The Results of Fixed and Random Effects Models Using Monthly Data – 
Dependent Variable – IPI Growth Rate 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FE RE FE RE FE RE 
logexport 1.035*** 0.678***     
 (0.172) (0.0443)     
logEXR 0.335 1.129** 2.009*** 1.363** 3.195*** 3.192*** 
 (0.577) (0.443) (0.628) (0.579) (0.374) (0.378) 
logFDI 0.230*** 0.243*** 0.249*** 0.326*** 0.282*** 0.290*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0231) (0.0280) (0.0301) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Law -0.715*** -0.566*** -0.322** -0.712*** -0.217*** -0.207*** 
 (0.136) (0.101) (0.136) (0.134) (0.0692) (0.0699) 
WTO -0.214** -0.0828 0.0321 -0.146 0.123 0.121 
 (0.104) (0.0849) (0.120) (0.112) (0.0765) (0.0773) 
logimport   0.270 0.542***   
   (0.175) (0.0752)   
Constant -0.158 -5.570 -11.57** -7.445 -22.39*** -22.79*** 
 (4.928) (4.240) (5.390) (5.494) (3.608) (3.650) 
Observations 252 252 248 248 747 747 
R-squared 0.554  0.494  0.501  
Number of id 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Instead of using gross industrial output as a dependent variable, I utilize the industrial production 
index as a proxy for industrial performance in Vietnam. Table III.13 presents the results of fixed 
and random effects models which employ IPI as a dependent variable. The coefficients of exports 
are positive and strongly significant in all specification while the coefficient of imports is only 
significant in Model (4). The coefficient of export is significantly positive at around 0.6 to 1.03. 
As expected, Vietnamese industrial production gets benefits from FDI inflows. This result is 
reasonable, since FDI inflows into manufacturing have been increased since 199524. The dummy 
variable to present entry to WTO is adopted in this model. It seems that joining the World Trade 
Organization since 2007 has had a negative influence on Vietnamese industrial performance. The 
coefficient of this dummy is negative and significant in Model (1) and (2).  The negative effect 
                                                          
24
 FDI inflows’ trend in Vietnam by GSO, 2013 
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might be explained by higher competition from foreign companies due to WTO requirements. The 
exchange rate seems to drive industrial growth positively. An increase in the exchange rate leads 
to about 3.2 percentage points increase in industrial production index.  
In sum, the results from both the fixed and random effects model using the industrial production 
index as a dependent variable also supports the hypothesis that a higher degrees of trade openness 
proxied by exports, imports and FDI volume lead to a better industrial performance at the 
provincial level in Vietnam. 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Discussions 
Vietnam has been shifting its economy from a centrally-planned to a more opened and market-
oriented economy, since launching extensive reforms (Doi Moi – 1986). The nation has displayed 
higher growth rate of GDP, better industrial performance and more FDI inflows. Export and import 
volumes have increased dramatically. This paper aims to investigate the impact of external 
liberalization on Vietnamese economic growth and industrial performance at both regional and 
provincial levels. Provincial economic preconditions are also considered, in order to evaluate their 
influence in attracting FDI and the benefits of external liberalization on growth as well as industrial 
performance.  
To investigate the relationship between trade openness and economic growth at both regional and 
provincial levels, we have employed a fixed effect estimation models. Three interesting stylized 
facts emerge from the results: 
• The effect of FDI on economic growth is positive and strongly significant in five economic 
regions in Vietnam namely Red River Delta (Region 1), Northern midlands and mountain areas 
(Region 2), North Central area and Central coastal area (Region 3), South East (Region 5) and 
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Mekong River Delta (Region 6). While FDI has a negative but statistically insignificant impact 
on economic growth in Central Highlands (Region 4), which might be explained by poorer 
economic condition in this region.  
• The results of fixed effect estimations support the hypotheses that higher levels of trade leads 
to a higher rate of economic growth at provincial level in Vietnam.  And provinces with better 
infrastructure and located in the key economic regions relatively get more benefits from trade 
liberalization. 
• Economic growth is one of the most important driving forces of FDI attraction at provincial 
level in Vietnam and provinces with better economic condition have attracted more FDI. 
We also estimated the correlation between industrial sector growth and trade liberalization at 
regional and provincial level in Vietnam by employing both annual and monthly dataset for 
provincial level and annual dataset for regional level. The proxies for trade openness including 
exports, imports volume and FDI and two proxies of industrial performance including gross 
industrial output and industrial production index were employed in both fixed and random effects 
models.  
• The effect of FDI on the gross industrial output is positive and strongly significant in Red River 
Delta, Northern midlands and mountain areas, South East and Mekong River Delta, while FDI 
has negative effect on industrial performance in Central Highlands, however the coefficient is 
not significant. 
• The results also support the hypothesis that trade openness and FDI have been one of the most 
important determinants of industrial performance in Vietnam during the phase of vigorous 
reform in Vietnam (1995-2015). 
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• The passage of the Law on Foreign Investment and Unified Law on Enterprise have positive 
impacts on provincial industrial performance in Vietnam. 
The study suggests that FDI inflows and trade openness play very important role in accelerating 
economic growth and industrial performance at both regional and provincial levels in Vietnam. 
Vietnamese government should enhance FDI and more trading with international market by easing 
regulations for FDI and foreign invested companies and implementing international trade 
commitments. Regions and provinces with better infrastructure seem to get more benefit from FDI 
and trade openness, which suggests that provincial authorities should invest in building new and 
more modern infrastructure and also improve rules and regulations governing FDI inflows. An 
open-door policy remains a priority, but the government and the State Bank of Vietnam should 
pursue a flexible monetary policy to maintain macroeconomic stability and ease the pressure of 
high inflation. These macroeconomic policies together with appropriate provincial governance 
structures should lead to greater benefits of external liberalization for the whole country, regions 
and provinces of Vietnam. Moreover, the Vietnamese government should be cautious about the 
possibility of premature deindustrialization. Active policy efforts should be made to adopt and 
innovate in labor intensive technologies and the promotion of manufacturing to prevent premature 
deindustrialization. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study examines the effect of financial account openness on the labor share of income which 
does account for the income share of self-employment (Chapter I); the relationship of external 
liberalization, the Doi Moi policy and macroeconomic performance in Vietnam (Chapter II); the 
mechanisms driving economic growth and industrial performance at both regional and provincial 
levels in Vietnam (Chapter III). Chapter I demonstrates the recent declining trend of the labor share 
of income and examines the impact of financial integration on the labor share. It concludes that 
capital account openness is negatively correlated to the labor share of income even when account 
for earnings of the self-employed. Chapter II studies the milestones of 6 phases of the 
comprehensive reforms, the Doi Moi Policy, in Vietnam in the past thirty years (1986-2016). The 
decomposition of aggregate demand and labor productivity were taken, which suggests that the 
external sector together with government expenditure have become important driving factors of 
Vietnamese economic growth since 2012, while sectoral productivity growth of the service sector 
plays an important role in the improvement of overall labor productivity in Vietnam during the 
period of 2005-2015. Chapter III investigates the impact of trade openness on economic growth 
and industrial performance at both regional and provincial levels, it concludes that trade openness 
and FDI are the main drivers of economic growth and manufacturing sector growth in Vietnam 
since Doi Moi. 
In this context, the three Chapters may complement each other. Chapter I and Chapter II provide 
the basis for the empirical work on regions and provinces in Vietnam in Chapter III. Chapter I 
brings a new measure of the labor share of income which accounts for earnings of the self-
employed, while investigates the impact of capital account openness on the labor share. The results 
of Chapter I motivated the author to examine the correlation of the comprehensive reforms, 
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external liberalization and Vietnamese economic performance. There are few studies have done 
on the comprehensive reforms of Vietnam (the Doi Moi Policy), however, to best of my 
knowledge, this is the first paper describes the milestones of 6 phases of the Doi Moi through the 
past 30 years (1986-2016) and links it with macroeconomic performance and the open-door 
policies in each phase. The decomposition of aggregate demand and labor productivity found the 
main drivers of economic growth and labor productivity in Vietnam during the period of 2005-
2015. And it motivated the author continue investigating the impact of trade openness on economic 
growth and industrial growth at regional and provincial levels in Vietnam. There are many studies 
on Vietnamese economic growth have done, but due to the difficulty of data collecting, Chapter 
III is one of the first papers attempt to examine the effect of external liberalization on regional and 
provincial economic growth recently. However, this dissertation shows some weaknesses. The 
2005-2015 period for the empirical part in Chapter II and Chapter III may not be long enough for 
the accurate consideration of the comprehensive reforms and structure changes over thirty years 
in Vietnam.  
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APPENDICES  
Table A.I. 1. Country Listings of Chapter I 
  
Country Listings 
Country Developing Countries Country Developed Countries 
1 Argentina 16 Australia 
2 Brazil 17 Austria 
3 Chile 18 Canada 
4 China 19 Finland 
5 Colombia 20 France 
6 Costa Rica 21 Germany 
7 Dominican Republic 22 Ireland 
8 Hong Kong 23 Italy 
9 Iran 24 Japan 
10 Mexico 25 Netherlands 
11 Paraguay 26 New Zealand 
12 Philippines 27 Spain 
13 Republic of Korea 28 Sweden 
14 Singapore 29 United Kingdom 
15 Thailand 30 United States 
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Table A.I. 2. Results of OLS Regression: Laborshare1, Laborshare2, Laborshare3, 
Laborhsare4 and Kaopen Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare4 
Kaopen_index 0.00166 -0.0203*** -0.0270*** -0.0125** 
(0.00313) (0.00527) (0.00553) (0.00591) 
logGDPpcpt 0.0492 -0.768*** -0.458*** 0.275** 
(0.0595) (0.0914) (0.0968) (0.129) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt -0.00187 0.0393*** 0.0228*** -0.0137** 
(0.00318) (0.00491) (0.00514) (0.00649) 
Trade_Openness 0.000102** 2.93e-05 1.48e-05 -0.000191 
(4.03e-05) (5.55e-05) (5.79e-05) (0.000133) 
Govshare 0.00931*** 0.00270** 0.00586*** 0.00696*** 
(0.000738) (0.00123) (0.00128) (0.00111) 
Unemrate -0.000203 0.00213* 0.000413 0.000719 
(0.000675) (0.00116) (0.00119) (0.00101) 
Patent_A 2.25e-07*** 3.24e-07*** 1.92e-07*** 1.59e-07*** 
(3.48e-08) (4.85e-08) (4.24e-08) (3.08e-08) 
Logpop16_60 0.00315 0.00356 0.00604 -0.00336 
(0.00374) (0.00376) (0.00381) (0.00316) 
Linear_lamrig -0.0171*** -0.00886 -0.0289*** -0.0408*** 
(0.00511) (0.00908) (0.00843) (0.00462) 
Constant 0.00680 4.235*** 2.840*** -0.855 
 (0.276) (0.426) (0.455) (0.635) 
Observations 709 309 388 369 
R-squared 0.465 0.586 0.487 0.323 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 3. Results of OLS Regression: Laborshare1, Laborshare2, Laborshare3, 
Laborhsare4 and FO1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare4 
FO1 -0.000204 -0.00705*** -0.00707*** -0.00406*** 
(0.00102) (0.00126) (0.00123) (0.00141) 
logGDPpcpt 0.0432 -0.970*** -0.659*** 0.121 
(0.0629) (0.0939) (0.0931) (0.138) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt -0.00142 0.0498*** 0.0329*** -0.00589 
(0.00340) (0.00514) (0.00504) (0.00710) 
Trade_Openness 0.000113* 0.000265*** 0.000217*** -0.000294** 
(5.87e-05) (7.53e-05) (7.91e-05) (0.000131) 
Govshare 0.00932*** 0.00163 0.00433*** 0.00725*** 
(0.000739) (0.00120) (0.00125) (0.00117) 
Unemrate -0.000186 0.00302*** 0.000826 0.000148 
(0.000696) (0.00113) (0.00120) (0.00105) 
Patent_A 2.24e-07*** 3.09e-07*** 1.63e-07*** 1.13e-07*** 
 (3.81e-08) (4.95e-08) (4.37e-08) (3.32e-08) 
Logpop16_60 0.00355 0.00154 0.00378 -0.00440 
(0.00378) (0.00424) (0.00438) (0.00337) 
Linear_lamrig -0.0178*** -0.00745 -0.0267*** -0.0421*** 
(0.00512) (0.00930) (0.00869) (0.00501) 
Constant 0.0257 5.185*** 3.819*** -0.0925 
 (0.288) (0.432) (0.429) (0.676) 
Observations 686 309 388 356 
R-squared 0.464 0.590 0.467 0.318 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 4. Results of OLS Regression: Laborshare1, Laborshare2, Laborshare3, 
Laborhsare4 and FO2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare4 
FO2 -0.00299 -0.0106*** -0.0127*** -0.0305*** 
(0.00247) (0.00384) (0.00431) (0.00555) 
logGDPpcpt 0.0330 -0.881*** -0.583*** 0.0386 
(0.0617) (0.0898) (0.0932) (0.143) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt -0.000774 0.0446*** 0.0285*** -0.00126 
(0.00332) (0.00488) (0.00504) (0.00737) 
Trade_Openness 0.000152*** 0.000173** 0.000156* -1.58e-05 
(5.52e-05) (7.61e-05) (8.13e-05) (0.000137) 
Govshare 0.00924*** 0.00241** 0.00488*** 0.00744*** 
(0.000741) (0.00120) (0.00126) (0.00113) 
Unemrate -8.17e-05 0.00266** 0.000637 1.45e-05 
(0.000695) (0.00115) (0.00122) (0.00102) 
Patent_A 2.18e-07*** 3.19e-07*** 1.84e-07*** 9.22e-08*** 
(3.72e-08) (5.02e-08) (4.37e-08) (3.28e-08) 
Logpop16_60 0.00391 0.00280 0.00432 -0.00321 
(0.00378) (0.00418) (0.00431) (0.00313) 
Linear_lamrig -0.0181*** -0.00723 -0.0251*** -0.0438*** 
(0.00507) (0.00940) (0.00864) (0.00485) 
Constant 0.0628 4.793*** 3.486*** 0.259 
 (0.284) (0.415) (0.430) (0.697) 
Observations 686 309 388 356 
R-squared 0.465 0.575 0.455 0.346 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 5. Results of OLS Regression for Developing and Developed Countries Panels: Laborhsare1, Laborshare2, 
Laborshare3, Laborshare4 and Kaopen index 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare4 laborshare4 
Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed 
Kaopen_index 
  
-0.00814 -0.000609 -0.0129* -0.0310*** -0.0272*** -0.0250*** -0.0207*** -0.00999*** 
(0.00507) (0.00294) (0.00719) (0.00347) (0.00757) (0.00372) (0.00602) (0.00294) 
logGDPpcpt 
  
-0.319*** 0.219** -1.165*** 0.371* -1.038*** 0.654*** -0.617 -0.136 
(0.107) (0.0872) (0.216) (0.205) (0.184) (0.188) (0.562) (0.119) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.0192*** -0.0120*** 0.0593*** -0.0189* 0.0536*** -0.0338*** 0.0314 0.00517 
(0.00622) (0.00432) (0.0128) (0.0100) (0.0109) (0.00919) (0.0321) (0.00590) 
Trade_Openness 
  
8.32e-05 -0.000363*** 8.03e-05 -0.000455*** -6.36e-05 -0.000419*** -0.00346*** 0.000201** 
(7.10e-05) (6.24e-05) (0.000125) (0.000109) (0.000127) (9.75e-05) (0.000867) (9.68e-05) 
Govshare 
  
0.00911*** 0.00591*** 0.00523* -0.00272*** 0.00399 0.00251*** 0.000862 -0.00178* 
(0.00191) (0.000530) (0.00273) (0.000922) (0.00263) (0.000948) (0.00221) (0.000946) 
Unemrate 
  
-0.00104 -0.00408*** -0.00125 -0.00105 -0.00399* -2.16e-05 0.000993 -0.00170** 
(0.00150) (0.000469) (0.00183) (0.000862) (0.00206) (0.000723) (0.00276) (0.000850) 
Patent_A 
  
4.63e-07*** -1.03e-08 9.83e-07*** 6.00e-08** 9.75e-07*** 2.33e-08 6.02e-06** -1.65e-08 
(9.41e-08) (2.33e-08) (2.85e-07) (2.92e-08) (3.26e-07) (2.55e-08) (2.31e-06) (2.44e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
  
-0.0172** 0.0212*** -0.0188** 0.0202*** -0.0204** 0.0188*** -0.0882*** 0.0155*** 
(0.00708) (0.00209) (0.00791) (0.00313) (0.00803) (0.00265) (0.0245) (0.00218) 
Linear_lamrig 
  
-0.0215* -0.00227 -0.0470*** 0.0120** -0.0631*** -0.000195 0.102*** -0.0113*** 
(0.0120) (0.00298) (0.0158) (0.00524) (0.0178) (0.00448) (0.0225) (0.00328) 
Constant 
  
1.663*** -0.600 6.254*** -1.193 5.699*** -2.589*** 3.712 1.451** 
(0.457) (0.439) (0.911) (1.040) (0.774) (0.961) (2.522) (0.598) 
Observations 277 432 128 181 142 246 82 287 
R-squared 0.287 0.546 0.800 0.740 0.733 0.614 0.620 0.549 
Country_code 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 6. Results of OLS Regression for Developing and Developed Countries Panels: Laborshare1, Laborshare2, 
Laborhshare3, Laborshare4 and FO1 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare4 laborshare4 
Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed 
FO1 
  
0.00804*** -0.00130** 0.00209 -0.00221* 0.00258 -0.00139 -0.0165 -0.00139 
(0.00198) (0.000640) (0.00225) (0.00125) (0.00255) (0.000938) (0.0207) (0.00118) 
logGDPpcpt 
  
-0.229** 0.196** -1.117*** -0.313 -0.897*** 0.111 -0.645 -0.331** 
(0.114) (0.0898) (0.228) (0.247) (0.202) (0.193) (0.831) (0.136) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.0132** -0.0107** 0.0555*** 0.0146 0.0434*** -0.00724 0.0315 0.0147** 
(0.00669) (0.00452) (0.0134) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.00951) (0.0485) (0.00676) 
Trade_Openness 
  
-0.000228* -0.000283*** 1.34e-06 -0.000421** -0.000170 -0.000429*** -0.00373*** 8.66e-05 
(0.000121) (6.98e-05) (0.000170) (0.000164) (0.000178) (0.000125) (0.000968) (9.22e-05) 
Govshare 
  
0.0106*** 0.00570*** 0.00607** -0.00339*** 0.00514** 0.00208** 0.00255 -0.00145 
(0.00198) (0.000552) (0.00266) (0.00106) (0.00259) (0.00100) (0.00306) (0.00110) 
Unemrate 
  
-0.00278* -0.00422*** -0.00147 -0.00123 -0.00440** -0.000214 -0.000889 -0.00256*** 
(0.00159) (0.000480) (0.00192) (0.000975) (0.00222) (0.000787) (0.00359) (0.000915) 
Patent_A 
  
5.26e-07*** -2.00e-08 1.21e-06*** 5.03e-08 1.49e-06*** 9.18e-09 6.50e-06** -5.02e-08* 
(1.11e-07) (2.48e-08) (2.50e-07) (3.18e-08) (3.10e-07) (2.70e-08) (3.06e-06) (2.64e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
  
-0.0187** 0.0220*** -0.0235*** 0.0194*** -0.0307*** 0.0186*** -0.112*** 0.0163*** 
(0.00739) (0.00222) (0.00771) (0.00352) (0.00861) (0.00302) (0.0305) (0.00233) 
Linear_lamrig 
  
-0.0203* -0.00252 -0.0454*** 0.0230*** -0.0641*** 0.00734 0.0885*** -0.00891** 
(0.0122) (0.00292) (0.0159) (0.00556) (0.0189) (0.00486) (0.0228) (0.00344) 
Constant 
  
1.342*** -0.490 6.126*** 2.241* 5.265*** 0.140 4.066 2.431*** 
(0.489) (0.446) (0.962) (1.250) (0.848) (0.989) (3.598) (0.684) 
Observations 268 418 128 181 142 246 80 276 
R-squared 0.305 0.558 0.795 0.679 0.704 0.575 0.579 0.544 
Country_code 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 7. Results of OLS Regression for Developing and Developed Countries Panels: laborshare1, laborshare2, 
laborhshare3, laborshare4 and FO2 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
laborshare1 laborshare1 laborshare2 laborshare2 laborshare3 laborshare3 laborshare4 laborshare4 
Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed 
FO2 
  
0.00756*** -0.00779*** 0.00825** -0.0121*** -0.00951*** -0.00951*** -0.0725 -0.00984** 
(0.00251) (0.00226) (0.00344) (0.00310) (0.00252) (0.00252) (0.0534) (0.00395) 
logGDPpcpt 
  
-0.286** 0.170* -1.107*** -0.421* 0.0224 0.0224 -0.510 -0.343** 
(0.114) (0.0896) (0.225) (0.239) (0.187) (0.187) (0.771) (0.134) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 
  
0.0168** -0.00925** 0.0548*** 0.0202* -0.00258 -0.00258 0.0240 0.0155** 
(0.00668) (0.00452) (0.0133) (0.0118) (0.00919) (0.00919) (0.0450) (0.00662) 
Trade_Openness 
  
-6.55e-05 -0.000186** -6.38e-05 -0.000292** -0.000290*** -0.000290*** -0.00330*** 0.000165* 
(9.48e-05) (7.56e-05) (0.000145) (0.000145) (0.000106) (0.000106) (0.000958) (8.82e-05) 
Govshare 
  
0.00985*** 0.00549*** 0.00646** -0.00378*** 0.00173* 0.00173* 0.00418 -0.00109 
(0.00195) (0.000542) (0.00265) (0.00100) (0.000985) (0.000985) (0.00288) (0.00110) 
Unemrate 
  
-0.00209 -0.00419*** -0.00209 -0.00119 -0.000201 -0.000201 -0.00129 -0.00273*** 
(0.00164) (0.000475) (0.00189) (0.000946) (0.000763) (0.000763) (0.00341) (0.000891) 
Patent_A 
  
5.08e-07*** -2.44e-08 1.20e-06*** 4.56e-08 4.09e-09 4.09e-09 7.76e-06** -5.40e-08** 
(1.06e-07) (2.49e-08) (2.47e-07) (3.14e-08) (2.64e-08) (2.64e-08) (3.47e-06) (2.63e-08) 
Logpop16_60 
  
-0.0190** 0.0222*** -0.0260*** 0.0185*** 0.0183*** 0.0183*** -0.124*** 0.0166*** 
(0.00785) (0.00219) (0.00778) (0.00343) (0.00293) (0.00293) (0.0369) (0.00220) 
Linear_lamrig 
  
-0.0233* -0.00303 -0.0460*** 0.0222*** 0.00599 0.00599 0.0858*** -0.00994*** 
(0.0121) (0.00290) (0.0157) (0.00536) (0.00470) (0.00470) (0.0216) (0.00342) 
Constant 
  
1.572*** -0.378 6.100*** 2.756** 0.567 0.567 3.486 2.464*** 
(0.487) (0.444) (0.951) (1.210) (0.957) (0.957) (3.338) (0.674) 
Observations 268 418 128 181 246 246 80 276 
R-squared 0.284 0.565 0.800 0.696 0.587 0.587 0.584 0.552 
Country_code 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 8. Correlation of Capital Account Openness and Self-employed Income Share 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES selfincome selfincome selfincome 
Kaopen_index 0.00351   
(0.00217)   
logGDPpcpt -0.493*** -0.473*** -0.429*** 
(0.0440) (0.0493) (0.0467) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 0.0241*** 0.0231*** 0.0207*** 
(0.00228) (0.00259) (0.00245) 
Trade_Openness -0.000400*** -0.000410*** -0.000584*** 
(8.14e-05) (8.77e-05) (0.000101) 
Govshare -0.00773*** -0.00790*** -0.00770*** 
(0.00130) (0.00131) (0.00129) 
Unemrate 0.00314*** 0.00331*** 0.00337*** 
(0.000658) (0.000664) (0.000647) 
Patent_A -3.61e-07** -3.68e-07*** -3.54e-07** 
(1.40e-07) (1.41e-07) (1.38e-07) 
Logpop16_60 0.0683 0.0678 0.0601 
(0.0414) (0.0425) (0.0410) 
Linear_lamrig 0.0178*** 0.0165*** 0.0154*** 
(0.00535) (0.00532) (0.00525) 
FO1  0.000419  
 (0.000794)  
FO2   0.00569*** 
  (0.00184) 
Constant 2.526*** 2.427*** 2.260*** 
 (0.225) (0.236) (0.230) 
Observations 309 309 309 
R-squared 0.542 0.538 0.553 
Number of Country_name1 23 23 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 9. Correlation of Capital Account Openness and Self-employed Income Share for 
Developing and Developed Countries 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
selfincome selfincome selfincome selfincome selfincome selfincome 
Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed 
Kaopen_index 0.00438 -0.0101***     
(0.00379) (0.00223)     
logGDPpcpt -0.682*** -0.299*** -0.645*** -0.494*** -0.624*** -0.479*** 
 (0.127) (0.0933) (0.125) (0.0963) (0.124) (0.0937) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt 0.0363*** 0.0143*** 0.0350*** 0.0239*** 0.0334*** 0.0232*** 
 (0.00748) (0.00455) (0.00734) (0.00471) (0.00729) (0.00458) 
Trade_Openness -0.000314** -0.000185 -0.000513*** -0.000485*** -0.000691*** -0.000495*** 
 (0.000130) (0.000116) (0.000147) (0.000102) (0.000173) (0.000105) 
Govshare -0.0138*** -0.00302*** -0.0146*** -0.00393*** -0.0137*** -0.00394*** 
 (0.00299) (0.00105) (0.00291) (0.00110) (0.00287) (0.00111) 
Unemrate 0.00762*** 0.00157*** 0.00831*** 0.00137*** 0.00723*** 0.00141*** 
 (0.00223) (0.000388) (0.00214) (0.000417) (0.00213) (0.000414) 
Patent_A -8.35e-07** -5.47e-07*** -8.77e-07** -4.59e-07*** -8.47e-07** -4.55e-07*** 
 (4.00e-07) (9.01e-08) (3.87e-07) (9.34e-08) (3.82e-07) (9.32e-08) 
Logpop16_60 0.0288 -0.00668 0.00697 -0.00925 0.0476 -0.0142 
(0.0666) (0.0395) (0.0661) (0.0435) (0.0641) (0.0434) 
Linear_lamrig 0.0503*** -0.000110 0.0508*** 0.00268 0.0471*** 0.00267 
 (0.0126) (0.00317) (0.0123) (0.00330) (0.0122) (0.00331) 
FO1   0.00435** -0.000264   
   (0.00182) (0.000505)   
FO2     0.00972*** -0.000168 
     (0.00324) (0.00145) 
Constant 3.354*** 1.739*** 3.224*** 2.746*** 3.054*** 2.685*** 
 (0.528) (0.488) (0.521) (0.489) (0.521) (0.480) 
Observations 128 181 128 181 128 181 
R-squared 0.626 0.674 0.640 0.633 0.650 0.632 
Number of 
Country_name1 
11 12 11 12 11 12 
Fe yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country_code 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.I. 10. Correlation of Capital Account Openness and Unemployment Rate 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Unemrate Unemrate Unemrate Unemrate 
Kaopen_index 0.402*** 0.376* 0.247 1.064*** 
(0.117) (0.201) (0.182) (0.147) 
logGDPpcpt 2.539* 1.274 2.484 -8.429** 
(1.492) (4.286) (3.543) (4.221) 
sqrtlogGDPpcpt -0.274*** -0.297 -0.351* 0.279 
(0.0788) (0.218) (0.183) (0.216) 
Trade_Openness 0.00193 0.00915 0.00852 -0.0199 
(0.00417) (0.00763) (0.00688) (0.0128) 
Govshare 0.760*** 0.726*** 0.639*** 0.603*** 
(0.0541) (0.111) (0.0797) (0.0672) 
Patent_A 7.64e-06*** 1.73e-05 1.12e-05*** 8.61e-06*** 
(2.09e-06) (1.29e-05) (3.97e-06) (2.49e-06) 
Logpop16_60 2.701* -2.490 -0.123 -0.663 
 (1.398) (3.782) (3.267) (2.451) 
Linear_lamrig -0.169 0.0564 0.257 0.356 
(0.280) (0.491) (0.425) (0.356) 
laborshare1 -15.06***    
(2.719)    
laborshare2  1.002   
 (3.803)   
laborshare3   1.365  
  (3.196)  
laborshare4    -8.702*** 
   (3.094) 
Constant -7.635 15.64 3.194 57.53** 
(7.505) (22.85) (19.77) (23.13) 
Observations 709 309 388 369 
R-squared 0.309 0.373 0.364 0.387 
Number of 
Country_name1 
29 23 26 17 
Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.II. 1. Monthly Average Income Per Capita at Current Prices by Income Source 
 
Year 2010 2012 2014 
Types Total 
Salary 
& 
wage 
AFF25 Non-AFF Others Total 
Salary 
& 
wage 
AFF Non-AFF Others Total 
Salary 
& 
wage 
AFF Non-AFF Others 
Whole Country 1387 622 279 328 158 2000 923 397 442 238 2637 1253 458 591 335 
Red River Delta 1580 798 189 392 201 2351 1216 275 556 304 3265 1733 327 738 467 
Ha Noi 2013 1165 109 467 273 2945 1741 169 657 378 4113 2537 226 767 583 
Vinh Phuc 1232 519 256 317 140 1867 784 373 517 193 2378 1089 342 645 302 
Bac Ninh 1646 560 190 707 189 2502 875 256 1089 281 3512 1178 299 1641 394 
Quang Ninh 1787 895 176 533 183 2557 1367 224 626 340 3053 1580 308 795 370 
Hai Duong 1306 600 258 286 163 2047 996 377 415 259 2755 1289 433 651 382 
Hai Phong 1694 958 115 418 204 2526 1278 197 590 461 3923 2002 314 862 745 
Hung Yen 1199 522 261 275 141 1803 785 412 445 161 2192 998 429 492 273 
Thai Binh 1129 518 251 216 143 1729 878 368 299 184 2469 1214 384 476 395 
Ha Nam 1150 470 264 248 168 1754 710 374 440 230 2198 917 389 544 348 
Nam Dinh 1237 477 286 322 153 1791 769 379 423 220 2816 1280 446 718 372 
Ninh Binh 1202 498 264 280 160 1696 762 355 289 290 2215 1092 437 386 300 
Northern midlands and 
mountain areas 905 359 314 146 86 1258 536 406 197 119 1613 707 471 283 152 
Ha Giang 610 193 317 61 38 850 274 440 76 60 1121 367 507 157 90 
Cao Bang 749 312 293 83 61 1054 453 402 112 87 1252 590 403 112 147 
Bac Kan 776 266 311 135 65 1142 313 481 290 58 1216 410 500 220 86 
Tuyen Quang 887 348 344 125 70 1162 472 410 194 86 1571 683 498 243 147 
Lao Cai 819 345 324 105 45 1085 527 311 183 64 1468 644 411 345 68 
Yen Bai 844 373 273 119 79 1114 520 326 187 81 1386 590 421 262 113 
Thai Nguyen 1149 504 282 253 110 1747 869 397 350 132 2238 1087 473 526 152 
Lang Son 929 367 342 169 52 1212 475 468 202 68 1437 635 494 214 94 
                                                          
25 AFF is agriculture, forestry & fishery 
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Bac Giang 1103 406 344 196 157 1568 668 473 235 192 2174 995 550 378 251 
Phu Tho 1126 519 228 244 135 1579 754 311 294 219 1954 940 389 327 298 
Dien Bien 611 196 306 61 48 819 364 323 52 80 1200 450 420 235 95 
Lai Chau 567 205 255 59 48 758 237 337 120 64 987 373 390 137 87 
Son La 802 224 444 86 48 1020 257 541 108 113 1178 400 565 149 64 
Hoa Binh 829 379 286 85 79 1219 570 404 136 110 1598 707 459 279 153 
Northern Central area 
and Central coastal 
area 
1018 442 231 229 116 1505 679 320 343 163 1982 923 379 440 240 
Thanh Hoa 840 364 245 151 81 1207 545 294 248 120 1635 831 368 251 185 
Nghe An 920 391 246 136 147 1367 564 351 240 212 1583 657 367 307 252 
Ha Tinh 840 336 214 147 142 1299 554 364 238 143 1810 831 372 320 287 
Quang Binh 950 447 201 168 135 1410 735 268 227 180 1837 939 313 386 199 
Quang Tri 951 381 257 232 80 1300 521 390 231 158 1673 732 370 380 191 
Thua Thien-Hue 1058 439 174 342 104 1747 834 221 496 196 2175 993 263 672 247 
Da Nang 1897 1106 62 507 223 2865 1507 75 904 379 3612 1954 41 1186 431 
Quang  Nam 935 411 213 205 107 1376 649 288 306 133 1784 885 337 379 183 
Quang  Ngai 909 350 200 262 97 1300 571 239 356 134 1619 734 295 389 201 
Binh Dinh 1150 429 272 329 119 1719 717 414 447 141 2346 1005 531 509 301 
Phu Yen 1013 398 302 228 86 1440 650 402 309 79 1979 833 640 362 144 
Khanh  Hoa 1258 650 217 269 121 1896 961 278 468 189 2670 1452 258 616 344 
Ninh  Thuan 947 361 228 278 81 1637 722 403 366 146 2331 897 536 677 221 
Binh Thuan 1160 430 335 287 108 1747 667 504 431 145 2395 891 736 564 204 
Central Highlands 1088 334 470 217 67 1643 497 759 294 94 2008 678 863 350 117 
Kon Tum 947 384 307 186 70 1294 604 363 258 69 1587 710 445 294 138 
Gia Lai 1027 360 386 229 52 1563 483 659 341 80 1760 661 699 318 82 
Dak Lak 1068 312 496 193 67 1639 483 817 241 98 1988 600 937 332 119 
Dak Nong 1039 207 652 141 38 1611 372 994 179 66 1824 466 1064 207 87 
Lam Dong 1257 372 508 282 95 1848 537 824 367 120 2499 878 982 485 154 
South East 2304 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3173 1709 361 725 377 4125 2247 344 1022 512 
Binh Phuoc 1526 514 641 270 101 2218 802 1003 313 100 2693 998 1076 469 150 
Tay Ninh 1435 494 516 312 113 2100 886 616 431 167 2796 1155 584 754 303 
Binh Duong 2698 1100 710 753 135 3568 1514 1109 774 171 3769 1773 825 937 234 
Dong Nai 1763 862 301 398 203 2577 1247 432 635 263 3504 1742 488 882 392 
Ba Ria - Vung Tau 1695 875 217 442 161 2904 1580 408 623 293 3752 1647 535 1245 325 
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Ho Chi Minh city 2737 1613 30 745 348 3653 2205 21 870 557 4840 2925 37 1161 717 
Mekong River Delta 1247 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1797 598 539 402 257 2327 783 674 528 342 
Long An 1289 520 369 230 170 1956 813 569 335 239 2430 1035 633 447 315 
Tien Giang 1313 440 369 331 172 1941 773 493 404 271 2596 1049 656 560 331 
Ben Tre 1200 348 353 318 180 1580 505 522 363 190 2162 705 649 442 366 
Tra Vinh 1089 313 373 258 144 1398 433 377 266 322 2098 739 703 361 295 
Vinh Long 1239 377 357 319 186 1744 601 446 400 297 2205 802 593 418 392 
Dong Thap 1138 382 356 243 158 1666 536 539 377 214 2134 741 661 439 293 
An Giang 1319 406 378 417 118 1871 546 498 548 279 2472 738 572 771 391 
Kien  Giang 1316 441 408 294 173 1963 641 656 396 270 2642 795 828 571 448 
Can Tho 1540 642 282 436 180 2325 933 411 620 361 2673 1074 359 895 345 
Hau Giang 1098 332 343 259 164 1527 445 483 285 314 2088 482 633 541 432 
Soc Trang 1029 289 427 229 84 1324 421 445 317 141 1913 582 648 436 247 
Bac Lieu 1273 304 580 227 162 2035 406 992 393 244 2214 515 1093 339 267 
Ca Mau 1250 315 531 245 159 1779 502 673 366 238 2154 564 914 388 288 
Source: GSO, unit: thousand Vietnamese Dong 
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Table A.II. 2. Labor Productivity by Industry 
 
Year 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
TOTAL 21.4 25.3 32 37.9 44 55.2 63.1 68.7 74.7 79.4 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 7.5 9.7 13.6 14.1 16.3 22.3 25.6 26.4 28.6 30.6 
Manufacturing 34.2 42.7 50.1 51.3 42 53.2 60.7 65.8 70 71 
Construction 26.9 33.6 38.8 42.5 42.7 48.5 53.4 55.6 60.7 66.5 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 24.3 31.2 40.9 46.7 31.1 40.3 47.4 51.7 58.3 63.4 
Transportation and storage 21.7 29.1 35.4 38.8 43.8 55.9 62.2 67 73.2 71.9 
Accommodation and food service activities 35.6 41 43.6 42.8 45.5 51.1 55.3 60.7 64.2 63.7 
Information and communication 66 76.3 85.9 84.9 77.3 78.4 80.3 82.8 84.9 87 
Financial, banking and insurance activities 257.3 84 103.3 435.6 457.8 493 547.7 581.9 588.2 631.1 
Real estate activities 3232.2 541 699.8 1769.2 1300 1370.6 1204.8 1263.6 1278.6 1284.7 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 82 107.2 117.6 111.2 128.8 160.4 166.5 190.2 204.2 220.7 
Administrative and support service activities 32.3 34.7 40.8 41.6 42.5 50.8 51.3 55 56.3 56.6 
Activities of Communist Party, socio-political 
organizations; public administration and 
defense; compulsory security 
13.7 18.8 25 29.5 35.2 45.5 51.9 57.9 62.5 66.9 
Education and training 21.4 23 25.6 27 30 38.3 47.6 58 64.9 72.1 
Human health and social work activities 35 41.5 51.8 58.3 53.4 55.2 69.2 119.5 134.4 133.8 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 76.9 70.2 61.6 61.9 62.8 67.3 73 78.1 80.7 84.6 
Other service activities 17.9 25.6 37 51.1 50 59 68.5 76.9 85.6 90 
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Activities of households as employers; 
undifferentiated goods and services producing 
activities of households for own use 
7.5 11 15.6 15.8 15 20.5 25.4 28.7 32.9 35.9 
Source: Author’s computation from GSO’s website: https://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=774, last updated: 10/10/2017 
Unit: Millions Dong/Person  
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Table A.III. 1. Monthly Average Income Per Capita at Current Prices by Regions and 
Province 
 
Year 2010 Thous.VND 
2012 
Thous.VND 
2014 
Thous.VND 
Whole Country 1387 2000 2637 
Red River Delta 1580 2351 3265 
Ha Noi 2013 2945 4113 
Vinh Phuc 1232 1867 2378 
Bac Ninh 1646 2502 3512 
Quang Ninh 1787 2557 3053 
Hai Duong 1306 2047 2755 
Hai Phong 1694 2526 3923 
Hung Yen 1199 1803 2192 
Thai Binh 1129 1729 2469 
Ha Nam 1150 1754 2198 
Nam Dinh 1237 1791 2816 
Ninh Binh 1202 1696 2215 
Northern midlands and mountain areas 905 1258 1613 
Ha Giang 610 850 1121 
Cao Bang 749 1054 1252 
Bac Kan 776 1142 1216 
Tuyen Quang 887 1162 1571 
Lao Cai 819 1085 1468 
Yen Bai 844 1114 1386 
Thai Nguyen 1149 1747 2238 
Lang Son 929 1212 1437 
Bac Giang 1103 1568 2174 
Phu Tho 1126 1579 1954 
Dien Bien 611 819 1200 
Lai Chau 567 758 987 
Son La 802 1020 1178 
Hoa Binh 829 1219 1598 
Northern Central area and Central coastal 
area 
1018 1505 1982 
Thanh Hoa 840 1207 1635 
Nghe An 920 1367 1583 
Ha Tinh 840 1299 1810 
Quang Binh 950 1410 1837 
Quang Tri 951 1300 1673 
Thua Thien-Hue 1058 1747 2175 
Da Nang 1897 2865 3612 
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Quang  Nam 935 1376 1784 
Quang  Ngai 909 1300 1619 
Binh Dinh 1150 1719 2346 
Phu Yen 1013 1440 1979 
Khanh  Hoa 1258 1896 2670 
Ninh  Thuan 947 1637 2331 
Binh Thuan 1160 1747 2395 
Central Highlands 1088 1643 2008 
Kon Tum 947 1294 1587 
Gia Lai 1027 1563 1760 
Dak Lak 1068 1639 1988 
Dak Nong 1039 1611 1824 
Lam Dong 1257 1848 2499 
South East 2304 3173 4125 
Binh Phuoc 1526 2218 2693 
Tay Ninh 1435 2100 2796 
Binh Duong 2698 3568 3769 
Dong Nai 1763 2577 3504 
Ba Ria - Vung Tau 1695 2904 3752 
Ho Chi Minh city 2737 3653 4840 
Mekong River Delta 1247 1797 2327 
Long An 1289 1956 2430 
Tien Giang 1313 1941 2596 
Ben Tre 1200 1580 2162 
Tra Vinh 1089 1398 2098 
Vinh Long 1239 1744 2205 
Dong Thap 1138 1666 2134 
An Giang 1319 1871 2472 
Kien  Giang 1316 1963 2642 
Can Tho 1540 2325 2673 
Hau Giang 1098 1527 2088 
Soc Trang 1029 1324 1913 
Bac Lieu 1273 2035 2214 
Ca Mau 1250 1779 2154 
Source: GSO  
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Table A.III. 2. Descriptive Statistics for Economic Growth Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
N Mean SD Min Max 
PCI 641 57.21 5.969 36.39 77.20 
logGDP 674 3.238 1.186 0.104 8.341 
logEXR 2,852 6.184 4.171 0 9.985 
logpop 1,319 7.199 0.918 4.988 11.44 
logFDI 674 6.244 2.238 1.386 12.54 
logGIO 991 7.455 1.680 2.868 13.73 
logEDU 867 10.63 0.862 8.977 14.94 
 
Table A.III. 3. Descriptive Statistics for Industrial Production Model: Annual Data 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) N Mean SD Min Max 
EXR 2,944 8,609 7,919 1 21,698 
Pop 1,319 3,738 12,818 146.6 92,618 
Exgso 467 1,944 11,183 0 132,033 
Imgso 466 2,475 12,401 0 132,033 
GIO 1,025 16,023 65,357 17.60 920,371 
EDU 867 101,275 369,178 7,920 3.075e+06 
Law 2,944 0.239 0.427 0 1 
Lib 2,944 0.435 0.496 0 1 
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Table A.III. 4. Descriptive Statistics for Industrial Performance Model: Monthly Data 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) N Mean SD Min Max 
Exportusd 654 1,673 1,400 110 8,460 
Importusd 639 2,031 1,699 153 8,930 
FDIusd 865 1,079 5,004 0 60,271 
IPIvnd 1,323 57,107 95,333 277.5 794,202 
Exrate 1,323 15,770 1,294 12,292 20,813 
Law 1,323 0.322 0.467 0 1 
WTO 1,323 0.213 0.410 0 1 
 
 
 
 
